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OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGY OF CASE
REPORTING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Susan W. Brenner*
INTRODUCTION
There is no magic in parchment or in wax.'
Eighteenth century lawyers and judges used parchment and wax to me-
morialize their legal precedents.' This article is a sociological inquiry into
the means that we use to memorialize our legal precedents and into the
consequences that attend such memorialization. The inquiry analyzes rules
that differentiate as to the precedential status of judicial decisions depending
upon whether they have been "published," i.e., reduced to printed form
and issued in bound volumes by law reporting services.
Such rules are known generically as "limited publication provisions." The
empirical parameters of these provisions have been the subject of several
law review articles.3 This, however, is not another of those articles. Rather,
this Article uses limited publication provisions as the occasion for examining
the evolution of our assumptions about legal precedent and the extent to
which those assumptions are likely to change with the availability of com-
puterized research techniques. It focuses upon the peculiar empirical phe-
nomenon that courts ostensibly adhere to limited publication policies while
releasing "unpublished" decisions to legal databases such as LEXIS and
WESTLAW. One would assume that decisions released to such databases
are available for perusal and citation as precedent. That the former assump-
tion is true, while the latter is not, illustrates how certain of our assumptions
about the nature of "precedent" are being propelled into obsolescence by
the proliferation of computer technologies.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law, Dayton, Ohio.
1. Master v. Miller, 2 Rev. Rep. 339, 403 (1791).
2. A "precedent" is "[aln adjudged case or decision of a court of justice, considered as
furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1340 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Case reports are "the production of an adequate
record of a judicial decision on a point of law ... for the subsequent citation as a precedent."
M. PRICE & H. BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 93 (1953) (quoting C. MORAN, THE
HEiA.LDS OF THE LAW (1948)). It is important to remember that there is a distinction between
"case reports" and "precedents." Although a case report will almost certainly constitute a
precedent, even though that precedent may have been overruled or otherwise invalidated,
precedents are not confined to decisions that have been reduced to case reports. This proposition
is elucidated in section III, infra.
3. See infra section I(C)(4).
OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT
In theoretical terms, this Article is a venture into the sociology of knowl-
edge. Although it resists facile characterization, it is accurate to say that the
sociology of knowledge explores "the relationship between human thought
and the social context within which it arises." ' 4 According to this perspective,
what we experience as a "society" is simply a sociological artifact consisting
of the accumulated knowledge, or "understandings," and behavioral routines
of a particular historical population.5 And what is true of "society" is true
of the "institutions" that comprise a particular society. 6 In this perspective,
therefore, a particular social institution exists because it has accumulated a
particular stock of knowledge and a particular inventory of behaviors, or
roles, over a period of time. An institution assumes at least a patina of
objective reality because the individuals who are indoctrinated with this stock
of knowledge and who come to assume those roles believe in the existence
of that institution.
The sociology of knowledge can be used to generate broad, macro-level
theories about the structure and behaviors of particular societies, 7 or it can
provide the basis for microsociological inquiry into the constitutive processes
of particular segments of a society. Specifically, it can provide a framework
for analyzing the behaviors that sustain and transform social institutions.'
One variety of microsociological inquiry is known as "ethnomethodology. '"9
4. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 4 (1966). "The
sociology of knowledge understands human reality as socially constructed reality." Id. at 189.
5. See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY LIFE (1971); T. LUCKMANN, PE-
NOMENOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY (1978); A. PODGORECKI, W. KAUPEN, J. VAN HOUTTE, P. VINKE
& B. KUTCHINSKY, KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW (1973); A. PODGORECKI & C. WHELAN,
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LAW (1981). In this perspective:
[S]ocial rules and their meanings are created in interaction. Thus even if to the
lawyer law seems fixed as a positive code or collection of rules, in reality . .. it
operates through the negotiation of meanings in interaction between police and
suspect, probation officer and delinquent, lawyer and client; negotiations which fix
numerous informal rules about appropriate behavior and expectations which deter-
mine the 'real' effects and meaning of the formal rules in the law books.
R. COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 156-57 (1984); see also Van Zandt, Commonsense
Reasoning, Social Change, and the Law, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 894 (1987).
6. See infra section I(B)(I).
7. See, e.g., K. MARx, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 48-90 (C. Arthur ed. 1947).
8. See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Van Zandt, supra note 5, at 894; see also section I(B)(l),
infra.
9. See, e.g., A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1976); R.
COTTERRELL, supra note 5, at 156-57; H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967);
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420-24 (1956);
see generally Cotterrell, Professional Autonomy and the Construction of Professional Knowl-
edge: Sociology in the Professional Practice of Law and Medicine, in I DEVELOPMENT AND
DIVERSITY: BRITISH SOCIOLOGY 1950-1980 280-96 (P. Abrams & P. Lewthwaite eds. 1981).
"Ethnomethodology is concerned with penetrating what determines and constitutes 'common
sense' in various situations; with understanding the taken-for-granted rules which define those
situations and so with connecting the general problem of social order in sociology with the
motivations and outlook of the individual." R. COTTERRELL, supra note 5, at 157.
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Although it, too, is an elusive concept, ethnomethodology is essentially
concerned with operationalizing the theoretical framework of the sociology
of knowledge by applying its principles to a particular social activity so that
the normally "taken for granted" aspects of that activity become problematic
in and of themselves.10 The purpose is to "treat the familiar and the obvious
as 'anthropologically strange"' 1 in order to analyze familiar behaviors from
a disinterested, presumably objective perspective. The purpose of analyzing
familiar behaviors from such a perspective is to understand why it is, to use
the vernacular, that we "do what we do" in a particular social context.
This Article is not a rigorous ethnomethodological exercise but, instead,
applies the ethnomethodological perspective of treating the familiar and the
obvious as "anthropologically strange" to the practice within the American
legal system of limiting the precedential effects of "unpublished" opinions
while releasing them to computer systems such as LEXIS and WESTLAW.
This practice was chosen not for its intrinsic interest as a purely empirical
phenomenon but because the author believes that it can provide some
valuable insights into our assumptions about "precedent" and, indeed, about
the law itself.
Section I examines the evolution of the Anglo-American conception of
precedent and its relationship to printed reports of judicial decisions, and
articulates the conceptual model that is applied in section III. Section II
describes the origins and operation of LEXIS and WESTLAW, while section
III applies the model that was articulated in section I to the empirical
information that is presented in that section and in section II.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRITTEN REPORTS OF JuDICIAL DECISIONS AND
OF THE CONCEPT OF PRECEDENT
All things which are now regarded as of great antiquity were once new,
and that which we maintain today by precedents will be among the
precedents. 2
In order to understand the contemporary American process by which a
judicial decision comes to represent a "precedent," it is necessary to under-
stand the process by which Anglo-American law developed its conception of
written case reports as "precedent." Subsection A summarizes the evolution
of this conception in English law, while subsection B provides a digression
on the sociological import of this phenomenon. Subsection C describes the
American experience in this area.
A. Case Law as Precedent-England
The first written "legislation" appeared around 597 A.D., drafted by
missionaries who were establishing Christianity in what would later become
10. See R. COTTERRELL, supra note 5, at 157.
11. Id.
12. TACITUS, ANNALS C. 110.
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England, 3 and was soon followed by legislation on other topics.' 4 "Legis-
lation,"' 5 however, comprised but a small fraction of English law, as it dealt
only "with matters of national importance.' ' 6 Matters of less than national
importance were consigned to local laws, or "customs."' 7 These customs
were said to be of an antiquity sufficient that "man's memory runneth not
to the contrary."'"
The process by which the common law replaced these customs began when
William the Conqueror undertook the creation of a centralized legal au-
thority.' 9 His immediate successors desultorily continued this effort, but in
1178, Henry II took a dramatic step toward the achievement of a "common
law" by creating a new court. This court, which would become known as
"the Court of Common Pleas," embarked upon the articulation of a "law
common to the whole land."' 20
1. Glanvill
In 1178, the "customs which prevail[ed] in the local courts [were] ... so
many, so various, so conftised" that there really was no "English law." '2'
13. See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1 (1908). Christianity
disappeared from the island with the collapse of the Roman occupation and the invasion of
various barbarian tribes, to return in 597 A.D., with the arrival of St. Augustine, who was
followed by a stream of missionaries. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 6-9 (5th ed. 1956). The romans had brought with them their tradition of written laws. Id.
at 8.
14. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 8-9.
15. Id. at 315-27.
16. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 4.
17. A "custom" is "[a] usage or practice of the people which, by .. .long and unvarying
habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired the force of a law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
461 (4th rev. ed. 1968). See F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 4-23; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note
13, at 15-16. "Law was transmitted by oral tradition and the men of one shire would know
nothing and care nothing for the tradition of another shire." F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at
4.
18. C. REmaAR, THEx LAW OF THE LAND 32 (1980).
If we want the view of a lawyer who knew from experience what custom was, we
can turn to Azo (d. 1230), whose works were held in high respect. . . . 'A custom
can be called long,' he says, 'if it was introduced within ten or twenty years, very
long if it dates from thirty years, and ancient it if dates from forty years.'
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 307-08.
19. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 7.
The word 'common' of course is not opposed to 'uncommon' rather it means
'general,' and the contrast to common law is special laws. Common law is in the
first place unenacted laws; thus it is distinguished from statutes and ordinances. In
the second place, it is common to the whole land; thus it is distinguished from
local customs. In the third place, it is the law of the temporal courts; thus it is
distinguished from ecclesiastical law .... Common law is in theory traditional
law-that which has always been law and still is law, in so far as it has not been
overridden by statute or ordinance.
Id. at 22-23.
20. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 13; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 148:
21. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 13.
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Rather than deal with this confusion, the Court of Common Pleas set about
creating its own "uniform rules," thereby initiating the development of a
''common law.'' 2 2 This development produced the first law treatise,23 "Glan-
viii, " which seems to have been intended to provide guidance for those who
found themselves overwhelmed by the rapid changes that were then occurring
in the legal system. 24
2. Bracton
Bracton sat for twenty years on a royal court that was assigned the task
of applying the new common law.2" This court travelled from place to place,
hearing cases as the need arose, carrying the new law "through the length
and breadth of the kingdom." ' 26
"Sometime between 1250 and 1260," this itinerant justice wrote a treatise
on English law which followed the format that Glanvill established, pre-
senting writs with commentary appended to each. 27 But Bracton also cited
cases that had involved these writs. 28 This was an incredible innovation in a
time when legal artisans did not cite cases in support of their observations
but, instead, seldom included "anything more definite than a vague 'It is so
in our books.'' 29 Bracton, on the other hand, cited "no less than 500
decisions of the king's judges." ' 0
22. Id. Glanvill was only concerned with the law of this court: "[All the tangled masses
of local custom .. he completely ignores. . . .He is . . .the first exponent of the new common
law. ... T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 257. An earlier treatise, LEGES HENRICI PRI1t,
appeared in 1118 and represents the first effort to write a "legal text book." Id. at 155-56.
The author of the LEGES, however, was "overcome by the confusion of competing systems of
law, none of which alone was adequate. Even in England he had to recognize three territorial
laws, the Dane Law, the Law of Mercia and the Law of Wessex, but in order to make sense
out of them, he had to appeal to Roman, canon and Frankish law." Id. at 257. Glanvill
introduced a style that "settled the method of legal writing for many centuries to come." Id.
at 256. It presented a writ that was being used in the royal court and offered a commentary
on its nature and use and, in this regard, Glanvill seems to have invented the "form books"
that are utilized by contemporary practitioners. See id.
23. Authorship is generally attributed to Ranulf Glanvill, who became prime minister and
chief justice of England in 1180. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 13.
24. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 256.
25. "The king's court ha[d] been steadily at work evolving common law." I F. MAITLAND,
BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK 14 (1887) [hereinafter BRACTON's NOTE BOOK]; see also T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 13, at Ill, 259.
26. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 17; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 259.
27. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 17. Bracton died in 1268; it appears that he never
completed his great work and, indeed, "seems to have stopped working upon it in 1256,"
perhaps as the result of the civil war which followed soon thereafter. T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 13, at 259; see also BEACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 42-43.
28. BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 10-12; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 259-
60.
29. BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 11.
30. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 18. In BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, Maitland writes that
Bracton actually cited four hundred and ninety-four cases in his treatise. BRACTON's NOTE
BOOK, supra note 25, at 52-53.
[Vol. 39:461
OF PUBLICA TION AND PRECEDENT
This development was absolutely extraordinary when one realizes that
lawyers were not given access to the "plea rolls," which were the case records
of this era.3 Bracton gained access to them only because he was a judge in
a royal court, and even then, it required a great deal of effort on his part.3 2
Having gained access to the plea rolls, Bracton had two thousand cases
copied into a "note book" and used it to write his treatise.33 In order to
understand why the "note book" was necessary,3 4 one must appreciate the
format of case records at this time:
Imagine fifty rolls, each composed of twenty or thirty membranes, each
membrane as long as one's arm, as broad as one's span, each membrane
covered back and front with writing, whereon are no headnotes, no catch-
words, nothing to guide the eye save the name of counties in the margin.
Such was the raw material; to have transplanted five hundred cases directly
out of this disorderly mass into their proper place in a systematic exposition
of the law, would surely have been beyond the power of any man.35
Although Bracton used decisional law, he did not use it in any modern
sense. "[H]is cases are carefully selected because they illustrate what he
believes the law ought to be, and not because they have any binding authority;
he freely admits that at the present moment decisions are apt to be on
different lines." '3 6 Bracton wanted to restore the law to the state that it had
occupied approximately a generation before.37 His "use of cases, therefore,
31. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 260.
32. Id. at 260-61. It appears that Bracton's work was never finished because he received an
order requiring that he "surrender the rolls which were in his possession." BRACTON'S NOTE
BOOK, supra note 25, at 79; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 260.
33. BLACTOrN's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 71-117; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 260-
61. Bracton apparently gave very specific directions as to which cases he wanted copied, for
Maitland discovered notations indicating that:
[Hie was collecting cases and had various categories in his mind. Thus he writes-
De recto (A Writ of Right), De dote (An action for Dower), Ass' no' (An Assize
of Novel Disseisin), Quis adnoc' (An Assize of Darrein Presentment), De Sum' et
attach' (Summonses and Attachments, Mesne Process), De communibus (Common
Form). Occasionally he even writes Error on the roll.
BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 68.
34. [T]he reader may ask, What need had Bracton of any transcripts of cases if the
very rolls themselves were in his hands? The answer is, that, even with the aid of
a note book, his feat of citing some five hundred cases scattered about in some
fifty rolls was a gigantic feat of patience, industry, memory, and that without some
such aid the feat would have been impossible.
BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 79.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 40; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 260.
37. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 259-60.
At the beginning of his book he explains ... that the contemporary bench is not
distinguished by ability or learning, and that his treatise is ... a protest against
modern tendencies. He endeavours to set forth the sound principles laid down by
those whom he calls 'his masters' who were on the bench nearly a generation ago;
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is not based upon their authority as sources of law, but upon his personal
respect for the judges who decided them, and his belief that they raise and
discuss questions upon lines which he considers sound." 3 Bracton's treatise,
therefore, clearly establishes that no modern conception of precedent existed
since, if decisions had been a binding source of law, his work would have
been futile because it relied upon decisions that had been "overruled" by
more recent entries upon the plea rolls. 39
Bracton's use of cases was instrumental in the emergence of such a
conception. Although the lawyers and judges of his time could not have
accessed the plea rolls even if they had wanted to do so,4° it does not appear
that it had ever occurred to any of them to want to do so. "[Bracton] was
undertaking research into the present and former condition of the law by a
novel method which he had devised, namely, the search of plea rolls, which
was a new discovery in his day."141 But he set an example which they would
hence it is that his cases are on the average about twenty years older than his book.
Id. at 259; accord BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 40-41.
[H]e tells us that ... [t]he judges ... are perverting the law, they are too often
ignorant and partial; we must go back to the wisdom of the men of old time....
[So] it was to old judgments that he went for his law. This may seem strange to
us brought up in the belief that the latest decision of a court is of more value than
any previous determination. But we have Bracton's word for it; he deliberately
chose old judgments, judgments of judges no longer on the bench, as the best
authorities.
BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 40-41.
38. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 260. Bracton relies almost exclusively on the decisions
of two judges, Martin Pateshull and William Raleigh; it is not clear what prompted this reliance,
although Maitland suggests that it may have been simple expediency, i.e., these were the rolls
to which Bracton was given access. See BRAcTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 45-60.
39. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 344.
In other words, Bracton has no hesitation in using cases which we should call out
of date or overruled, in order to maintain that the law ought to be something
different from what it is. From this it is clear that the whole of Bracton's position
would fall if decisions . . . were in any modern sense a source of law.
1d. Bracton's plan seems simply to have been to "state in logical order a series of legal
propositions, and then to illustrate their working from cases." Id. "In Bracton's hands a case
may illustrate a legal principle, and the enrolment may be historical proof that that principle
was once applied, but the case is not in itself a source of law." Id.
40. Id. at 343. Indeed, it appears that none of his contemporaries could have undertaken
similar research even if it had occurred to them to do so:
Any use of cases on Bracton's lines by the profession at large, or even by the bench
alone, would have been manifestly impossible. The plea rolls are immense in number
and there was and still is no guide to their contents; they have to be read straight
through from beginning to end without any assistance from indexes or head-notes.
Id.
41. He alone of all the lawyers in England sought and obtained access to the plea
rolls; he used the originals, and there were no copies until he made one for his
own convenience. .. .None of his contemporaries attempted such a thing. Bracton
... was the only lawyer of his day who chose to exert a good deal of court
influence in order to obtain the loan of numerous plea rolls, and who was ready
[Vol. 39:461
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follow: rudimentary "case reporters" began to appear after the issuance of
his treatise. 42
3. The Year Books
The most successful of the rudimentary reporters were the Year Books,
which began in 1292 as guides to court procedures. The Year Books were
periodically updated, and these updates came to include case annotations: 43
In the end it must have occurred to several minds at once that such reports
need not necessarily be interspersed through one of these treatises, and
that a small separate collection could be made consisting only of cases.
As a result the ... case material will become a separate class of literature.-
The earlier Year Books "resemble not so much the modern law report as a
professional newspaper which combines matters of technical interest with
the lighter side of professional life."
'4
-
They did share one feature with modern reporters. Case reports were noted
on slips of parchment and copied into pamphlets that circulated as "advance
sheets." The materials in the advance sheets were later recopied into per-
manent volumes which became the "Year Books." '46 Because reports were
prepared by a number of individuals, "there were frequently found to be
two, three, four, or even more versions of one case, so different that collation
was impossible. '47 However, between 1377 and 1399, the variation in reports
disappeared and consistent reporting was a standard feature until the Year
Books were replaced by "modern" case reports. 41
The Year Books "did not exist for the same reason as the modern law
report," that is, they were not "collections of precedents whose authority
to devote immense pains and labour in searching hundredweights of manuscript
and having his discoveries copied in a very substantial volume.
Id.
42. Id. at 344; BIACTON'S NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 53-54. Although it was the custom
"on the continent ... for a clerk of the courts to prepare a collection of interesting cases from
the documents in his custody," this practice did not exist in England. T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 13, at 261.
43. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 22; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 261, 268.
Since written pleadings did not exist and since lawyers were not given access to the plea rolls,
the only way that they could "keep current" on court procedures was either to compare notes
with their colleagues or to consult the Year Books. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 268 n.2.
44. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 268; see also F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 22
("from 1292 onwards we have law reports").
45. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 270.
46. Id. at 269-70.
47. Id. at 270 (quoting T. PLUCKNETT, Y.B. 13 Richard 2, xiii (1929)). This variation also
resulted from the fact that judges delivered their opinions orally and that "[s]ome of the bench
in that day, as in this,... spoke indistinctly, or without capacity of being heard." J. WALLACE,
THE REPORTERS 109 (4th ed. 1882).
48. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 33-34. For this era, "all our manuscripts give the
same portions of the discussion, even the same repetitions .... The conclusion is irresistible:
there was but one report-perhaps only one reporter." Id. at 272; see also id. at 272-74, 280.
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should be binding in later cases." 4 9 It was custom rather than "precedent"
that controlled. "[Clases are used only as evidence of the existence of a
custom of the court. It is the custom which governs the decision, not the
case or cases cited as proof of the custom." 50
In the sixteenth century, "modern" case reports replaced the Year Books
and references to "precedent" began to appear. Although decisions were
not yet accorded binding precedential effect, they were recognized as having
some value, and this recognition created a market for volumes which reported
the decisions that the judges were making.5
4. Law Reporters
The Year Books were replaced by "something which was at first not so
very different, namely, the early reporters." 52 These reports issued "under
the name of some distinguished lawyer or judge, with the implication that
he was in some way concerned with their composition. ' 53 This was true for
some reports54 but others had little or no connection with the individuals
under whose name they appeared. 5 Many reports were mediocre or worse.5 6
Among the most admired were those issued by Lord Coke, who was "so
highly regarded by the profession that his work is cited simply as The
Reports."5 7 However, even Coke's reports bear little resemblance to modern
"case reports":
In his hands a law report takes the form of a somewhat rambling disqui-
sition upon the case in question. He frequently gives the pleadings, but
less often ... the arguments. As for the decision, it is often impossible
49. Id. at 272; see also id. at 345-47.
50. Id. at 347. "A single case was not a binding authority, but a well-established custom
(proved by a more or less casual citing of cases) was undoubtedly regarded as strongly
persuasive." Id. This conception of law survived into the nineteenth century and surfaced in
the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842):
[lit will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are,
at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not themselves laws .... The
laws . . . are ... the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative author-
ity ... or long established local customs having the force of laws.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
51. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 280-81, 348-50.
52. Id. at 280.
53. Id.
54. Most notably, the reports issued by Moore, Dyer, Plowden and Coke. See id. at 280;
see generally J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 122-96.
55. Id. at 13-15.
56. Wallace's description of the Savile reports, which were issued between 1580 and 1594:
"This book seems to be pretty much in the condition of Pope's 'most women,' and to have
,no character at all."' J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 197.
57. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 280 (citing Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke's Reports,
27 CORNELL L.Q. 190 (1942)); see also J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 165-96. Coke issued his
first reports while he was Attorney General, and continued to publish them after he became
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas court and later of the King's Bench. Id. at 166-67.
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to distinguish the remarks of the judge . . . from the comments of the
reporter. There was no clear boundary in his mind between what a case
said and what he thought it ought to say, between the reasons which
actually prompted the decision, and the elaborate commentary which he
could easily weave around any question. A case in Coke's Reports, there-
fore, is an uncertain mingling of genuine report, commentary, criticism,
elementary instruction, and recondite legal history.5"
Coke was succeeded by reporters whose accounts were "frequently short
and inaccurate, and sometimes unintelligible." 5 9 Consequently, there was
little technical or doctrinal development in precedential authority during the
remainder of the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth
century.60 Cases were cited as "precedent," but "precedent" was used to
prove "custom" rather than as authority in its own right. 6' Furthermore,
because reporters were erratic and unreliable, judges could blame them for
inaccurately reporting a decision which they disliked and chose not to
follow. 62
This was no longer possible after Sir James Burrow began publishing his
reports in 1756.63 Burrow eschewed Coke's editorials and confined himself
to recounting:
1st. The case or statement of the facts .... 2d. Arguments of counsel
on that case. 3d. The opinion or judgment of the court upon it;-each of
the parts being separate and pure, the statement ... being pure fact, the
argument of counsel argument merely, the opinion of the court opinion
simply on the case .... This makes a full, formal, and correct report,
and such as properly instructs and enlightens the bar.
58. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 281.
Lord Redesdale declared ... that while he had a great respect for the memory of
Sir Edward Coke, he was yet ready to accede to an assertion, made by some of Sir
Edward's contemporaries, that 'he was too fond of making the law, instead of
declaring the law, and of telling untruths to support his own opinions.'
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 172 (emphasis in original) (quoting Case of the Earldom of
Banbury, reported in NICOLAS ON ADULTERINE BASTARDY 461 (1836)).
59. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 281; J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 248-446.
60. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 281, 349.
61. Id. at 348-49. Even during the eighteenth century, "the function of citations [was]
merely that of proving a settled policy or practice." Id. at 349.
62. Id. at 349; J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 251-52:
[Judge Rolle's] Reports ... have always been deemed authoritative; although, when
Mr. Justice Eyre cited a case from [them], Mr. Justice Dolben answered that 'that
was but the opinion of Rolle;' and although on another occasion a very accurate
Judge said to counsel, citing Rolle, that a good many cases which are reported by
him are reported in other books, which do not always bear him out: the first
observation going, I suppose, only to the technical point of 'authority,' and the
last not involving as of logical necessity inaccuracy in Rolle, since 'other books'
may be in error, rather than he.
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 251-52 (emphasis added).
63. J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 446.
64. Id. at 447.
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Unlike many of his predecessors, Burrow was concerned with "the correct-
ness of the 'states of the case' and his report of the judgment. ' 6 The
opinions in his reports were not, however, "written by the court, nor ever
printed in the exact form in which they were delivered." '66 Instead, as Lord
Mansfield noted in his preface to a volume of these reports, Burrow edited
oral opinions "into the form that was requisite to make them the proper
component of a report. '67 This let Burrow eliminate the elaboration and
repetition that were unavoidable when opinions were delivered orally without
sacrificing the accuracy of his presentation. 68
The concern for accuracy eventually produced a system of law reporting
in which "judges adopted the practice of looking over the draft reports of
their decisions, and in this way certain reporters were regarded as 'author-
ized.' ' 69 England finally established a system of standardized, "modern"
reports in 1865.70
B. Significance of the Evolution of the Rule of Precedent in English
Common Law
Although the term "precedent" was being used in the sixteenth century, 7'
the jurisprudence of that era did not accord authoritative effect to judicial
decisions. 72 Indeed, as is noted above, the contrary was true.73 This state of
affairs continued until the modern conception of precedent finally emerged
in the nineteenth century. 74 Having emerged, this conception proceeded to
extinguish the use of custom as legal authority by gradually restricting the
areas in which custom could operate.75
65. Id. (emphasis in original).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. "[T]hat is, to strike out ... statement[s] ... very proper to have been in the opinion
as delivered from the bench . . . but unnecessary ... to be stated or presented in the same
way" in the reporter. Id. at 447-48. "'Let me, once for all,' he says, 'caution the reader ....
I pledge my credit and character only that the case and judgment and the outlines of the
grounds or reasons of the decision are right:' " Id. at 448 n.2 (quoting from page x of the
preface to one of Burrow's reports).
69. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 13, at 281.
70. Id. at 281 (creation of the "official series of Law Reports in 1865"); see also M. PRICE,
H. BITNER & S. BYsmwicz, EFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 331-36 (4th ed. 1979).
71. When we come to the sixteenth century we get a little nearer the modern point
of view, although even such a reporter as Dyer thought it worth while to report
what the judge said privately and what was said in mock trials in Lincoln's Inn. If
he uses the word 'precedent' in 1557 (which Sir Carleton Allen thinks is the first
occurrence of the word) it is merely to tell us that in spite of two 'precedents' the
court adjudged the contrary.
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 348 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 348-49.
73. See supra sections I(A)(3) and I(A)(4).
74. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 349-50.
75. This was done by confining the operation of custom to those areas in which it "was,
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Those who have been trained by a legal system in which precedent reigns
unchallenged76 cannot understand why medieval and post-medieval England
were so slow to abandon customary law for case law, as we are assured of
the superiority of the latter. 7 The more interesting inquiry, however, is why
our predecessors chose to abandon it at all. In order to understand this
choice and thereby understand the dilatoriness with which it was finally
implemented, it is necessary to understand the sociological context from
which it emerged.
Prior to the Norman invasion, "courts" were simply assemblages of the
male populace in a particular community7 8 the deliberations of which were
guided by local custom rather than any generalized conception of "law." ' 79
These courts did not issue "decisions" in any modern sense, although they
may have kept records of their actions.8 0 After the conquest, the effort to
develop a central political organization resulted in the creation of the Court
or seemed to be, immemorially old," which meant that a custom could be enforced only if it
were proven to have been in existence "right back to the time of legal memory". Id. at 312.
The "time of legal memory" was arbitrarily established as "3d September, 1189." J. WALLACE,
supra note 47, at 62. Although the purpose was to provide a means for curtailing the influence
of custom in what was rapidly becoming a modern legal system, it may have had the unintended
effect of encouraging the destruction of legal records prepared prior to it: "[W]hen it was
declared that legal memory extended not beyond the first year of Richard's reign, the earlier
judicial records, deprived of their practical utility, were cast aside and neglected, and ultimately
destroyed either by neglect or design." Id.
76. Precedent, of course, reigns unchallenged in the modern world except insofar as it
conflicts with legislative authority. The possibility of such a conflict is omitted from the
discussion above for purposes of simplicity and clarity.
77. The dominance of precedence in English and American law is a phenomenon which can
be attributed to the twentieth century with no dispute, to the nineteenth century with little
dispute and to the eighteenth century with some significant dispute. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note
13, at 342-50. This means that customary law was the dominant force in Anglo-Saxon law at
least from the time that the Roman occupation of the British Isles ended in the fifth century
A.D. until the seventeenth century, and possibly even until the eighteenth century. This, in
turn, means that customary law has dominated Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence for some twelve
centuries, as opposed to the almost-three centuries that can reasonably be characterized as being
governed by the rule of precedent. When one considers the remarkable longevity of customary
law, it is more remarkable that precedent triumphed at all than that it took several centuries
to do so.
78. Id. at 83-89; F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 45, 105. Indeed, it appears that the word
"court" developed from the practice of summoning these assemblies, which often met in the
interior spaces, or "courts" of medieval buildings. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 142-43.
Plucknett writes that "[tihe original sense of the word is the rectangular open space around
which the mediaeval house was built." Id.
79. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 86-94. For a theoretical discussion of customary
law and its relationship to other types of law, see N. TIMAsHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOCIOLOOY OF LAW 310-12 (1939).
80. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 83-100. It also appears that particular localities
assembled and maintained records of their unique customs. These records were known as
costumals or customaries. See MAx WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 73 n. 19 (M.
Rheinstein ed. 1954).
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of Common Pleas-the "king's court."'8 The creation of this court had two
immediately apparent consequences: The articulation of a "common law
' 8 2
and the emergence of the belief that judges should be "learned, professionally
learned in the law of the land." 83 By Bracton's time, "there were in the
royal court learned judges, most of them ecclesiastics, who were making for
themselves fame . . . as great judges.' '84
The necessity for a cadre of professionally trained jurists resulted from
the shift from a local to a common law: as long as law was guided by local
custom, there was no need for judicial officers who were trained in the
manipulation of principles of an abstraction transcending routine. s5 As law
replaced custom, however, new skills were required8 6 because this shift
represented a sociological revolution. To understand the significance of this
revolution, it is necessary to refer to a classificatory scheme that was devel-
oped by Max Weber. 7
Weber concluded that law is a social institution the purpose of which is
to secure obedience to certain rules, or norms, which have been articulated
by a particular society.88 The viability of a particular legal system depends
81. In the discussion that follows, the phrase "the king's court" will be used to refer to
the Court of Common Pleas. The discussion makes no effort to distinguish the respective roles
which this court and the Court of King's Bench played in the evolution of the English common
law and its reliance upon precedent. For a discussion of the contributions made by each of
these courts and their older predecessor, the Exchequer, see T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at
146-56.
82. The creation of this court began the process of developing a common law; this process
was not, of course, completed in an instant but, instead, continued throughout the reigns of
Henry II's successors. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 10-18. The previous discussion
collapses this evolution into a relatively short period of time in order to illustrate the effects
which Bracton's work must have had upon the conception of law that would emerge.
83. BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 4. "[Ilt was felt that study and book-learning,
something more special than an ordinary experience of public life, were needful for those who
term after term were to sit in a certain place ... and declare the law." Id. at 4-5.
84. Id. at 5. Bracton himself was an ecclesiastic, as were the judges whom he revered and
upon whose decisions he places his greatest reliance. Id. at 17, 45-48.
85. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 231-41. Indeed, no judicial officer was
required under the practice that prevailed during the Anglo-Saxon era: "The central figure of
a court to-day is the judge, but . . . it required some time before English law developed this
office. Feudal courts seem generally to have consisted not of judges but of a number of 'suitors'
with whom rested the decision." Id. at 143.
86. This development was also responsible for the evolution of the legal profession: "There
is no convincing evidence of a legal profession in the Anglo-Saxon period." Id. at 215. By the
time of Henry II, however, England was experiencing "the growth of a legal profession, for
the public could hardly be expected to understand the newly invented office machinery of the
King's Court." Id. at 216.
87. Weber, of course, has been one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth
century. See, e.g., 2 R. ARON, MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICA THOUGHT 219-336 (1970). "To
me, Max Weber is the greatest of the sociologists; I would even say that he is the sociologist."
Id. at 294.
88. Weber defined law as "an 'order system' endowed with certain specific guarantees of
the probability of its empirical validity." MAX WEBER ON LAW IN EcONOX AND SOCIETY, supra
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upon the extent to which it is able to "legitimate" its exercise of coercive
authority so as to ensure obedience to the appropriate rules, or norms.8 9
A legal system can legitimate its exercise of coercive authority by relying
upon tradition, faith or rationality. 9° In a traditional legal system, "valid is
that which has always been";91 in a rational legal system, legitimacy is
predicated upon "logically deduced propositions. ' 92 By creating the "king's
court," Henry II initiated the transition from a traditional legal system to
a rational legal system93 and Bracton is an integral part of this transition.
Bracton wrote his treatise approximately seventy-five years after the King's
court was created. 94 During those years, the new court was inventing "com-
mon law" and discarding local law with equal rapidity. 9 This process must
note 80, at 13. He concluded that each society includes a "legal order" which is composed of
a set of "legal norms" and of the coercive machinery for ensuring compliance with those
norms. Id. at 11-13. For Weber, the enforceability of legal norms derives not from their
"logically demonstrable correctness" but rather from the availability of "legal coercion." Id.
at 13-14.
Sociologically, the question of whether or not . . . law exists . . . depends on the
availability of an organized coercive apparatus for the nonviolent exercise of legal
coercion. This apparatus must also possess such power that there is in fact a
significant probability that the norm will be respected because of the possibility of
recourse to such legal coercion.
Id. at 14.
89. "Conduct ... [is] oriented on the part of the actors toward their idea ... of the
existence of a legitimate order. The probability of such an orientation shall be called the validity
of the order in question." Id. at 3. Weber notes that although a legal order can be predicated
upon simple, coerced obedience to social norms, "more stable is the conduct oriented toward
a [norm] which is endowed with the prestige of exemplariness or obligatoriness or, in other
words, of 'legitimacy."' Id. at 4; see also id. at 7-15.
90. MAX WEBER ON LAW r ECONOMY AND SOciET, supra note 80, at 8-9.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 8-9. Legal systems are rarely predicated upon faith; when such systems do exist,
they tend to derive their legitimation from the unique characteristics of an individual who has
been recognized as a "prophet." Id. at 337 (charismatic authority "rests upon that authority
of a concrete individual which is based neither upon rational rules nor upon tradition").
93. See, e.g., BRACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 5:
And the 'gladsome light of jurisprudence' (to use Coke's fine phrase) had dawned
in England as elsewhere, an idea of law as of a reasonable system of connected
principles, providing in advance for all possible cases, a proper subject for doubt,
disputation, proof,-and yet no mere ideal existing only in the speculations of
doctors and scholars, but the very law of the land, of which ordinances, charters,
writs, decisions, ancient custom, wonted procedure, were authoritative though partial
manifestations .... The concentration of justice in the king's court, the evolution
of common law, were but one process. That the development of legal doctrine was
rapid, we may easily see as we pass from that strange dark book the Leges Henrici
Primi, through Glanvill to Bracton.
Id.
94. F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 17; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 259.
95. In one sense, of course, the invention of the common law was merely the creation of
a new system of customary law, one in which "custom" became the practice in the king's
court. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 342. "The common law in its ultimate origin
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have generated a great deal of discomfort with regard to the "legitimacy"
of the new law. The old system of law was "legitimate" because it consisted
of customs the pedigree of which extended back into an unfathomable
antiquity. The new system, however, was replacing customs with law that
was being created "on the spot." ' 96 In order to survive, the new system had
to legitimate its law, and this law was clearly not the product of immemorial
custom. Legitimation therefore had to come from some source other than
tradition. It was Bracton who provided this source.
Bracton wrote his treatise, of course, to criticize the decisions that were
being handed down by his contemporaries. Nevertheless, he did not argue
for a return to customary law but, instead argued that the older decisions
upon which he relied were correct statements of the "new" law and asserted
that recent decisions erred insofar as they departed from the rationale of
these decisions. The substance of his arguments is irrelevant, but the tech-
nique that Bracton utilized in making them is of profound importance for
modern law. By referring to earlier judicial decisions, Bracton provided the
predicate for legitimating the "new law" that had been articulated by the
king's court. That is to say, that by providing a means for legitimating what
had already been articulated, Bracton also provided a device for legitimating
the law that would be articulated in the future.
Although the "new law" could not be legitimated by reference to imme-
morial custom because it very clearly departed from that custom, by the
time Bracton was writing, the "new" law had existed for at least seventy-
five years. This longevity provided the basis for a mode of legitimation that
superficially resembled the prior mode of legitimation, reference to custom,
insofar as it relied upon reference to past practice, that is, judicial decisions
that had been rendered in the past. 97
It is this aspect of Bracton's work that was revolutionary in a sociological
and jurisprudential sense. Eventually, cases would be used to fill the void
that had been left by the rejection of custom. Case law, like custom, could
was merely the custom of the King's courts; the regular routine which they developed in the
administration of justice became settled and known, and therefore served as the basis upon
which people could forecast with some certainty the future decisions of the courts." Id.
96. The king's court has been steadily at work evolving common law. . . . As yet the
judges have a free hand-they can invent new remedies to meet new cases. Towards
the end of the reign indeed complaints of this grow loud. It is more and more seen
that to invent new remedies is in effect to make new laws; that the judges while
professing to declare the law are in reality making law.
F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 17 (emphasis added). Maitland is describing the reign of Henry
III, but his comments seem equally apropos to what was occurring during the reign of Henry
I, as well. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 17-26.
97. Bracton, of course, was not using cases that dated from the very beginning of that
court but was, instead, using more recent cases that had been decided by those jurists whom
he had known and for whom he had especial regard. See supra section l(A)(2). These cases
were decided roughly between 1216 and 1240. See, e.g., BP.ACTON's NOTE BOOK, supra note 25,
at 63.
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provide a basis for predicting what action a court might take in a case that
was before it and for making arguments on behalf of a particular outcome. 98
Even more important, however, was the fact that the judiciary could use its
prior decisions to legitimate its actions in present and future litigation29
To the modern observer, it seems that the advantages of case law should
have been immediately apparent, so that the shift should have occurred at
once. Even a cursory examination of history, however, reveals that the
transition took approximately five hundred years before it was complete."°°
Why did it take so long to establish the rule of precedent, a doctrine the
desirability of which is obvious to a modern lawyer?
The answer is derivable from two propositions. The first proposition is
that the transition from customary to case law represented a sociological
revolution. The second proposition is that, unlike political revolutions, so-
ciological revolutions do not occur overnight. The sections immediately below
develop these propositions and apply them to resolve this question.
1. Sociological Revolution
"Sociological revolution" denotes a fundamental alteration in the fabric
of social and conceptual relationships within a society. The term refers to
micro-social changes within a particular segment of a given society, not to
the type of macro-social changes that are subsumed under the term "revo-
lution" or the phrase "political revolution."
In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the
nature of social reality. "Social reality" is a modern construct. Historically,
those who studied the phenomenon of social life tended to conceptualize
"society" as a unitary, even mechanistic entity, a macro-organism the ex-
istence of which was objectively real and impervious to the influence of its
constituent parts.10 In the last fifty years or so, however, sociologists have
98. The ability to predict the consequences of one's actions with some degree of certainty
is an essential element of a stable social system. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra
note 4, at 50-72. The older system of customary law clearly included the first of these virtues
but may have had neither need nor regard for the second, since it did not develop the concept
of law as a "profession" and never recognized the role which is played by attorneys in modern
society. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 215-17.
99. Weber notes that judges will utilize "in a later case a norm" which they have used "in
an earlier similar decision" because "then . . . every decision, regardless of how it came into
existence, appears as being derived from" rational principles and is, thereby, legitimated. MAX
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 74. Although this use of precedent
may superficially resemble the operation of customary law, the two are really quite different.
Id. at 65-67.
100. Bracton's treatise appeared at the end of the thirteenth century, but the modern
conception of precedent had not become fixed in English law until sometime in the nineteenth
century. See supra section I(A).
101. See, e.g., I H. BECKER & H. BARNES, SOCIAL THOUGHT FROM LORE TO SCIENCE 43-404
(1961).
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developed a far more fluid conception of what they prefer to call "social
reality.' 102
"Social reality" is our experience of "society." "Empirically, human
existence takes place in a context of order, direction, stability. The question
then arises: from what does the empirically existing stability of human order
derive?"' 03 The answer is that:
[Siocial order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human
production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing external-
ization. Social order is not biologically given or derived from any biological
data in its empirical 'manifestations .... Social order is not part of the
'nature of things,' and it cannot be derived from the 'laws of nature.'
Social order exists only as a product of human activity.,,,
Social order, or social reality, is the product of routinized human activity.
Each of us lives out our existence in what one paradigm refers to as the
"world of everyday life." 1°1 This world is:
[TIhe intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced
and interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world....
All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experi-
ences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our
parents and teachers, which in the form of 'knowledge at hand' function
as a scheme of reference.'10
The generalized world of everyday life is composed of discrete parts, or
"institutions."' ' 07 Individuals participate in social reality by participating in
these institutions. 0 s They experience institutions "as an objective reality"
because each has "a history that antedates the individual's birth and is not
accessible to his . . . recollection.' ' 0 9 Institutions are, however, merely the
102. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 1-18. The conception of society
as a more or less fluid "social reality" is a characteristic of that branch of sociology which is
known as the sociology of knowledge. Id.
103. Id. at 51.
104. Id. at 52 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In presenting this model of social
reality, Berger and Luckmann are deriving a sociological model from the work of philosophers
who developed a phenomenological perspective on social relationships and society in general.
See, e.g., ALFRED SCHUTZ ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (H. Wagner ed. 1970)
[hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS]; PHENOMENOLOOY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDMUND HUSSERL AND ITS INTERPRETATION (J. Kockelmans ed. 1967).
105. See, e.g., PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, supra note 104, at 72; P. BERGER
& T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 19-27.
106. PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, supra note 104, at 72.
The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require
additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as
self-evident and compelling facticity. I know that it is real.
P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 23.
107. Id. at 53-67.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 60.
The institutions are there, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he
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result of routinized human activity." 0 They develop as individuals fall into
routine patterns of behavior and develop concepts that are associated with
these patterns of behavior."' They flourish because they are a means for
establishing order in a chaotic universe:
Institutions . . . control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns
of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other
directions that would theoretically be possible .... To say that a segment
of human activity has been institutionalized is already to say that this
segment of human activity has been subsumed under social control. "2
Because institutions are experienced as objective reality, they resist change. " 3
This resistance occurs because the individuals whose activities are the present
manifestation of a particular institution have been trained, or socialized, to
believe in the validity of the institution as originally constituted.' '4 Therefore,
the participants will be reluctant or even unable to alter its basic structure.
The extent to which institutional change will occur is a function of processes
likes it or not. He cannot wish them away. They resist his attempts to change or
evade them. They have coercive power over him, both in themselves, by the sheer
force of their facticity, and through the control mechanisms that are usually attached
to the most important of them.
Id. The phenomenon is referred to as reification: "Reification is the apprehension of human
phenomena as if they were ... something else than human products-such as facts of nature,
results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will." Id. at 89.
110. Id. "It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world,
however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objec-
tivity." Id.
111. "Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized
actions by types of actors." Id.
112. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 54-55. Institutions must also be "legiti-
mated":
Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its
objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a
normative dignity to its practical imperatives .... Legitimation not only tells the
individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why
things are what they are.
Id. at 93-94. Legitimation implies knowledge as well as values. Sophisticated legitimation
structures "contain[ ] explicit theories by which an institutional sector is legitimated in terms
of a differentiated body of knowledge. Such legitimations provide fairly comprehensive frames
of reference for the respective sectors of institutionalized conduct." Id. at 94. In other words,
legitimation comes to include a particular type of expertise, the exercise of which itself serves
to legitimate the existence and operation of that institution. In pre-Norman England, the local
courts were legitimated, as authority structures, by the fact that they were able to predicate
their actions upon the force of custom; the availability of custom eliminated any perception
that these communal courts were acting out of caprice, bias or as the result of any other
impermissible, "illegitimate" factor. Weber's contribution was to isolate the concepts that can
serve as legitimating predicates. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
113. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 45-72.
114. See id. In this context, the reference to the institution as "originally constituted" denotes
the perception of the institution that has been transmitted to the individuals who are its present
constituent parts. Id. at 60-72.
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operating outside of a particular institution.' ' The extent to which change
will be accepted within a particular institution is a function of the sociali-
zation that its members have received.1 1 6
Law is a fundamental institution in every society and was, therefore, one
of the basic institutions of pre-Norman England. Pre-Norman law, of course,
was an institution composed of the communal courts and their customary
law." 7 By creating the king's court and assigning it the task of developing
a common law, Henry II initiated a sociological revolution, setting in motion
forces that would radically change "the law" as a social institution in
England.
2. Pace of Sociological Revolutions
Sociological revolutions are inherently idiosyncratic, which means, among
other things, that they proceed at their own pace. The pace of a sociological
revolution is determined by: the nature and extent of the social relationships
that are being altered; the forces that have set these alterations in motion;
the temporal and geographical environment in which the alterations are
occurring and a host of other equally unmanageable factors. One thing is
certain, however, and that is that sociological revolutions cannot be effected
overnight.
Indeed, this should be intuitively obvious after the discussion that was
presented above. This Article is using the phrase "sociological revolution"
to refer to dramatic changes in the structure and/or operation of social
institutions. Social institutions are made up of individuals who have been
socialized to believe in the validity of those institutions and in the means
which they use to accomplish their activities. Institutions exist only because
their constituent members are firmly committed to the legitimacy of their
means and ends." 8
Imagine, then, the effect which Henry II's creation of the "king's court"
and its embarkation upon the invention of the common law must have had
115. The issue of social change has always been a matter of great debate in sociology, and
is, therefore, quite outside the scope of this Article. It should be intuitively obvious, however,
that social institutions will be forced to change to reflect changes that are occurring in other
aspects of society. One example of this process is the impact which the emancipation of the
American slaves had upon existing social institutions. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 192-201, 440-45 (1973).
116. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 47-163. Again, this proposition
is easily illustrated by referring to the changes that resulted from the emancipation of the
American slaves. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 440-45; C. WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).
117. See supra section I(A). Arguably, of course, these communal courts had not yet evolved
into a formal social institution, as they met only sporadically and were not characterized by
the articulation of social roles that belonged only to the operation of "the law" as a separate
and distinct activity. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 139-55, 215-30.
118. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 47-92; see generally M.
NATANSON, THE JOURNEYING SELF: A STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ROLE (1970).
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upon the social institution of the law in twelfth and thirteenth century
England. In the space of little more than a century, the law was being
transformed and local custom, which had been legitimate legal authority,
was being disregarded. This particular sociological revolution may have
succeeded simply because Henry II set it in motion by establishing an entirely
new aspect of an existing social institution rather than by attempting to
replace existing law in one fell swoop. If, for example, he had attempted to
re-form English law by simple legislative fiat the effect of which was to
eliminate customary law all at once, it is highly likely that the attempt would
have failed simply because it would have allowed no period of adjustment.
Such a period of adjustment is necessary in order to allow a shift in the
orientation of the individuals who constitute a particular social institution."19
The first evidence of this shift was the development of a cadre of profes-
sionally trained jurists. As was noted above, professionally trained jurists
were necessary because the law had ceased to consist of customs which were
available to every member of society and was well on its way to becoming
a true modern social institution, complete with its own stock of idiosyncratic
expertise. 120
If this was true, then why did it take so long for the "new law" to
implement its own legitimating structure, that is, the rule of precedent? Why
did the common law persist for so long in using cases only as evidence of
custom?
The answer lies in the constraints that attend upon any sociological
revolution. Remember that English law had been customary law for many
centuries by 1178, when the new court was created. Although customs were
occasionally recorded, "it was typical of customary law that there was no
need for it to be written down"' 2 because the force of custom lay not in
119. It is true that prior to 1178, when Henry II created his new court, English law does
not seem to have existed as a formal social institution complete with a clearly defined institutional
structure and differentiated social roles within that structure. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T.
LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 72-79. "All institutionalized conduct involves roles" and, indeed,
"roles represent the institutional order." Id at 74.
This representation takes place on two levels. First, performance of the role rep-
resents itself. For instance, to engage in judging is to represent the role of judge.
The judging individual is not acting 'on his own,' but qua judge. Second, the role
represents an entire institutionalized nexus of conduct. The role of judge stands in
relationship to other roles, the totality of which comprises the institution of law.
Id. at 74-75. Instead, the institutional courts appear to have operated in a sporadic fashion,
with members of the community assuming their "judicial" roles as the need arose. See supra
section I(B)(1). This does not mean, however; that the law did not exist as a social institution,
nor does it mean that there would not have been an allegiance to the legitimacy of the existing
social structure and its reliance upon customary law. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN,
supra note 4, at 56-67. Indeed, such an allegiance is likely to have been particularly tenacious
given that it was diffused among the entire male populace rather than being confined to a
particular subset of that populace, as would be the case in later centuries.
120. Id. at 117-25.
121. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 313. Plucknett goes on to note that "there can be no
1990]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
its recordation but in the reiteration of empirical patterns that had been
established long before. 22 The exercise of authority was legitimate if and
only if it accorded with the force of custom; although the recordation of
past practice could serve as evidence of custom, it had no legitimating value
in and of itself.
After one understands this, it is possible to understand the laboriousness
with which England went about adopting the rule of precedent and the
events that were described in section I(A) fall into place as essential parts
of that process. Prior to Bracton, although the courts were keeping records
of their actions, no one consulted those records. Judges did not consult
these records because they were able to remember what they had done in
prior, similar cases' 23 and because the records were not available to them. 24
Moreover, although "attorneys" had appeared by Bracton's time, they did
not consult the case records either because it did not occur to them to do
so, or because they did not have access to the records or both. 5 It is far
more likely, however, that the legal artisans of this era did not consult case
records because it did not occur to them to do so, rather than because the
records were not available. Once it became apparent that there was some
utility in consulting such records, means were then developed by which they
were made available.' 26
Judges and attorneys did not think to consult case records because their
conception of law was rooted in a strong tradition of oral advocacy. Written
pleadings had not yet evolved; from Bracton's time until at least the fifteenth
century, court proceedings were conducted orally.127 "Cases" consisted of
oral argument and "memoranda" of arguments noted on the plea rolls. 28
doubt that many communities had notable bodies of custom without ever possessing a" written
record of their customs. Id.
122. Plucknett notes that "[tihe communal courts .. .were customary in their origin, and
declared customary law whose sanction was derived from custom." Id. at 307.
123. Judges may have been the only ones who would have been interested in the outcome
of prior decisions, as it took some time for a legal profession to develop. Id. at 215-30. In
discussing the Year Books, which encompass a much later period, Plucknett notes that "[tihere
are quite frequent cases . . .where we find judges or counsel mentioning previous decisions.
They seem generally to quote from memory; sometimes they give us the names of the parties,
but not always." Id. at 344-45.
124. See supra section I(A)(2).
125. Indeed, access to the plea rolls might not have mattered. At least during this early
period, the "record" was the "official memory" of the judges, while the plea roll was simply
the notations that had been made by the court's clerk. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 403
n.5; Thorne, Courts of Record, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 347, 352 (1934).
126. See supra section I(A).
127. A successful advocate "depended upon quick thinking in order to understand his own
case and his opponent's, for it would seem that hardly any work was done on a case before it
came into court." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 222.
128. Id. at 401-02:
If we look at the earlier plea rolls, we shall find that they are brief and informal.
Their object is merely to serve as memoranda of the proceedings for official use.
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In addition, during this period, legal education emphasized the observation
of proceedings in court. 2 9 Would-be attorneys observed oral arguments in
order to develop the capacity for making such arguments. Consequently,
they had little, if any, inclination toward written sources. 30
As long as cases consisted of oral arguments, the common law courts
measured their actions against the actions which had been taken in earlier,
similar controversies, so that the legitimacy of their decisions derived from
the extent to which they conformed to past practices. Although this system
may have been known as the "common law" and although it included
substantive areas that were unknown to customary law, its modus operandi
was that of customary law.' 31
This changed once written pleadings appeared: instead of "memoranda,"
clerks began to write descriptions of oral arguments, or "pleas," onto the
plea rolls. This development forced lawyers to conclude "that what really
matters . . . is not so much what they say (as under the old system) as what
the clerks write on the roll.' ' 2 Although this development had certain
advantages,' it inculcated a significant amount of paranoia because lawyers
They were not for the use of the parties, and the parties had no control whatever
over the form in which their case was enrolled.
Id. at 402.
129. According to Plucknett, legal apprentices had "a special enclosure, humorously called
the 'crib,' from which they could follow the proceedings in court." Id. at 218. Plucknett is
describing legal education in the thirteenth century at a time after the law schools that had
existed in London "were closed by royal edict." Id. at 219. During this era, judges often
explained their decisions 'for the sake of the young men who are present,' and down to the
eighteenth century judges in court would bear in mind the fact that a judgment might be
expanded into a lecture for the law students who were present." Id. at 346.
130. Plucknett suggests that the practice of educating attorneys in court rather than in
universities gave "a very different complexion to English law." Id. at 219. Indeed, perhaps if
legal education had been in the hands of the universities at this time, the rule of precedent
might have been established much earlier than it was, as a university education would have
accustomed future members of the bar to using written sources as the source of legal authority.
Plucknett notes that English law differed from the legal systems that were developed on the
continent in that English lawyers were not educated in canon law and so did not learn their
law from "texts and text-books." Id.
131. This proposition is easily established by means of an illustration: In 1401, Beaulieu v.
Finglam was tried to judgment at the Easter Term of the Court of Common Pleas. J. WALLACE,
supra note 47, at 84-86. The case was included in Y.B. 2 Henry 4, fo. 18, pl. 6 (1401). Id. at
82. It was an action for damage to a neighbor's house; the damage was alleged to have resulted
from a fire that the defendant negligently caused to occur. Id. at 84. Finglam's counsel argued
that his client was entitled to judgment because he had "counted on a common custom of the
realm." The court's response was "Pass over that, for the common law of the realm is the
common custom of the realm." Id. at 85.
132. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 403.
133. "[Ljawyers could free themselves from the old bonds of the spoken [pleas] and indulge
in tentative pleadings and arguments, trusting that nothing will be recorded until the informal
altercation has finished, and the parties have reached definite positions." Id. at 403. Plucknett
also notes that "the early Year Books are in consequence full of instances of counsel 'licking
their plea into shape' . . . in open court," an opportunity that was considered "an advance
from the old system where oral [pleas] were binding." Id..
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were denied access to the plea rolls and "could only guess what was on"
them. 3 4 This eventually led lawyers to draft their own written pleadings,
thereby "secur[ing] absolute control of what was written on the rolls.' 3 5
As written pleas emerged, "cases" were transformed from oral arguments
and memoranda of those arguments into something else. This "something
else" became the foundation for the modern conception of precedent. "Cus-
tom" and "precedent" are superficially similar in that both emphasize
consistency of outcome; that is, both systems attempt to maintain consistency
of result in situations which present identical or nearly identical factual
parameters. The distinction between them lies in the manner in which they
go about achieving their results.
In a system of customary law, results are dictated by the extent to which
a particular factual situation resembles factual situations for which custom
has devised a resolution. 3 6 Thus, in England, customary law was legitimated
by empirical consistency. During the period when the common law was
functioning as a species of customary law, the courts recited maxims in order
to link a particular exercise of judicial authority with custom, "reminding"
the populace of the empirical referent.' 37 Judicial maxims not only served
this mnemonic, "reminding" function, but also operated as ritualistic for-
mulae the intonement of which provided symbolic assurance of legitimation.
Such formulae were necessary due to the absence of any tangible manifes-
tation of custom.
By contrast, in a system that is predicated upon precedent, the legitimating
device is not simply empirical consistency but "rational consistency," which
requires that a particular result be brought within a particular "rule of law."
These "rules of law" are the result of prior exercises of judicial authority.
This is the fundamental difference between a system of customary law and
a system of precedential law: in the former, the legitimation of judicial
action is a function of empirical consistency; in the latter, although empirical
consistency is a necessary element, the legitimation function is provided by
an abstraction, by a "rule of law."' 3
134. Id. at 403.
135. Id. at 406.
136. By its very nature, custom is reluctant to develop new remedies for situations that have
not arisen before. Indeed, the argument that the early "common law" continued to function
as a system of customary law is only strengthened by that law's notable reluctance to grant
relief in any instance that could not be conformed to one of its existing writs or "forms of
action." For a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of such a system of law, see C.
RADDING, THE ORIGINS OF MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE: PAVIA AND BOLOGNA 850-1150 (1988)
[hereinafter C. RADDING, MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE]; C. RADDING, A WORLD MADE BY MEN:
COGNITION AND SOCIETY 400-1200 (1985) [hereinafter C. RADDING, A WORLD MADE BY MEN].
137. What appears to be such a maxim is included in Beaulieu v. Finglam, which is described
supra note 131. In Beaulieu, one of the justices of the Court of Common Pleas is recorded as
having made the following observation: "If a man kill or slay another by misfortune, he shall
forfeit his goods; and it is necessary that he get his character of pardon as of grace." J.
WALLACE, supra note 47, at 85. This statement sounds very much like the type of maxim that
would have been used to legitimate the exercise of judicial authority in a system of customary
law.
138. For a theoretical perspective on the relationship between particular categories of intel-
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In a fully developed system of precedential law, this "rule of law" will
be recognized as the product of judicial activism.3 9 The transition to a fully
developed system of precedential law can, however, be accomplished only
by passing through an intermediate stage which permits the accommodation
and gradual elimination of the tension between the empirical legitimacy of
customary law and the rational legitimacy of precedential law.
That is, the transition must include an intermediate stage in which judicial
decisions are accorded some quantum of legitimate authority but in which
the legitimacy of this authority is buttressed by a legitimating referent that
has an objective existence that is external to the decisionmaker. This referent
is essential in order to overcome the natural human reluctance to make
fundamental shifts in the nature of one's social reality' 4° and to provide
some assurance of stability in decisionmaking. 4' The latter consideration is
of particular importance in pre-industrial societies which are characterized
by a distaste for social innovation.142
English law moved through this intermediate stage between the thirteenth
and nineteenth centuries. During this transitional period, judicial decisions
possessed a measure of authority but that authority was grounded in the
external referent and not in the decisions qua decisions.' 43 In the early part
of this stage, when the common law's legitimacy depended upon its identity
to custom, judicial decisions were valued as "evidence of custom."' ' In the
latter part of this stage, when the common law's legitimacy depended upon
an external referent, judicial decisions were valued as the means by which
this referent manifests itself. This latter period was characterized by the
insistence that judges do not make law but, instead, simply "discover"
preexisting natural law. 45
Bracton's contribution comes at this stage, for it was Bracton who "in-
vented" the notion that one could examine particular judicial decisions in
order to ascertain the extent to which the empirical manifestation of "law"
had departed from its underlying source of legitimation.' 46 Bracton "in-
lectual operations and the social context from which they emerge, see J. WILLER, THE SOCIAL
DETERMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE (1971).
139. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 127-58 (1949). "The law ... consists
of decisions, not of rules .... [W]henever a judge decides a case he is making law." Id. at
138 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1964).
140. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 104-28.
141. See infra section Ill(A).
142. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 116-28.
143. See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *69.
144. "It is the custom which governs the decision, not the case or cases cited as proof of
the custom." J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 347.
145. See supra section III.
146. Bracton's application of this notion is apparent in his use of the cases which he relies
upon in his treatise, and is evidenced by the instances in which his "note book" identifies a
particular case as falling into "error." See, e.g., BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK, supra note 25, at 81;
see also supra section I(A)(2).
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vented" the "artifactual" use of cases, the practice by which particular
judicial decisions are used as evidence of an underlying source of legitimation.
For Bracton, that source was a type of customary law.147 Later, the source
of legitimation changed but the methodology remained the same. For ex-
ample, judicial decisions were valued only as artifacts of an underlying,
external source of legitimation. Once judicial decisions came to have value,
even artifactual value, a market arose for accounts of those decisions.
However, as long as judicial decisions were valued only as artifacts of an
underlying legitimation source, the legal system could tolerate a fair degree
of ambiguity in its accounts of those decisions. This ambiguity was permis-
sible because the artifactual value of the decisions lay in their results rather
than in the rationale that was offered to sustain the results. 148 Consequently,
the reports of this era display a high degree of idiosyncrasy in their accounts
of judicial proceedings. 49
This idiosyncrasy also resulted from another factor: because the legal
system was still evolving from a system that was predicated upon oral
invocations of an external source of legitimation, there was little, if any,
reverence for the idea of a written "record."' 150 This irreverence is expressed
in the persistent observations that written case reports are "not authority"''
147. Bracton's whole purpose is to reconstruct, and, if possible, to revive the law of
nearly a generation ago; he would put the clock back and restore the court's custom
as it used to be in its best period, and it is as evidence of that custom that he uses
his cases.
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 344.
148. See infra section III(A).
149. Speaking generally, we may say that the older contemporary reports sometimes
contradict one another, and sometimes confirm one another even on points which,
but for their concurrence, we should think had hardly been decided. It is constantly
observable, moreover, than an inferior-and sometimes in itself, only, a positively
unintelligible-report will contain certain things which enlighten and render more
complete another which, as a whole is much more accurate and valuable. Besides
this, one reporter will give you the judgment of the court, in the form of an abstract
principle; another will state you the facts on which it went; a third perhaps record
the arguments of counsel; a fourth, last of all, supply something omitted by each
of the others.
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 42.
150. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 8 (1917).
151. We find it stated .. .not that a reporter is inaccurate, not that reliance cannot
be placed upon his report, or that he is of bad authority, but that he is 'not
authority.' Take, for example, the book known as Popham's Reports. Chief Justice
Hyde, in quotini a case which is found there, while he vouches for the accuracy
of the case (having heard it), yet speaks of 'the authority of the book as none.' So
in regard to the Reports of Sir John Davies, a book of undoubted accuracy: when
these were cited, the court, not denying the accuracy of the Reports, yet informed
counsel that the book was not 'canonical;' that is .... not authoritative, not having
the force and binding efficacy of a rule. . . . In another instance, Lord Hardwick
• ..refers to Fitzgibbon's Reports, but adds: 'Which I do not care to rely on, as
it is of no authority; though this and some other cases are well reported in it; this
particularly finely.'
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 31-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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and in the lack of concern with the literal accuracy of such reports. 15 2 It
also appears in the distinction between a "case report" and the "opinion of
the court," with the former being valued more than the latter.'53
This disrespect for written accounts of prior cases had a distinct, pragmatic
advantage for those who occupied the bench at this time: if written reports
of prior cases were inaccurate, then they were of no consequence, so that
judges were free to ignore or disagree with prior, adverse decisions. 54 It also
appears, however, that jurists were not above using written reports to their
advantage by citing a case as authoritative even though it had been "mis-
reported."' 55
Although both practices may strike modern lawyers as peculiar, to say the
least, they were perfectly rational in a legal system which accorded signifi-
cance to particular judicial decisions only to the extent that they were
perceived as evidence of an underlying, external source of legitimation.
56
152. On this issue, the reader should refer back to the discussion in section I(A)(4), supra,
of the reports issued by Sir James Burrow. Burrow, of course, "nowhere professe[d] to follow
verbatim the opinions as delivered" but, instead, assured his readers only that "the case and
judgment and the outlines of the grounds or reasons of the decisions are right." J. WALLACE,
supra note 47, at 448 n.2 (emphasis in original).
153. In his discussion of the reports that were issued by Sir James Burrow, Wallace's practice
of creating a report that included three parts, i.e., the statement of the facts, arguments of
counsel and the "opinion or judgment of the court," and then goes on to criticize the style of
reporting that succeeded Burrow's:
Burrow's influence on the style of reporting remained in England for many years....
Of later times, by a departure from Sir James's plan, and referring the reader to
the 'opinion of the court' for the case, a slovenly style has frequently been exhibited.
The result has been ... [tihat the opinion becomes the whole report, . . . its value
as a report diminishing in the exact ratio of its excellence as an opinion or judgment.
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 450. Wallace also observes that "when the Judge turns himself
into reporter, and undertakes to perform the duties of that person, it is then that person should,
in presenting his report, relegate the Judge to his proper place, and confine the Judge's work
to the judicial duty alone." Id. at 450-51; see Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48 (1981).
154. Lord Campbell, Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, is reported ... to have said,
in referring to a dictum reported by Burrow in Rex v. Wilkes, as uttered by Lord
Mansfield, with which dictum the Queen's Bench did not agree:-
'As Lord Mansfield himself has said, Sir James Burrows's [Burrow's] Reports
were not always accurate.'
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 451 (footnotes omitted); see also T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13,
at 349 ("Another possibility was to blame the reporter for cases one did not like . . . a device
often used by Mansfield").
155. J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 33. Wallace says that:
In one case, Lord Rosslyn even speaks of a book as of 'considerable authority,'
yet, referring to a case reported there, calls it 'totally misreported.' And Sir William
Grant, in another case, uses similar language about the same book, the technical
'authority' of which he does not call in question.
Id. at 33 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in.the original).
156. As Sir William Holdsworth has pointed out, there were: [C]ircumstances under
which the courts considered themselves free from any obligation to follow prece-
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Because decisions were accorded only artifactual significance, courts ranked
reports in terms of the extent to which they were "recommended":
[T]ake the Year Books. The ... judges not only 'allow the publishing' of
the work, but also 'recommend the same to all students of the law,' ....
Moore is not only 'allowed,' but [is] 'approved,' . . . . Yelverton is
'allowed and approved for the common good.'. . . All these are books of
authority. Descend, however, along the scale of merit, and you find that
Keble, Siderfin, Carthew, and Bulstrone ... are merely 'allowed;' and
that the Reports in Chancery are only 'licensed.""
The ranking of case reporters is a reasonable precaution in a system in which
the judicial decisions simply "evidence" what the law actually is. Such a
ranking provides the consumers of such reports with certainty as to the
extent to which it can rely upon a particular account of a particular deci-
sion. 5 '
This changed with the completion of the transition to a system of prece-
dential law in which legitimation derives from "logically deduced proposi-
tions." 5 9 When legitimation is derived from "logically deduced propositions"
appearing in properly rendered judicial opinions, these opinions become a
valuable legal commodity because they constitute "the law." Future cases
are decided in accordance with these "precedents," which have become the
source of law.' 60 This is very unlike the older system in which "precedents"
dents. If following them would lead to 'inconvenient' results, then it was arguable
that the precedents did not represent the true state of the law.
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 349 (footnote omitted).
157. J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 34-35 & n.3. Wallace is describing the state of affairs
that prevailed under an act which was passed in 1662 and which expired in 1692. It provided
that "all books concerning the common laws of the realm should be printed by the special
allowance of" certain officials. Id. The purpose was to eliminate "abuses" in the printing of
case reports. Id.
158. Of Barnardiston, Lord Mansfield 'absolutely forbade the citing;' yet he said
nothing against the correctness of the particular case quoted; nay, admitted that
the reporter did surprisingly often stumble upon what was right; and . . .made no
objection against receiving other evidence to show exactly the same thing which
was found in the interdicted volume.
Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Wallace also describes an instance in which Lord Mansfield:
[Tlold Mr. Impey that the book was one which 'he should not have quoted;' .....
Mr. Impey receives Lord Mansfield's remark exactly as if it were the overruling of
a point of evidence: 'the book is excluded; there's an end of that;' and what the
counsel meant to show by it he shows independently of it, by producing a certificate
to the same effect from the register's book.
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
159. MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 8-9; see infra section
Il1(A).
. 160. "Judicial decisions serve two basic purposes: (1) to settle the particular dispute before
the court, and (2) to establish the law that is used to decide other cases." Weaver, The
Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 481 (1986). A
complete discussion of the rule of precedent is beyond the scope and ambition of this Article;
for such a discussion, see, e.g., B. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921);
R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 247-58 (1985); LeFlar, Sources of Judge Made Law, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 319 (1971).
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simply evidenced "custom" and an "inconvenient" precedent could be
ignored. 161
Nevertheless, in a system of precedential law it is still possible to depart
from prior practice. Such departures can be justified by "distinguishing"
the present case from precedential cases or by "reconsider[ing] and dis-
card[ing] a previous decision, either because on reflection it appears to have
been decided incorrectly or because changes in law or society have made it
obsolete." 1 62 The system is able to tolerate such departures because it is
predicated upon the recognition that judicial decisions "make law,' 1 63 as
opposed to the earlier insistence that judicial decisions simply "reveal" or
"discover" the law.
C. Case Law as Precedent-United States
The American experience is for a time the British experience, which is to
say that what became American law began as English law. Consequently,
from the earliest years of the colonial period until some time in the nineteenth
century, American law existed in the intermediate stage between customary
law and a fully articulated system of precedential law.
During this period, reports of judicial decisions were valued only to the
extent that they served as "evidence" of an external legitimating referent.
Originally, this referent was custom and later it became "natural law." ' 64
Because cases were valued only as artifacts, case reporting was an idiosyn-
cratic affair which replicated the English experience in many respects. After
American law completed the transition to a fully articulated system of
precedential law,165 the issuance of case reports became a more rigorous
exercise.
1. Intermediate Stage'66
Since colonization commenced more than three centuries after Bracton
issued his treatise, American law began with some appreciation of the role
161. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 348-349. Plucknett notes that, according to
Lord Coke, "'two or three precedents' cannot prevail against a long catena of older authority."
Id. at 349 (quoting Slade's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 91, 92, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1074 (K.B. 1602)).
162. R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 247-48.
163. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 139, at 159-71.
164. See infra section III(A).;
165. Throughout the discussion, reference will be made to the "completion" of this transition.
Such references are made to simplify the structure and progress of the discussion and are not
intended to connote that the transition to a reliance upon written precedent was a straightfor-
ward, objective process that was completed at a date and time certain. Instead, as those students
of sociological phenomenon and others should suspect, transitions of this type are a far more
nebulous phenomenon, a phenomenon the accomplishment of which is uncertain in length and
often idiosyncratic in its effects.
166. The descriptions which follow are not intended as comprehensive treatments of the
publication of case reports in the United States but are, instead, simply intended to provide an
empirical framework for the analysis which appears in section III, infra. For a comprehensive
treatment of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Aumann, American Law Reports: Yesterday and
Today, 31 OHo ST. L.J. 331 (1938); Surrency, supra note 153, at 48.
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that judicial decisions could play in the articulation and application of the
common law. This appreciation did not, however, produce a system of
printed case reports. Although there was a demand for printed statutes, "[a],
corresponding demand for copies of judicial decisions did not exist.' ' 67
Since "[tihere were no American reports,"'' 6 lawyers relied upon English
case reports and upon their "notes" of American cases. 69 The revolution
yielded a determination to create "a distinctively American body of law,"
which resulted in a distaste for English cases and an emphasis upon the
decisions of American courts.' 70 These decisions were used in an artifactual,
rather than a precedential, sense; as "evidence" of underlying "principles"
of law rather than as law in and of themselves. 17' Consequently, the means
by which decisions were made available to the legal profession differed from
those that are in use today. 72 For one thing, there was an incredible
proliferation of reporters which varied widely in the style, accuracy and
frequency of their reports.'73
As an example, in 1798 Jesse Root published a volume of Connecticut
case reports. 74 This volume did not, however, consist of verbatim reports
of opinions drafted by judges but, instead, included "brief notes, recounting
some point of interest in a trial or appellate case."' 75 One note "reports"
the case of Bacon v. Minor as follows:
167. Surrency, supra note 153, at 49.
168. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 282.
169. Id. English law books were apparently imported from the very beginning, and "[tihe
reports of English decisions continued to enjoy popularity with the American legal profession
well into the Nineteenth Century." Surrency, supra note 153, at 49.
[Llegal education ... encouraged students to prepare notebooks ... containing
the principles of law extracted from statutes and decisions, and arranged by topics.
These notebooks were later used in practice. These written sources of law were
useful to colonial and later lawyers, so that they were much less dependent upon
published volumes than are present members of the profession.
Id. at 50.
170. Surrency, supra note 153, at 54-55; see also Aumann, supra note 166, at 331-35.
171. "Colonial and early Nineteenth Century lawyers relied more on general principles of
law than on detailed fact comparisons with reported cases." Surrency, supra note 153, at 66.
172. "Lawyers in different eras have reported cases to suit their needs, and methods of
reporting have not so much progressed as merely changed in accordance with the changing
needs of the profession." Id. at 48-49.
173. "Previous to the year 1804, but eight volumes of indigenous reported cases had been
printed in America; and the lapse of only one-fifth of a century has added to the number one
hundred and ninety volumes, exclusive of many valuable reports of single cases." 9 N. AM.
REV. 377 (1824), quoted in Aumann, supra note 166, at 331, 335 n.20; see also L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 115, at 282-285; Aumann, supra note 166, at 332-43; Surrency, supra note 153, at
48-60.
174. The full title was "Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Superior Court and Supreme
Court of Errors, From July A.D. 1789 to June A.D. 1793; With A Variety of Cases Anterior
to That Period, Prefaced With Observations Upon the Government and Laws of Connecticut.
To Which is Subjoined, Sundry Law Points Adjudged, and Rules of Practice Adopted in the
Superior Court," quoted in L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 284.
175. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at 284.
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Action of defamation; for saying that the plaintiff had forged a certain
note. Issue to the jury.
Daniel Minor was offered as a witness and objected to, on the ground
that he was a joint promissor in said note, and is sued for speaking the
same words. By the Court-Not admitted being interested in the question.,76
Presumably, Root's audience found this "report" useful;17 7 contemporary
lawyers are likely to regard it as having the precedential value of one of the
headnotes that are appended to modern case reports as research aids. It is
true that both were prepared by the reporter rather than by the court.
Modern lawyers accord no legal significance to such appendages 178 but at
the time Root's volume appeared, that was not the case. This "report" was
offered and presumably used as a "precedent" by Root's contemporaries,
which illustrates the extent to which conceptions of precedent have changed
in the past two centuries.
7 9
Root's reports illustrate one type of early reporter. Others included "ju-
dicial opinions" that were drafted from notes taken by the reporter8 ° while
still others included opinions, "headnotes" and arguments of counsel.' 8'
Additionally, "pamphlet" reporters provided accounts of noteworthy trials. 18 2
All of these reporters supplied early nineteenth century lawyers with their
"precedents," but "precedents" were not limited to printed case reports:
Legal literature . . . contains frequent references to unreported decisions.
Wharton's Digest, published in Philadelphia in 1822, refers to unreported
176. Bacon v. Minor, 1 Root 258 (Conn. 1791), quoted in L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 115, at
284.
177. This is perhaps because of its "holding," i.e., that Minor's testimony "was not allowed
on the grounds that [he] had a financial stake in the matter litigated." L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 115, at 284 n.53.
178. "[H]eadnote paragraphs are not authority but only indexes to it." M. PRICE & H.
BITNER, supra note 2, at 96.
179. It also illustrates the proposition that was adduced earlier, i.e., that during this era case
reports were used as artifacts of law rather than "as law." See supra section I(B)(2). Root's
reports are still a recognized case reporter, which apparently means that Bacon can still be
cited as a reported case notwithstanding its dramatic stylistic departure from modern case
reports. According to the Bluebook, Root's reports can be cited as published reports of the
cases that appear therein. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 181 (14th ed. 1986) ("Cite to
Conn., Day, or Root, and to A. or A.2d if therein"). The citation form that is given is the
form for "reported" cases, as opposed to the citation form that is provided for "unreported"
cases. See M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 50-51.
180. The first volume of DALLAS REPORTS includes manuscript records of decisions
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which were obviously written by persons in
attendance when the opinions were pronounced. Their original authors are not
known.
Surrency, supra note 153, at 51 (footnote omitted) (capitals in original).
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id. at 52-53. "Pamphlet reporting continued into the nineteenth Century, and some
pamphlets were originally considered ... as part of the decisional literature of the states." Id.
at 52 (citing D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 659, 660 (1836)). "The PENNSYLVANIA
STATE TRIALS, reported by E. Hogan, is often considered as part of a complete library of
Pennsylvania reports." Id. at 53 (capitals in original).
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decisions as did Dane's Abridgement, published in Boston during the
1820's. . . .This evidence suggests that in many jurisdictions a small
cohesive bar used non-printed sources as a matter of course.'83
Thus, American law reports, like their English counterparts, were idiosyn-
cratic, with a high level of ambiguity. The demise of idiosyncratic law
reporting began with the appearance of statutes requiring that judges issue
written opinions "rather than merely stat[ing] them orally. 1 4 Such statutes
revealed the extent to which American law was oral law while setting in
motion its destruction and replacing it with a system which depends upon
written precedent. 185
Idiosyncratic law reporting's demise was hastened by another innovation,
"the appointment of official court reporters, whose duty it was to attend
the courts and publish judicial opinions."' 18 6 The Supreme Court made the
first such appointment in 1790 and several states followed suit.8 7 The
appointments resulted from the belief that law was "a science, a body of
knowledge that had its own structure and was reducible to rational propo-
sitions." '8 This "reduction" was to be achieved scientifically, by using
empirical data such as case reports to "identify the larger structure" of the
underlying "natural law" and map out its contours. 8 9
183. Surrency, supra note 153, at 51 (footnotes omitted). Surrency notes that this practice
occurred in Alabama, and quotes an instance in which a Pennsylvania court relied upon a
"manuscript note" of an unpublished English decision. See id. at 51 n.10 (quoting Clayton v.
Clayton, 3 Binn. 476, 485 (Pa. 1811)).
184. Surrency, supra note 153, at 55; see also M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 94
("In the United States, contrary to English practice, opinions of courts are read instead of
being delivered orally"). In 1785, Connecticut adopted a statute requiring that its judges give
their opinions serially, including their rationales, and put their opinions in writing. Surrency,
supra note 153, at 55. Other states followed suit.
185. See Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 486 (1930).
186. Surrency, supra note 153, at 55.
187. "'Official' reporting began with the appointment in 1790 by the Supreme Court of the
United States of an official reporter, resulting in the initial volume of the United States Reports
(1 Dallas), which, however, contained nothing but Pennsylvania Supreme Court reports." M.
PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 95. In 1804, both Massachusetts and New York enacted
statutes authorizing the appointment of "official" reporters and other states followed their
lead. Surrency, supra note 153, at 56-60. The Massachusetts statute imposed upon the reporter
the duty to obtain and publish accurate reports. Id. at 56.
188. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 15 (1987). They also resulted from a desire to, in the modern vernacular, "keep judges
honest." One observer noted that when judges "know that their opinions may be severely
scrutinized" and when they "write their opinions at length, and themselves prepare them for
the press, they have every inducement ... to be laborious, accurate, and impartial." 27 N.
AM. REV. 179-80 (1828). Others made similar observations. See, e.g., Aumann, supra note 166,
at 331, 337 (citing 1 C. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *455, 462, 463). While this
reflects a nascent realization of the role judges play in the creation of the law, it has no
profound significance for this discussion.
189. Berring, supra note 188, at 16-17. "A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in
any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence we can
have of the law applicable to the subject .... J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
476 (14th ed. 1896).
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"Because these early reports were cited by the name of the reporter, a
definite feeling persisted that the reporter was far more important than the
judges who rendered the decisions." 19o Consequently, certain reports were
valued more highly than others.' 9' Such preferences disappeared once states
required that their reports be identified by the name of the jurisdiction rather
than by the name of the reporter.' 92 With this, the whole tenor of law
reporting changed: reports no longer reflected the efforts of a particular
reporter but, instead, appeared in volumes which displayed a standardized
numbering system and a standard nomenclature. 93
2. Contemporary Reports
The perception that cases constituted the substance of the law prompted
the appearance of "official" reporters, and by the end of the nineteenth
century, most jurisdictions had established a system of "official" reports.' 94
190. Surrency, supra note 153, at 58 (footnote omitted) (citing Rudd, Reports and Some
Reporters, 47 AM. L. REV. 481 (1913); Reports and Reporters, 24 AM. JURIST 335 (1841)). And,
indeed, this was true in certain respects; it is difficult for modern lawyers to comprehend the
extent to which these early reporters "participated" in the creation of their reports.
191. The reports issued by Judge Isaac Blackford of the Indiana Supreme Court between
1817 and 1841 are an example. See, e.g., Surrency, supra note 153, at 57. A similar state of
affairs prevailed with regard to the reporters of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court: "Names like Wheaton, Dallas, and Howard, are all better known than some of the
Nineteenth Century justices" of that Court. Id. at 58. This paralleled the English practice of
"ranking" reporters according to the degree to which they were "authorized." See supra section
I(B)(2).
192. Surrency, supra note 153, at 58. Connecticut passed such a measure in 1814; other states
followed suit, so that the "nominative reporters" had disappeared by the close of the nineteenth
century.
Formerly, the reporter commonly gave his name to his series of reports, as Dallas,
Pickering, or Wendell, regardless of the jurisdiction reported. About the middle of
the nineteenth century this cumbersome practice was dropped in favor of naming
the series after the jurisdiction, as United States or Massachusetts. In those official
series still current at the time, the existing volumes were renumbered consecutively
from the earliest one. Thus, there were then ninety such renumbered United States
Reports (Dallas through Wallace), ninety-six Massachusetts Reports, etc. However,
in spite of the renumbering, these early 'nominatives' are still cited in their original
form. Thus, 90 U.S. is cited as 23 Wallace, but 91 U.S. is not 1 Otto but 91 U.S.
Similarly for state reports.
M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 95-96.
193. See, e.g., Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 20.
194. See, e.g., M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 93-116; Surrency, supra note 153,
at 48. "Because it was common for the courts in a jurisdiction to require citation to the official
report, the official sets quickly became definitive." Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 20. The
articulation of the rationale for this distinction seems never to have advanced beyond its
pragmatic origins. That is, certain reports are "official" because they are prepared under the
aegis of the court. This is illustrated by Price and Bitner's explanation of "[w]hat makes a
report official":
This is not always clear. Those prepared by the statutorily appointed reporter and
published under authorization of statute are certainly official, and this category
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These reports were an attempt to control the case reports that were now
regarded as a valuable legal commodity. Because they were a valuable legal
commodity, case reports became an attractive business commodity: by the
end of the nineteenth century, commercial publishers were making profits
by reprinting reports from the "official" reporters. 195 Reprints were profit-
able because many "official" reports issued editions that were too limited
to satisfy the demands of an expanding legal profession and because the
reprints were often better reports.' 96
The initial advantage of commercial law reporting, however, was its speed:
when West Publishing began its operations in 1879, "the official state reports
were published only in bound form, usually more than a year and often
several years after the decision date." '1 97 This sluggishness was due to a
number of factors, not the least of which was a minimal financial incentive
to the contrary. 9 Although all of the commercial reporters bested the official
reporters in this regard, West Publishing Company outstripped its compet-
itors by resuscitating a practice from the era of the Year Books.' 99 West
issued reports:
includes all but a handful of the current state reports. Until about the middle of
the 19th century, . . . it was customary for the official reporter to publish and
distribute reports at his own expense or profit, and the reports were known by his
name. Whether or not these were official in the present day sense is academic; they
exist and are acceptably cited in any legal writing ....
M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 116.
195. Surrency, supra note 153, at 60-61.
196. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted) (citing C. SOULE, THE LAWYER'S REFERENCE MANUAL OF
LAW BOOKS AND CITATIONS 22 n.2 (1883)).
Although official sets met the need for systematic production, they failed to meet
lawyers' varied and growing needs as legal activity expanded rapidly during ...
industrialization. The explosion of legal activity created a need for better tools, or
at the very least, established a growing market for them. The old, inefficient process
was founded on assumptions from another age and could not respond to the wild
growth in legal materials.
Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 20.
197. M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 118-19.
198. In the early years of "official" reporting, the most common form of reimbursement
for these reporters was a "combination of salary and sales profit." Surrency, supra note 153,
at 59. Unfortunately, this arrangement had a variety of undesirable effects both for the reporters
and for the legal profession. In Pennsylvania, for example, a statute "limited the reporter to
two volumes annually to be sold at not more than four dollars per volume"; if the reporter
sold his volumes for more than the allowed price, he was subject to a two hundred dollar fine.
Id. This, of course, created a financial disincentive toward the timely issuance of volumes to
the extent that timely issuance would have required exceeding the two volume per year figure.
Other statutes placed page limitations on the volumes that could be issued which, again, created
disincentives toward timely, comprehensive publication. Id. And other problems arose: in North
Carolina, the official reporter could price his reports at one cent per page, which made them
very expensive and "may explain why ... the position of reporter was abolished" at one point
in time. Id. By the end of the century, these arrangements had disappeared, so that "all
reporters were on salary and all reports were printed at the expense of the states." Id. at 60.
199. See supra section l(A)(3).
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[I]n parts which, later, the subscribers could bind into volumes. The
advantage . . . was that decisions . . . were available at an earlier date
than the past practice of issuing opinions as a bound volume. Prior to
this . . . no means existed for the systematic early publication of decisions
in regular form. The 'advance sheet' . . . thus made its appearance and
has become a standard form of legal publishing.2°0
Other factors in West's success were its unique approach to law reporting
and the standardization of its reports.
20 1
Unlike its rivals in the nineteenth century, West seems to have decided
very early that success lay in publishing a comprehensive system of reports. 2 2
Its empire began in 1876, when John B. West and Company issued "a
modest pamphlet known as 'The Syllabi."' 2 3 Three years later, the North
Western Reporter appeared and by 1887 "the entire nation was embraced
in a series of Seven Reporters, which are now units of the National Reporter
System.' ' z°4 West later added federal reports to this system. 205 Aside from
the volume of cases that it made available, the National Reporter System
had other advantages: the reports were accurate and included features that
facilitated legal research. With regard to the former, West "prided itself on
gathering decisions and verifying the text with the judge who wrote them."1206
With regard to the latter, West transformed case reports into a standardized
product 20 7 and became the dominant supplier of that product by keeping "to
200. Surrency, supra note 153, at 62-63.
201. See, e.g., W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH, LEADERSHIP
(1969); M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 118-19. "[W]hat made the West Company
dominant as a publisher of legal decisions was its standardization of court reports and its
comprehensive reporting." Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21.
202. In 1887, West Publishing Company obtained the Eastern Reporter, published by
William Gould, Jr. and Company of Albany, New York. The last number of this
title contained a 'Valedictory' in which the editors admitted that the comprehensive
system such as that proposed by the West Publishing Company would 'alternatively
prevail over any local and fragmentary enterprises of the same character.'
Surrency, supra note 153, at 62 (footnote omitted) (quoting 21 AMER. L. REV. 963 (1887)).
203. WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, WEST's LAW FINDER: A LEGAL RESEARCH MANUAL 5 (1987)
[hereinafter WEST'S LAW FINDER]; see also Surrency, supra note 153, at 62. The Syllabi was a
weekly pamphlet that reported the decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Id.
204. WEST's LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 5; see also Surrency, supra note 153, at 62.
The seven reporters "listed in order of their addition to the system, are: North Western, Pacific,
North Eastern, Atlantic, South Western, Southern, and South Eastern." WEST'S LAW FINDER,
supra note 203, at 5.
205. Id. at 6-7. Federal cases are currently reported in the Supreme Court Reporter, the
Federal Reporter, Federal Supplement, Federal Rules Decisions, Bankruptcy Reporter, Military
Justice Reporter and Claims Court Reporter. Id.
206. Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21; see also WEST'S LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 9-
10.
207. This was because West:
[E]stablished a uniform format for reporting. All West reporters were designed
according to the same formula. West produced a sterile court reporting system that
guaranteed reliability through similarity. Caption, syllabus, and headnotes appeared
in the same form in all jurisdictions. They were produced by a centralized staff
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a regular schedule and [keeping] its prices low."2 8
West's triumph was the triumph of a particular philosophy of case law
reporting. "Two competing philosophies of law reporting continue to this
day: one is devoted to publishing all decisions, and the other is based upon
reporting selected decisions." 2°9 England relies upon the latter, America upon
the former.210
English law has a firmly rooted tradition of oral opinions. Thus, "any
written report signed or initialed by a barrister present when the opinion
was delivered . . . or any oral report vouched for by a barrister could ...
be cited in court." 21 1 Written reports were intended to make decisions
accessible to an audience which was wider and more varied than that which
was present for a particular pronouncement. Nevertheless, oral opinions
could be cited, and written reports did not constitute the only form in which
opinions existed as "precedent." Because written reports did not constitute
the entire body of precedent, it was perfectly reasonable to limit these reports
to the "highlights" of a particular judicial term. 21 2
and were drafted to fit into the pre-existing structure. Although previous digests
and abridgments presented and described cases, the West digests created a subject
structure and fit all new cases into it.
Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21 (footnotes omitted); see also WEST'S LAW FINDER, supra
note 203, at 7-33.
208. Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21.
209. Surrency, supra note 153, at 63. See also A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L.
REV. 396, 406 (1889) (John B. West arguing that "it is one of the great merits of the National
System that it gives all the cases"); id. at 661 (critically reporting on West Company's
disparagement of rival publisher); id. at 805 (Albany Law Journal's comment on the sympo-
sium).
210. M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysiEwIcz, supra note 70, at 333. "This method allows]
for publication of only a fraction of the available decisions with selection made under a set of
predetermined criteria." Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21. The English publish reports of
cases "concerning new points of law and those of permanent interest to the legal profession."
M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYSIEWICZ, supra note 70, at 333. The publication criteria are also
described as emphasizing decisions "involving new principles of law and cases interpreting
established principles in light of modern circumstances." Id. at 335.
211. Id. at 283, 331; see also M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 283 ("any written
report signed or initialled by a barrister, or any oral report vouched by a barrister, is citable
in court").
212. In the nineteenth century, there were selective American reporters. They reported cases
"on the basis of probable usefulness and as illustrative of established principles, and were not
confined to 'leading cases."' They included the American Reports (1869-1887), American
Decisions (through 1868), American State Reports (1887-1911), Lawyers Reports Annotated
(1888-1918), American and English Annotated Cases (1906-1911) and American Annotated
Cases (1912-1918). See, e.g., M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 127-28. The purpose was
"to make available ... a limited selection of cases of interest in all jurisdictions," an important
undertaking "[in the days before law libraries were as complete and accessible as they are
now." M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. ByssawIcz, supra note 70, at 172. For a time, they were
rivals with the West reporters but the latter prevailed, so that only one selective reporter
survives. Id. at 171-72 (these reporters "merged in 1918 into the current American Law Reports
Annotated").
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3. The West Publishing Company and American Case Reporting
The value of decisions . . .as precedents is . . .practically nonexistent if
the[y] . . .are not printed but are of record only in the clerk's office of
the court where decided .... [Sluch unprinted reports are in effect secret
.... Selective printing of reports excluded too many cases which should
have been reported and was one of the reasons for the establishment of
the National Reporter System which publishes many thousands of otherwise
unreported appellate decisions.23
Although "the expansion of jurisdictions and the growing litigiousness
brought on by the Industrial Revolution played a major role in the growth
of case law, " 1 4 it was not inevitable that this would produce a concomitant
growth in case reports. The growth in case reports resulted from the per-
ception that they were an essential legal commodity; while West may not
have created this perception, it exploited it to good advantage.2"5
The perception had several consequences for the publication of case re-
ports. The first was the decline of the "official" reporters. If case reports
were a commodity that was essential for the practice of law, then lawyers
would obtain them from the source that could provide the most comprehen-
sive scheme of case reports with the most speed. 2 6 The West Publishing
213. M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysiawIcz, supra note 70, at 140 (emphasis added).
214. Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21 (emphasis added).
215. The Preface to the initial volume of the Federal Reporter, for example, included the
following observations as to the utility of the new reporter:
'The plan,' says the distinguished circuit judge of the first circuit, 'is an admirable
one, and the FEDERAL REPORTER will be absolutely indispensable to all prac-
titioners in the courts of the United States, and highly useful to all other lawyers.'
The publishers, therefore, confidently submit this new enterprise to the favorable
consideration of the members of a busy and arduous profession, who cannot well
afford to neglect any means that may serve to decrease their labors, and bring
precedents to the aid of principles in the solution of legal problems.
1 F. iv (1880); see also WEST's LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 5-7.
Lawyers chose the comprehensive style of reporting, preferring that all precedent
be available. There can be little doubt that publication of so many decisions was
an incentive for the publication of even more decisions. Once the pattern of
comprehensiveness was established, the volume of cases published grew apace.
Whether the gigantic growth in published cases was a response to an existing
demand or the product of a stimulated demand is, in the end, not relevant. By the
middle of the twentieth century, an enormous structure of standardized case re-
porting had evolved. Far too many cases for any individual to master were now
available. . . .No longer could memory serve as the lawyer's main tool.
Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21-22.
216. Proper application of the rule of ...precedent requires the speedy availability
of the latest reports of decided cases in point. At the time the National Reporter
System was inaugurated in 1879, the official state reports made a farce of this rule,
because they were published from one to several years after the decision date. The
situation has improved little since then. This is because law report publication is
expensive. In most states, there are not enough cases decided during a year to
1990]
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Company offered such a scheme: its philosophy has always been to publish
every decision to which it can gain access regardless of whether or not that
decision appeared in an "official" reporter. 21 7 As lawyers relied more and
more upon the West reports, their use of the "official" reports declined.
As the use of "official" reports declined, publication in an "official"
reporter ceased to have any significance with regard to a decision's prece-
dential status: "The fact that [decisions published in a West reporter] were
unreported in the official reports in no way lessen[ed] their authority as
precedents. ' 21 s If publication in an official report had no effect upon a
decision's precedential value, then there seemed to be little if any reason to
maintain two systems for reporting the same cases. Consequently, states
began to abolish the reporters that they had so painfully established in the
nineteenth century. In those jurisdictions, publication in a West reporter
became the only means by which decisions could appear in print and thereby
attain precedential status. 21 9
justify the publication of more than a single volume. The contribution of the
National Reporter System . . .was to collate the reports of several contiguous states
in order to provide sufficient text to justify the expense of publishing them weekly.
The result was the 'advance sheet' ....
M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysIEwicz, supra note 70, at 166.
217. See, e.g., Surrency, supra note 153, at 63; see also Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 21-
22. The reporters in the National Reporter System "currently report in full all state appellate
court decisions that are received from the courts for publication . . . [and] thousands of
decisions that were not reported in the State Reports or that were reported there only as
memorandum decisions." WEST's LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 5 (emphasis added).
Not all of the reports of cases decided in any court are published. Whether or not
they are is, for most courts, a matter of editorial discretion on the part of the
official reporter. In most jurisdictions, if the official reporter decides that a given
case is merely routine and adds nothing to the state of the law, such a case is not
reported. . . .[Tihe National Reporter editors . . . believed that too few cases were
being published. Accordingly, they have printed thousands of cases not officially
published.
M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. Bysmwicz, supra note 70, at 167. "The editors feel that many
decisions, unreported in the official reports, merit publication. As a result, many thousands of
decisions elsewhere unavailable in print, are found in the Reporters." M. PRICE & H. BITNER,
supra note 2, at 119:
According to literature issued by the West Publishing Company, it was founded "[t]o furnish
the legal profession ... with prompt and reliable intelligence as to the various questions
adjudicated by our ...courts at a date long prior to the publication of the regular reports."
WEST's LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 5 (quoting from " The Syllabi").
218. M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 2, at 119. "It must be emphasized that just because
certain Regional cases have not been officially published, their authority as precedents is in no
way diminished." M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysiEwicz, supra note 70, at 167.
219. Id. at 161.
Once every state had an official court report to which its courts preferred to be
cited. Their number is now diminishing, and there is a trend toward discontinuing
the official reports and relying, instead, upon reports published by private publishers.
The following states have discontinued the publication of official reports: Alabama,
Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Mis-
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This had always been true for federal courts other than the United States
Supreme Court. Although there is an official Supreme Court reporter, the
lower federal courts have never enjoyed the status of an "official" case
reporter.220 "[S]ome 233 different reporters at various times printed lower
federal court decisions" until West initiated the Federal Reporter in 1880,
which was initially dedicated to "the prompt and complete publication of
the judicial opinions delivered in each of the United States circuit and district
courts. ' 221 In 1923, West added the Federal Supplement and gave it the task
of publishing the decisions of the district courts; since then, the Federal
Reporter has been devoted exclusively to publishing the decisions of inter-
mediate federal appellate courts.222 Since 1880, therefore, West reports have
been the only means of accessing the decisions of the lower federal courts.
223
The value 2 24 of West's reports continued to increase because they were the
only means for accessing the decisions of certain courts, and because they
appeared in a format which provided the most coherent means for accessing
the decisions of any court. 22 As its reports increased in value, West issued
souri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.
Id. It is also, of course, possible that decisions from these states will be reported in American
Law Reports, as well. See id. at 171-81. The proposition that publication is an essential
concomitant of precedential status is considered in section III, infra.
220. See, e.g., M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysniwIcz, supra note 70, at 152 (decisions of
the lower federal courts have "appeared only in a multitude of unofficial series before 1880
and in units of the unofficial National Reporter System since then").
221. 1 F. iii (1880). The Preface also indicates that the reporter published "both oral and
written opinions," and that it obtained these opinions from court clerks, from court stenog-
raphers and from "qualified attorneys, employed specially for that purpose." Id. "It is believed
that .. .many able and learned opinions will be rescued from a most undeserved oblivion,
while greater uniformity in the interpretation of the federal statutes and the practice of the
various federal courts will at the same time be secured." Id. In 1894 a new reporter appeared,
the purpose of which was to organize this body of decisional law into a coherent whole. This
reporter, Federal Cases, simply reprinted the decisions that were issued between 1789 and 1880
and arranged them by "title and an arbitrary case number." M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S.
Bysiawlcz, supra note 70, at 157-58.
222. "[Tlhat is, the Courts of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
United States Court of Custom and Patent Appeals and the patent, trade-mark, and customs
cases from the United States Emergency Court of Appeals." M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S.
BysIawicz, supra note 70, at 159.
223. See, e.g., Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 137, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("There are no
official published reports of the opinions of the federal district courts"), aff'd, 207 F.2d 526
(2d Cir. 1962).
224. "Value," here, refers both to simple economic value, as expressed in the price charged
for the reports, and to the more nebulous concept of "social" value. This concept of "social
value" is implicit in the discussion of the "factual" approach to case reports which appears in
the text. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Berring, supra note 188, at 15, 22-25.
So long as the reporting of decisions was limited to those cases selected by members
of the bar for their particular rectitude and value as examples, and to cases noted
for their utility by a practitioner or a judge, the literature was subject to a certain
quality control. . . .But ...[wihen publication standards shifted from a selection
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more and more of them, which required that more and more judicial opinions
be located and processed into case reports. This process expanded with
almost exponential rapidity during the recent years of this century.2 26
4. Recent Adventures in Selective Publication
Lawyers have come to rely more and more upon "case reports" as the
means by which they gain access to precedents. As the most visible mani-
festation of precedents, case reports have become objects of concern; after
comprehensive reporting prevailed, reports proliferated, producing fears that
the decisional law was becoming unmanageable. 227 At the end of the nine-
teenth century, an American Bar Association committee studied the problem
and considered "withholding opinions from publication" but concluded that
"public papers cannot be suppressed and therefore [this] course of action
was not feasible.""22 By the end of the 1940's, however, certain lower federal
courts were "withholding opinions from publication ' 229 and the others would
criteria of quality and utility to total comprehensiveness in coverage, the nature of
legal literature changed dramatically. Now the legal researcher was confronted with
enormous amounts of available and largely undigested data. The precedent that
was available did not emerge from a coherent and cohesive pattern ... but instead
emerged as a large body of unorganized and contradictory principles.
Id. at 22; see also id. at 24-25 (impact of West's Key Number System upon the structure of
American law).
226. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 59-93.
227. "[T]he period from 1790 to 1840 produced 50,000 reported decisions; the next 50 years,
450,000; the next 50 years, ending in 1940, 1,250,000; and from 1940 to 1960, approximately
600-700,000 opinions were published." Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of
Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 L. LIBR. J. 362 (1974). For statistics on
the current status of decisions of federal courts, see, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 59-
93; Reynolds & Richman, The Non-precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-citation
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978). In 1821, Mr.
Justice Story predicted that the nation was in danger of being "buried alive, not in the
catacombs but in the labyrinths of the law" and called for measures to confine the ever-
increasing corpus of the law to manageable proportions. Aumann, supra note 166, at 331, 342
n.40 (quoting Story, "Address delivered before the members of the Suffolk Bar in 1821,"
reprinted in I AM. JURIST 31 (1829)). Such observations continued throughout the nineteenth
and on into the twentieth century: "Unless courts set some restraints on the length and number
of published opinions, . . . our present system of making the law reports the chief repository
of new unwritten law will break down of its own weight." H.F. STONE, LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION 214 (1915), quoted in Aumann, supra note 166, at 343; see also O'Connell,
A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 13 (1949) (discussing the perceived problem);
Warren, The Welter of Decisions, 10 ILL. L. REV. 472 (1916) (same). They echoed Sir Francis
Bacon's call for a reduction "of the course or the core of the common law by omitting from
the reports all 'cases wherein there is solemnly and long debated matter whereof there is now
no question at all and cases merely of iteration and repetition."' Chanin, supra, at 362.
228. Surrency, supra note 153, at 64 (citing 8 REP. A.BA. 39 (1885); 16 REP. A.B.A. 345
(1895); 21 REP. A.B.A. 440 (1898)).
229. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 227, at 15 (discussing a report reprinted in Opinions
of Courts: Should Number Published Be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668 (1948)); Prince, Law
Books, Unlimited, 48 A.B.A. J. 134 (1962); Whitehair, Opinions of Courts: Fifth Circuit Acts
Against Unneeded Publication, 33 A.B.A. J. 751 (1947).
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eventually follow suit.230
Restricted publication was implemented in the federal courts as the result
of recommendations issued by the Federal Judicial Center. 23' The Judicial
Conference of the United States adopted these recommendations and directed
that each of the circuit courts of appeal "develop an opinion publication
plan."23 2 In 1973, the Federal Judicial Center issued a model publication
plan that became "the template for many of the rules subsequently prom-
ulgated by the United States courts of appeals. ' 233 Those rules continue in
230. Judge Posner notes that prior to the 1970's, "all opinions in federal court of appeals
cases were published by the West Publishing Company in the Federal Reporter, or its successor,
Federal Reporter, Second." R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 129. The discussion emphasizes
practices among the courts of appeal and the district courts, as the Supreme Court has not
adopted restricted publication: "All decisions for which there are written opinions are published
both in the official United States Reports and in the unofficial Lawyers' Edition and Supreme
Court Reporter." M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYsLEwiCz, supra note 70, at 152. The imple-
mentation of restricted publication has been considered at great length and with great erudition
elsewhere and is not a primary concern of this Article. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR
& M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); Nichols, Selective Publication of Opinions: One
Judge's View, 35 AMER. U.L. REV. 909 (1986); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167;
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989); Weaver, supra note 160,
at 477.
231. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ANN. REP. 7-8 (1971); BOARD OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE APRIL 1972 SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PUBLICATION OF COURTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS (1972). The
report issued by the Board of the Federal Judicial Center recommended that the Judicial
Conference direct each of the circuits to implement the following modifications in their
publication policies:
a. Opinions will not be published unless ordered by a majority of the panel rendering
the decision;
b. Non-published opinions should not be cited, either in briefs or in court opinions;
c. When an opinion is not published the public record shall be completed by
publishing the judgment of the Court.
Id. at 1, quoted in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167, 1170.
232. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167, 1170. In 1964, the Judicial Conference
adopted a resolution requiring that the "Judges of the Courts of Appeals and the district courts
authorize jublication of only those opinions which are of general precedential value." REPORT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 11 (1964). For
the concerns that prompted restrictive publication, see, e.g., COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE
FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CHANGE (June 1975); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE. A PRELIMINARY
REPORT (Apr. 1975).
233. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1171 (footnote omitted). The Model Rule
provided that opinions should not be published unless they: (a) established a new rule of law
or altered or modified an existing rule of law; (b) involved "a legal issue of continuing public
interest;" (c) "criticize[d] existing law;" or (d) resolved "an apparent conflict of authority."
Id. at 1171 n.28; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, FJC RESEARCH SERIES
No. 73-2, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1973).
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effect with modifications that have appeared in the years since 1973.234
The rules distinguish between "published" opinions, which are "prec-
edent," and "unpublished" opinions, which are generally not considered
"precedent. '235 However, these rules make no concerted effort to define
what is meant by "publication, '23 6 a noteworthy omission given that
there is no official reporter for the lower federal courts. 2 7 Because there
is no official reporter, the rules seem to equate "publication" with being
printed in an unofficial West reporter, 28  such as the Federal
234. See e.g., lST CIR. R. 36.2; 3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. F(1),(3); 4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC.
36.3-36.4; 6TH CIR. R. 24; 6TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 14.4; 7TH CIR. R. 53; 8TH CIR. PLAN FOR
PUB. OF OPINIONS; 9TH CIR. R. 36.1; 10TH CIR. R. 36; 1ITH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 3; D.C. CIR.
R. 14; FED. CIR. R. 47.8.
235. See, e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 36, as amended, effective January 1, 1989 ("Unpublished
opinions and orders and judgments of this court have no precedential value and shall be not
be cited").
Unpublished opinions . . . are those unanimously determined by the panel as not
adding significantly or usefully to the body of law and not having precedential
value. Opinions . . . designated as unpublished shall not be employed as precedent
by this court, and may not be cited by counsel as precedent.
FED. CIR. R. 47.8(c). Unpublished opinions can be cited "in support of a claim of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case." Id. This is a standard feature of many of the rules,
and is an interpretation that has been applied to all of them. See, e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (as
amended effective Jan. 1, 1989); Nichols, supra note 230, at 909; Weaver, supra note 160, at
477; cf. 11TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36-1(E) ("Although unpublished opinions may be cited as
precedent, this is looked upon with disfavor by the Court"); accord 6TH CIR. R. 24; 4TH CIR.
INT. OP. PROC. 36.5.
236. The Seventh Circuit rule does attempt to clarify the issue, providing that publication
means:
(i) Printing the opinion as a slip opinion;
(ii) Distributing the printed slip opinion to all federal judges within the circuit, legal
publishing companies, libraries and other regular subscribers, interested United
States attorneys, departments and agencies, and the news media; and
(iii) Unlimited citation as precedent.
7TH CIR. R. 53 (as amended, effective Jan. 1, 1989). Unpublished opinions are "typewritten
and reproduced by copying machine," subject to limited distribution and are reported only in
a table of dispositions in the Federal Reporter. Id. This rule is predicated upon what was once
a common practice, i.e., the practice by which the various courts of appeals printed and
distributed their own slip opinions. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYsIEwIcz, supra note 70, at 152:
Each of the . . . Courts of Appeals . . . prints and distributes its slip decisions ...
Reversing the usual practice-that the unofficial reports print decisions not officially
reported-the above slip decisions may print per curiam decisions not printed in
the unofficial Federal Reporter. . . . All courts . . . accept citations to the unofficial
only.
Id. at 157 (emphasis in original). Due to budgetary constraints, all the courts of appeals except
the Seventh Circuit have ceased this practice, so that there is no longer any "official" publication
of their opinions.
238. One rule, for example, begins by providing that:
[The] disposition of appeals may be announced in a published or unpublished
opinion ... 'Published' means the opinion . . . has been . . . forwarded for
publication in one or more commercial reports of decisions. 'Unpublished' means
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Reporter.239 Under these rules, therefore, an opinion is "published" when
its full text appears in that reporter and "unpublished" when only a notation
of the disposition of the case appears. 240
Although the rules of the respective courts of appeals are phrased differ-
ently, each is based upon the concept of precedent that is noted above, that
precedent is a commodity the existence or nonexistence of which can be
determined by whether or not the full text of an opinion is printed in a
volume of the Federal Reporter.241 This concept is illustrated by a provision
from the Eighth Circuit: "It is unnecessary for the court .. . to publish
every opinion written. The ... nonpublication of an opinion does not mean
that the case is considered unimportant. It does mean that an opinion in the
case will not add to the body of law and will not have value as precedent.' '242
The premise underlying this concept of precedent is that courts can dis-
tinguish between "precedential" and "nonprecedential" opinions. 243 Accord-
an opinion ...that has not been prepared for publication in a commercial report
of decisions.
FED. CR. R. 47.8(a); see also 9TH CIR. R. 36-1; D.C. CIR. R. 14.
239. See, e.g., 6TH CiR. R. 24; 6TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 14.
Although not official reporters of this court the West Publishing Company in its
Federal Reporter and, in Virgin Islands cases, also the Equity Publishing Corpo-
ration in its Virgin Islands Reports report for the information and use of the bench
and bar those opinions of this court which the court desires to have published.
3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. F(I). The presumption of publication in the Federal Reporter is explicit
in the Sixth Circuit's rule and in the above quoted procedure from the Third Circuit, but is
implicit in the rules of certain of the other circuits. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-1 ("As used in
this rule, the term publication means to make a disposition available to legal publishing
companies to be reported and cited"); FED. CIR. R. 47.8(A) ('Published' means the opinion
... has been prepared and forwarded for publication in one or more commercial reports of
decisions. 'Unpublished' means an opinion ... that has not been prepared for publication in
a commercial report of decisions.").
240. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. ("The style of all nonpublished opinions is published
in table form in the Federal Reporter."); accord 4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36.4 ("The Federal
Reporter periodically lists the result in all cases involving unpublished opinions"); 11TH CIR.
INT. OP. PROC. 36-1(3) ("All non-published opinions and affirmances without opinion ... are
printed in table form in the Federal Reporter"). By the same token, "publication" for district
court cases seems to mean that they have appeared in printed form in the Federal Supplement.
See, e.g., Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 137, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (no official reports for
the opinions of the federal district courts, so that the West reports furnish "the only compre-
hensive compilation of such opinions"), aff'd, 207 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1962).
241. See R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 120.
242. FED. R. APP. PROC., (28 U.S.C.) 8th Circuit Rules, Appendix II, 8th Cir. Plan for
Pub. of Opinions, sec. 1; see also IST CiR. R. 36.2 (general policy of publication may be
overcome where opinion does not change the law, apply the law to new situation, or otherwise
guide future litigants); 4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36.3-36.4 (opinions will only be published if
they change the law, involve a legal issue of public interest, criticize existing law, review the
history of a rule for the first time, resolve an intra-circuit conflict or create an inter-circuit
conflict); IITH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36-1 ("unlimited publication of opinions is undesirable
because it tends to impair the development of the cohesive body of law"); D.C. CIR. R. 14
("All published opinions of this court shall be printed").
243. See, e.g., IST CIR. R. 36.2; 3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. F(l); D.C. CIR. R. 14; see also
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ing to this premise, "precedential" opinions have a legal significance which
extends beyond an immediate controversy while "nonprecedential" opinions
simply resolve a controversy. 2" Because "precedential" opinions have a
generalized legal significance, they are made "available to legal publishing
companies to be reported and cited. ' 245 In sum, "published" opinions can
be cited as "precedent" and "unpublished" opinions cannot. 2"
This scheme postulates that the quantity of legal precedent that is generated
by a particular court can be determined and controlled by simply limiting
the number of opinions that are released for "publication. ' 247 Full-text
publication in the West reporters is being used as an operational definition
of "precedent," with the lack of such publication constituting the residual
category of "nonprecedent. ' 241 The application of this operational definition
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167, 1191-92 ("The ... generally unarticulated
premise of the non-publication [rules] asserts that judges can, and in good faith will, predict
early in the game whether the opinion in a case will merit publication.").
244. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 14 ("It is the policy of this court to publish opinions and
explanatory memoranda found to have general public interest.").
In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be published .... The policy
may be overcome in some situations where an opinion does not articulate a new
rule of law, modify an established rule, apply an established rule to novel facts of
serve otherwise as a significant guide to future litigants.
IST CIR. R.
Unpublished opinions give counsel, the parties and the lower court or agency a
statement of the reasons for the decision. They may not recite all of the facts or
background of the case and may simply adopt the reasoning of the lower court.
4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36.4; see also FED. CiR. R. 47.8(c) ("Unpublished opinions and orders
are those ... not adding significantly or usefully to the body of law and not having precedential
value"); accord 3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. F(l); 7TH CIR. R. 53(2).
245. 9TH CIR. R. 36-1.
246. [Tlhis court will not cite an unpublished disposition in any of its published opinions
or unpublished dispositions. Citations of this court's unpublished dispositions in
briefs and oral arguments in this court and in the district courts within this Circuit
is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the
law of the case.
4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 36.5; accord FED. CIR. R. 47.8(c) ("Opinions and orders designated
as unpublished shall not be employed as precedent by this court, and may not be cited by
counsel as precedent"); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 ("Unpublished orders and judgments of this court
have no precedential value and shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit,
except for purposes of establishing law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel."); 7TH
CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) ("Unpublished orders ... except to support a claim of res judicata,
collateral estoppel or law of the case, shall not be cited or used as precedent by any [federal
court within the circuit] for any such purpose."); IST Cut. R. 36.2(6); cf. IITH CIR. INT. OP.
PROC. 36-1(3) ("Although unpublished opinions may be cited as precedent, this is looked upon
with disfavor by the Court").
247. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 230, at 909; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at
1167, 1181-94; Robel, supra note 230, at 940.
248. See Nichols, supra note 230, at 909:
I am sure no judge . . .ever dreamed of suggesting [the courts of appeals] should
... publish official reports. The idea of federal circuit courts below the Supreme
Court actually themselves publishing their own opinions we may safely regard as
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is a consistent theme in the reported decisional law. 249 In Leimer v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co., 250 for example, the Eighth Circuit observed that its
unpublished opinions "are not intended to create binding precedent" because
the "decision of a panel not to publish an opinion usually represents the
judges' view that the case is without substantial value as a precedent." 25' A
District of Columbia judge212 emphasized the responsibilities that attend such
decisions:
With a burgeoning caseload, there is little doubt .. .courts will resort to
* . .unpublished opinions with even greater frequency. Thus it is imperative
that we scrutinize our selection of those cases to be disposed of without
... precedential effect ever more carefully so as to avoid confusion,
repetition, nonuniformity, and even skepticism about the way we do our
job.2
53
The concerns that are perceived as requiring the continued application of
this operational definition of precedent were expressed in a dissent which,
ironically enough, issued in a case in which the majority relied upon the
unpublished decisions of a Guam court as binding precedent. 214 Judge Fer-
dead.... This leaves us in the hands of the West Publishing Company.
Id.
249. See, e.g., Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 895 nn.2 & 3 (7th
Cir. 1989) (unpublished decisions "improperly cited as legal precedent"); Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corp. v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1326 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Tsosie v. United
States, 825 F.2d 393, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (court not "bound" by its "own unpublished
precedents"); Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 499 n.4 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished per curiam
opinion improperly cited as precedent); Aetna Life & Casualty Corp. v. Maravich, 824 F.2d
266, 269 (3d Cir. 1987) (unreported memorandum opinion not binding precedent); Griffin v.
Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1986) ("An unpublished opinion is ... not a binding
precedent"); Western Union v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 377 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (unpublished
orders are not to be cited as precedents); National Classification Committee v. United States,
765 F.2d 164, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 930 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (same); Prestin v. Mobil Oil, 741 F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Demarest v.
United States, 718 F.2d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346,
351 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 798
(4th Cir. 1983) ("we do not even treat unpublished opinions of our own court as binding
precedent"); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738, 739 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("as an unpublished
opinion, the decision ... does not establish precedent"); Laborers' Pension Fund v. Jobarr
Concrete, Inc., 1988 WL 17595 (N.D. Ill.) (same); Fisher v. Walters, 1988 WL 6946 (N.D. Ill.)
(same); Belcher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 686 F. Supp. 671, 673 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (unreported
decision does not establish precedent); Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J.
1987) (same); Philman's v. City of West Carrollton, 577 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
250. 724 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1984).
251. Id. at 745-46; see also Krolick Contracting v. Benefits Review Bd., 558 F.2d 685, 689
(3d Cir. 1977) (the "published opinions of this Court are binding precedents . . .while the ...
unpublished opinions" are not).
252. National Classification Committee v. United States, 765 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. Id. at 175.
254. People v. Yang, 800 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). The Ninth
Circuit relied upon the unpublished decisions because the applicable provisions of Guam's court
rules, "insofar as they address the issue, suggest that simple filing is sufficient to make an
opinion citable." Id. at 947 n.2 (citing GUAM DiST. CT. R. APPL. P. 22).
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guson dissented because he was concerned about the consequences of such
a result:2"
[Plermitting unpublished decisions to control would create the worst sort
of judicial confusion. Instead of access for all individuals to the law, the
result would be chaos. Only the most elaborate system would permit any
law firm, let alone a sole practitioner, to keep abreast of every decision.
One of the greatest features about the law is that anyone may walk into
4 public law library and almost instantly learn of every controlling decision
on a given issue. If unpublished decisions became controlling, legal research
as we know it would end, and only the most wealthy-those who could
afford a permanent law clerk stationed in every clerk's office-would be
able to litigate the great issues of our day.1 6
II. "LEGAL RESEARCH As WE KNOW IT": 2 7 LEXIS And WESTLAW
This section provides an overview of a recent innovation in legal research,
the use of computer systems such as LEXIS and WESTLAW. Subsection A
examines some general characteristics of these systems. Subsection B consid-
ers their aptitude as law reporters.
A. Computerized Legal Research
LEXIS and WESTLAW are "online database systems which contain
judicial cases ...from the federal and state courts of the United States. '2 8
255. He also felt that the majority misinterpreted Guam's attitude toward the unpublished
decisions of its courts. Id. at 947-50 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 949. Restrictive publication was the product of concerns other than the simple
inequities inherent in allowing the citation of decisions that are not generally accessible. See,
e.g., COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE. A PRELIMINARY REPORT 72 (Apr.
1975). This rationale is, however, commonly used to justify a distinction between the precedential
effects of "published" and "unpublished" opinions. See, e.g., King v. United Commercial
Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948). King presented the issue as to whether a federal court of appeals
was required to accord precedential status to a decision issued by a South Carolina trial court.
The Supreme Court held that the decision was not binding precedent, first of all, because the
issuing court did not occupy a position within the South Carolina court system such that "its
decisions should be taken as authoritative expositions of that State's 'law."' Id. at 161. The
Court also relied upon the difficulty of gaining access to such decisions:
Litigants could find all the decisions on any given subject only by laboriously
searching the judgment rolls in all of South Carolina's forty-six counties. To hold
that federal courts must abide by Common Pleas decisions might well put a premium
on the financial ability required for exhaustive screening of the judgment rolls or
for the maintenance of private records. In cases where the parties could not afford
such practices, the result would often be to make their rights dependent on chance;
for every decision cited by counsel there might be a dozen adverse decisions
outstanding but undiscovered.
Id. at 161-62.
257. People v. Yang, 800 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1986) (F.erguson, J., dissenting).
258. J. KINSOCK, LEGAL DATABASES ON LINE: LEXIS & WESTLAW 1 (1985). Although both
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Both are "full-text" data bases, which means that each incorporates the full
text of judicial opinions into its database25 9 and that this text can be accessed
in a particular fashion. The text that they provide is identical to the text
that was issued by the deciding court and is available as a display on a
computer screen and/or in "hard copy" as a computer print-out. 26° It is
even possible to obtain print-outs that permit citations to specific pages of
the printed report of an opinion, although this feature can vary between the
two databases.
261
The information that is contained in a data base can be accessed through
any of several means, including "full-text" and "index" searching. 262 "In-
dex" searching depends upon the creation of index terms which can be
assigned to particular documents, stored and then searched. A "full-text"
system allows searching based upon "all the non-common words in the
original text. ' 263 In LEXIS and WESTLAW, this permits "searches for
anything contained in the text of an opinion including names of judges,
also include other materials, this Article is concerned with them only to the extent that they
incorporate the decisions of the state and federal courts. A data base is "a compilation of facts
stored in a computer memory and . . . capable of being retrieved in various forms through a
set of prescribed search instructions." Donham, Copyright, Compilations, and Public Policy:
Lingering Issues after the West Publishing-Mead Data Central Settlement, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 375, 380-81 (1988) (footnote omitted).
259. See, e.g., M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYSIEWICZ, supra note 70, at 459-67. "The LEXIS
base ... includes every word of each respective case and statute." McGonigal, Implementation
and Cost Effectiveness of Computerized Legal Research-LEXIS and WESTLA W Compared,
I COMPUTER L.J. 359, 364 (1978). West describes WESTLAW's contents as "Full-Text Plus,
which means that they include the full text of court opinions plus editorially prepared synopses
and headnotes." WEST'S LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 34.
260. See, e.g., M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BysInwicz, supra note 70, at 460-467. For an
interesting study of the error rate in the opinions that appear on the two data bases, see, e.g.,
Warnken, A Study in LEXIS and WESTLA W Errors, 13 A.B.A. J. (July-Aug. 1987), ABANET
ID ABAl37.
261. This, of course, has been the subject of a recent controversy between Mead Data
Central, Inc. and West Publishing Company. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986); Donham, supra note 258, at 375; Comment,
Copyright Protection for Citations to a Law Reporter: West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, Inc., 71 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1987). As the result of a settlement between the two
entities, each data base now has its own system for identifying the documents that it contains
and for allowing citations to specific pages within that material. See, e.g., Standard Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Cook, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2277 (7th Cir.) (printed at 868 F.2d 893); Taher v.
K Mart Corp., 1988 WL 142240 (D. Kan.). For a discussion of the differences between the
arrangement and organization of the two databases, see Donham, supra note 258, at 375, 397-
406.
262. See, e.g., P. MAGGS & J. SPROWL, COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN THE LAW 40 (1987);
Bing, Legal Information Retrieval Systems: The Need for and the Design of Extremely Simple
Retrieval Strategies, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 379 (1978).
263. C. TAPPER, COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 125 (1973); see also Bing, supra note 262, at
379. Full-text searches cannot be predicated upon "common words" such as basic articles ("a,"
"an," "the"), prepositions ("to," "by," "with") and the similar terms. See, e.g., M. PRICE,
H. BITNER & S. BYsIEwIcz, supra note 70, at 462.
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witnesses, products, companies or organizations, unusual terms and so on. '2" 64
B. LEXIS and WESTLA W as Law Reporters
Neither LEXIS nor WESTLAW were created as a "law reporter. 2 65 When
computerized legal research was being developed, many felt that computers
could be used only as a case indexing system rather than as a full-text
retrieval system.26 One early service used its computers to generate lists of
case citations in response to search requests submitted by subscribers. 267 Even
WESTLAW began as merely an indexing system, originally including only
"the West summary headnote digests of cases and their key numbers. '26
Although WESTLAW, and even LEXIS, may have been originally created
as a device for locating decisions that were available in printed form in the
case reporters, both systems have undergone a dramatic change in recent
years. One indicator of this change is the amount of information that each
presently makes available, as opposed to what was available ten years ago.
In 1978, WESTLAW was transforming itself from an indexing system into
a full-text system, and LEXIS had been operating as a full-text system for
at least eight years.2 69 At that time, LEXIS included the full-text of "federal
court decisions from 1960 for district courts, from 1945 for courts of appeals,
and from 1938 for the United States Supreme Court," as well as the decisions
of some state courts.2 70 Moreover, it was reported that the operators of the
LEXIS system were "reasonably receptive to embarking on a program to
build a state file covering the past ten to twenty years." 27' By this time,
264. WEST's LAW FINDER, supra note 203, at 34; see also M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S.
BYSIEWICZ, supra note 70, at 461.
265. See supra section I(C)(3).
266. See, e.g., C. TAPPER, supra note 263, at 106-206; Bing, supra note 262, at 379.
267. The service was Law Research Incorporated ["LRI"] and it was founded in 1964. See
C. TAPPER, supra note 263, at 184-85. At first, search requests were submitted in writing on a
standardized form and the searches were conducted by an LRI employee. After running a
search, the employee selected the four "most relevant" citations and sent the full-text of these
decisions, along with the list from which they had been selected, to the subscriber. Id. Later,
subscribers were able to conduct their own searches on terminals which they rented from LRI,
but LRI remained an indexing system until it went out of business. Id. at 185-86.
268. M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYsIEWICZ, supra note 70, at 464. In 1977, it consisted of
"the headnotes from all federal court opinions from 1961, and all state appellate court decisions
from 1967." Id. In 1978, it was expanded into a full-text system. Id.
269. McGonigal, supra note 259, at 359, 360; Comment, supra note 260, at 991.
270. McGonigal, supra note 259, at 364, 375-78. In 1978, LEXIS included cases from
seventeen identified states: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas and Virginia. Id. at 375-77. The extent to which cases from particular states were included
varied widely: the Florida cases, for example, were selected from decisions that had issued after
1968, while Michigan cases were selected from decisions that had issued after 1977. Id. at 376.
But because LEXIS was the descendant of an Ohio State Bar Association data base, it included
Ohio decisions extending back to 1940. Id. at 377.
271. Id. at 364.
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WESTLAW had added full-text versions of the decisions of certain federal
courts, and was in the process of adding full-text versions of state decisions,
as well. 272 Its primary advantages were that it allowed searches by means of
its key number system and that it provided access to the decisions of all the
states, albeit on a limited basis.
273
In 1989, the contents of both systems have expanded to such an extent
that it is difficult to describe them concisely. The sections immediately below
summarize the contents of both data bases as they existed in May of 1989,
emphasizing the extent to which each included full-text reports of the deci-
sions of the various federal courts. Although both also include the decisions
of state courts, the discussion emphasizes federal decisions simply because
they provide an adequate empirical predicate for the analysis that appears
in section III of this Article. 274
1. LEXIS in 1989
In a computer search conducted on May 22, 1989, LEXIS described the
contents of its federal decisional files as follows: 275 decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, "1790 to 5/89"; decisions of the courts of appeals,
"1789 to 5/89"; decisions of the district courts, "1789 to 5/89. ' ' 276 According
to this same search, the LEXIS data base includes decisions from each of
the federal courts of appeals 277 and from the district courts for which they
serve as appellate tribunals.
271
272. See id. at 372. WESTLAW described itself as including the full text of the following:
"U.S. Supreme Court cases, 1932 to date"; "reported cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
Court of Claims, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals-all from 1961 to date"; and "reported cases from the U.S. District Courts ... from
1961 to date." Id.
273. McGonigal, supra note 259, at 364. WESTLAW described its coverage of state cases
according to the divisions of its National Reporter System, and indicated that this coverage
consisted of the "[h]eadnotes of all reported cases" within those divisions for certain periods
of time and the full-text of decisions for more limited periods of time. Id. at 372-73. The
headnotes were generally available for the period from 1967 through 1977, while full-text reports
were available from "1978 to date." Id. at 372-73.
274. The discussion is also limited: (a) because any attempt to include a consideration of the
extent to which state court decisions are reported in LEXIS and WESTLAW would expand
this Article to unnecessary, unmanageable proportions; and (b) because the discussion of the
reporting of federal decisions is representative of the reporting of state court decisions, as well.
275. The descriptions that appear in the text above are limited to the description of the
decisions of the "general" federal courts, i.e., the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals and
the district courts, and do not attempt to describe the extent to which the decisions of the
specialized courts are available on either LEXIS or WESTLAW.
276. Search run on LEXIS, GENFED file descriptions, May 22, 1989. The specific descrip-
tions of files for the individual courts of appeals and district courts reveals qualifiers which
indicate that these files include actually decisions from "the date of creation of the court" to
the present. Id.
277. That is, from the First through Eleventh Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia
and Federal Circuits. Id.
278. Id.
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It is extraordinarily important to realize that for some time LEXIS has
been including full-text opinions from state and federal courts even though
these decisions have not been printed in "hard copy" in either the West
reporters or in other unofficial or official reporters. Although it is not
possible to quantify the extent to which these otherwise "unreported" de-
cisions are being incorporated into LEXIS, Mead Data Central ("MDC")
has'explained the reasons for their inclusion:
MDC's customers constantly demand access to more and more informa-
tion. MDC's basic philosophy is to meet these needs. Counter balancing
out customer's needs, however, is our knowledge that many courts prefer
to limit the distribution of some of their documents. MDC works with
individual courts to develop procedures which are responsible to the court's
policies, while maximizing the amount of information available to our
customers." '
These procedures differ according to the extent to which a particular court
is willing to have its "unreported" opinions incorporated into the LEXIS
data base. Some federal courts of appeals allow all of their opinions to be
included in LEXIS while others place restrictions upon the incorporation of
opinions that are designated "not for publication. ' 280 Mead Data Corpo-
ration actively solicits otherwise "unreported" opinions for inclusion in
LEXIS. 28' This means that LEXIS includes decisions that are not available
in the conventional reporters as well as the decisions that are.
In addition to including West citations, 2 2 LEXIS has begun to assign
document identifiers to decisions as it includes them in its data base. For
279. Letter from Lorraine Gongla-Coppinger, MDC Analyst, to Susan W. Brenner (June 9,
1989) (discussing MDC's posture in regard to including otherwise unreported decisions on
LEXIS).
280. The United States Courts of Appeals, taken as a group, provide an excellent
example of the variety of accommodations MDC has made with courts regarding
the publication of opinions. Some Courts of Appeals have agreed that all of their
opinions can be available on LEXIS, in their entirety. For other Courts MDC
includes only the style and disposition information of those opinions designated as
'Not for Publication.' These specially designated opinions which are included in
LEXIS also carry wording which explains the status of the opinions, and often
details how it may be used by attorneys appearing in that court. This wording,
frequently adapted from and citing to a local court rule, has been developed in
conjunction with the issuing Court. Some courts have requested that 'Not for
Publication' opinions not be available in any format. MDC honors this request.
Id. (emphasis added).
281. MDC has a group of people in the Legal Data Collection Department, who are
dedicated exclusively to maintaining good court relations. They inform the court,
by visits and by mass mailings, of our desire to include unpublished opinions in
LEXIS and then they negotiate to obtain them.
Id. (emphasis added).
282. As the result of a settlement effectuated with the West Publishing Company, LEXIS is
entitled to include West citations in its reports of cases and other materials. See, e.g., Blodgett,
West, Mead Data Central Settle, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 36; Donham, supra note 258, at
375.
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example, the decision that the District Court for the District of Kansas issued
in Taher v. K Mart Corp. is given the following identifier, or "citation":
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15036.283 Because Taher was not reported in West's
Federal Supplement, the LEXIS citation is the only citation that appears
when this decision is retrieved by a LEXIS search. 284 If a decision has been
printed in full-text form in a West or other case reporter, LEXIS provides
citations to those reporters and then appends its own. For example, LEXIS
provides the following citations for the decision that the District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee issued in Belcher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.:
686 F. Supp. 671, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6003, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1222, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 38, 603.28
If LEXIS includes the full text of a case the disposition of which has
simply been noted in West's Federal Reporter, then LEXIS so indicates,
usually by quoting the circuit's limited "publication" rule at the beginning
of the LEXIS report of the opinion. For example, LEXIS reports the decision
issued by the Federal Circuit in Collins Marine Corp. v. United States in




In addition to providing its own citation for the full text of the opinion
s2 7
LEXIS prefaces it with the following:
Rule 18 opinions designated as unpublished opinions shall not be employed
as precedent by this court, nor may they be cited by counsel as precedent,
except in support of a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of
the case. A party may, on motion, request that an unpublished opinion
be reissued as a published opinion, citing reasons therefore. Such motion
will be granted or denied by the panel that rendered the decision.288
When such cases are reported in full-text form in West's Federal Reporter,
LEXIS so indicates by providing a parallel citation to that volume. 289
283. Taher v. K Mart Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15036 (D. Kan.).
284. LEXIS uses an identical system with regard to state court decisions that have not been
reported in "hard-copy" in a West or other conventional reporter. See, e.g., State v. Pete,
1988 Wisc. App. LEXIS 515.
285. Belcher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 686 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). Once again,
LEXIS follows the same practice with regard to state court decisions. See, e.g., McSloy v.
Jeanes Hospital, 376 Pa. Super. 595, 546 A.2d 684, 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2236 (1988).
286. See, e.g., 838 F.2d 1222-23.
287. Collins Marine Corp. v. United States, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 918 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 28,
1988).
288. Id. (upper-case deleted). LEXIS follows the same practice with regard to state court
decisions. For example, the decision which the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District Two,
issued in State v. Varnell is reported in full-text form but is prefaced by the following
admonition:
Pursuant to Rule 809.23(3) of Appellate Procedure, an unpublished opinion is of
no precedential value and for this reason may not be cited in any court of this
state as precedent or authority except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral
estoppel or law of the case. UNPUBLISHED LIMITED PRECEDENT OPINION
- REFER TO LOCAL RULE 809.23(3).
State v. Varnell, 123 Wis. 2d 480, 392 N.W.2d 848 (1986).
289. See, e.g., Law v. United States Postal Service, 852 F.2d 1278, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS
6217 (Fed. Cir.).
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2. WESTLA Win 1989
In a computer search conducted on May 20, 1989, WESTLAW described
the contents of its federal decisional files as follows: the decisions of the
Supreme Court since 1790 until the present,2 9g and the decisions for the
federal courts of appeals and federal district courts from 1789 until the
present. 29' Like LEXIS, WESTLAW includes decisions from each of the
federal courts of appeals2 92 and from the district courts for which they serve
as appellate tribunals. 293
Also like LEXIS, WESTLAW is including full-text reports of decisions
even though these decisions have not been printed in "hard copy" in either
the West reporters or in other unofficial or official reporters.2 94 According
to a communication from the West Publishing Company, it "seeks to provide
290. Id.
Coverage begins with the inception of the court, 2 U.S. (1790) through [the present]
and includes documents released for publication in the Supreme Court Reporter
and/or the United States Supreme Court Reports. Additional courts reported in
U.S. are included from 1 U.S. (1754).
Id.
291. The decisions for the federal courts since 1945 appear in the CTA file, while the decisions
from 1891 until 1944 are available in the CTA-OLD file. Id. Decisions of the former federal
circuit courts that were issued between 1789 and 1911 are included in the DCT-OLD file. Id.
District court decisions that have issued since 1945 are included in the DCT file, while decisions
issued prior to 1945 are included in the DCT-OLD file. Id. The peculiar division of the decisions
among these files is apparently the result of incorporating the decisions according to the
reporters in which they initially appeared. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. In the descriptions of its case files, WESTLAW explicitly notes that many of these files
include "opinions that are not scheduled to be reported by West Publishing Company" which,
of course, must mean that they are not scheduled to be printed in one of the volumes of the
National Reporter System. See id. at DESCRIPTION files for DCT. WESTLAW indicates that
certain "topical services are being monitored for [such] cases," including several CCH and
BNA services. See id. WESTLAW also includes one decisional file, DCTU, the contents of
which it describes as follows:
Decisions obtained, directly from the courts for WESTLAW, but which are not
scheduled to be reported by West and have not been published by any of the topical
services being monitored. Currently, cases are being obtained from the following
U.S. District Courts, beginning on the dates shown:
(a) N.D. Ill. (beginning 1984);
(b) E.D. La. (beginning 1986);
(c) D. Mass. (beginning 1986);
(d) E.D.N.Y. (beginning 1986);
(e) S.D.N.Y. (beginning 1984);
(f) E.D. Pa. (beginning 1985);
(g) S.D. Tex. (beginning 1986).
Id. The discussion in the text illustrates that WESTLAW is reporting decisions of the federal
courts of appeals that are not published in full text form in its Federal Reporter, and WESTLAW
is implementing the same practice with regard to at least some of the state courts. See id. at
DESCRIPTION files for ARKANSAS CASES, OHIO CASES, DELAWARE CASES, MIN-
NESOTA CASES and TENNESSEE CASES.
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the most complete source of opinions of American courts, state and federal
in print and electronically that it is possible to do and observe the guidelines
and rules adopted by the courts. 2
95
West's practices seem to parallel those of Mead Data Central: in response
to an inquiry from the author, West merely noted that it "observe[s] the
selection and publication rules in place in every [federal] judicial circuit"
governing the publication of the opinions of the federal courts of appeals. 296
But its general practices are suggested by comments concerning the inclusion
of otherwise unreported state appellate court opinions in WESTLAW: 297 "If
the state court permits electronic publication only, but also restricts citation
or reference by court rule that limitation by rule appears in the electronic
presentation of those opinions released for electronic publication. "29 Fur-
thermore, West intimated that it actively seeks out otherwise unreported
federal district court opinions for incorporation into WESTLAW, 29 thereby
continuing a practice that was established when decisions were available only
in printed form °" All of which means, of course, that WESTLAW, like
295. Letter from Arnold 0. Ginnow, Vice President & Editor-in-Chief, West Publishing
Company, to Susan W. Brenner (May 23, 1989) (concerning the incorporation of otherwise
unreported opinions into WESTLAW).
296. Id. No further information was provided on the efforts, if any, that West expends in
order to secure otherwise unreported decisions for inclusion on WESTLAW. Indeed, it may be
that West is not required to expend any additional effort given that the federal courts of appeals
are already in the habit of sending opinions to the West Publishing Company for inclusion in
the Federal Reporter, either in full-text form or as a disposition noted in tabular form.
297. "The state appellate courts have a variety of approaches to selection of opinions for
print and we cooperate with each of those courts." Id.
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. The United States District Courts send us opinions based upon their individual
determination whether the case is of interest to other than the principal litigants....
In addition our attention is directed to U.S. District Court opinions by lawyers, by
U.S. Government lawyers, by references to such opinions in other cases or in
newspapers or other print media. Whenever a case of interest from another source
is noted, a request is made of the U.S. District Court for a copy of the opinion.
There are no formal arrangements with any of the United States District Courts.
It is our practice to advise the individual judges of our wish to receive copies of
their opinions.
Id.
300. See, e.g., Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 526
(2d Cir. 1962). The Palmieri case was a libel action brought by an attorney, Gustave B. Garfield,
against a federal judge, Edmund Palmieri. The alleged libel was contained in an opinion issued
by Judge Palmieri. Id. at 139. Judge Palmieri issued the opinion in question, but did not
submit it for publication in the Federal Supplement until after he received the following letter
from the West Publishing Company:
In a recent opinion by Justice Spector which we are preparing for publication there
is reference to your unreported opinion in the above case.
We shall therefore appreciate it if you will send us copy [sic] of your opinion,
together with the names and addresses of the attorneys for the respective parties
and the filing date with a view to publication in the Federal Supplement so that a
definite volume and page reference may be given in Judge Spector's opinion.
Id. at 140. Judge Palmieri sent the opinion to West "and shortly thereafter it appeared under
the title of the case, Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., in 180 F. Supp. 717." Id.
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LEXIS, includes decisions that are not available in the conventional reporters
as well as the decisions that are.
WESTLAW has the advantage of being able to include citations to its
own National Reporter System volumes of printed reports, and does so. But
because WESTLAW also includes decisions that have not been printed in
volumes of the National Reporter System, it, too, has had to develop new
forms for identifying these "unreported" cases. When the disposition of a
case is published in the Federal Reporter but the full text is available in
WESTLAW, this is indicated by the following device: the full-text opinion
appears with a Federal Reporter citation, for example, 865 F.2d 1329 (Table),
plus the notation "(text in WESTLAW)." 0' Such an opinion will also be
accompanied by a caveat similar to that which accompanies an "unreported"
LEXIS decision, for example:
NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders,
judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents,
but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or
preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is
relevant. 302
Caveats such as this may also include the following, prefatory observation:
"Note: This opinion will not be published in a printed volume. The decision
will appear in tables published periodically." 30 a
WESTLAW has also developed its own unique citation form, a form
which is almost identical to the citation form that LEXIS uses for its cases.
As an example, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois'
decision in Laborers' Pension Fund v. Jobarr Concrete is given the following
identifier, or "citation": 1988 WL 17595. 04 This citation is accompanied by
the notation that such a decision is not reported in one of the volumes of
the National Reporter System, or simply, "Not Reported in F. Supp." 3 °5
While it is not uncommon for WESTLAW and LEXIS both to report a
decision that is not included in one of the volumes of West's National
Reporter System, when this occurs neither system indicates that the document
is available in the other database as well. 3° For example, in 1988 the District
Court for the District of Kansas issued a decision in Taher v. K Mart Corp. 17
301. See, e.g., KN Energy, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm., 865 F.2d 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (text in WESTLAW).
302. Id.
303. Id. (upper-case deleted). Like LEXIS, WESTLAW also includes otherwise "unreported"
decisions from various state courts. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App.
3d 1245, 244 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1988). The full text of this decision is included in WESTLAW,
accompanied by the notation that "[i]n denying review, the Supreme Court ordered that the
opinion be not officially published." Id.
304. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Jobarr Concrete, Inc., 1988 WL 17595 (N.D. I11.).
305. Id.
306. In other words, there are as yet no "parallel citations" between the two data bases.
307. See supra section II(B)(1).
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LEXIS gave this decision a LEXIS citation: 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15036.308
Because Taher is not reported in West's Federal Supplement, this is the only
citation that appears when Taher is retrieved by a LEXIS search. 3 9 Although
Taher is not reported in the Federal Supplement, it is included on WESTLAW
and is given the following WESTLAW citation: 1988 WL 142420 (D. Kan.).3 1 0
In sum, LEXIS and WESTLAW are now law reporters in the same way
that the volumes in West's National Reporter System are law reporters.
Section III develops the implications of this observation.3 '
III. LEGITIMATION REFERENTS AND DIFFERENTIAL AcCEss To PRECEDENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PAST AND AN ANTICIPATION OF THE FUTURE
Section I introduced the concept of "sociological revolution" as denoting
a fundamental alteration in the fabric of a social institution. 1 2 It explained
that social institutions must "legitimate" their existence and activities if they
are to survive.31 3 Since "the law" is such an institution, it too must legitimate
308. Taher v. K Mart Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15036 (D. Kan.).
309. LEXIS uses an identical system with regard to state court decisions that have not been
reported in "hard-copy" in a West or other conventional reporter. See, e.g., State v. Pete,
1988 Wisc. App. LEXIS 515.
310. Taher v. K Mart Corp., 1988 WL 142420 (D. Kan.). This WESTLAW citation is also
accompanied by the notation "Not Reported in F. Supp." Id.
311. In this regard, it is also relevant to note that the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts recently announced a "pilot project for distributing federal Circuit
Court opinions in electronic format." Pilot Project for Distribution of Federal Circuit Court
Opinions Announced, 20 AM. A.L. LIBR. NEWSL. 353 (June 1989). The pilot project:
[Elnvisions hardware (a personal computer) being placed in each participating court
to be used for transmitting electronic copies of each publicly available opinion,
immediately after release from the Court. The opinions will be transmitted to an
electronic mail service, where they will simultaneously be made available to all
interested recipients.
Id. (emphasis added). The project is being implemented in four circuits, and is similar to an
experiment that the Supreme Court is considering. See Marcotte, High-tech High Court, A.B.A.
J. Mar. 1990, at 26 (Supreme Court will soon distribute opinions electronically to approximately
a dozen subscibers who will then make opinions widely distributed). It is interesting to note
that this experiment at the appellate court level continues the distinction between "published"
and "unpublished" opinions, although it apparently categorizes them as "publicly available"
and "not publicly available" opinions.
312. See supra section I(B)(1). A society is composed of "social institutions." A "social
institution" is simply an accumulation of routinized conceptualizations about certain types of
activity and a repertoire of behaviors that have become the established means for accomplishing
that activity. As an example, every society will include a social institution that is devoted to
the process of "education," although the performance of this function will be organized
differently within different societies. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at
47-128.
313. Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its
objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a
normative dignity to its practical imperatives .... Legitimation not only tells the
individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why
things are what they are.
P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 93-94.
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its activities. Courts may legitimate their authority through any of three
predicates-tradition, faith or rationality.3 1 4
Subsection A traces the evolution of Anglo-American law from a reliance
upon the first predicate, tradition, to a reliance upon the third predicate,
rationality, with particular reference to the consequences which this had for
"precedent." The discussion denominates the predicates as "legitimation
referents" to more clearly denote their function as conceptual "yardsticks"
against which the correctness of particular conduct is measured; "precedent"
is the discrete manifestation of a particular legitimation referent. Subsection
B then examines the effects that computerized legal research is likely to have
upon the concept of "precedent" and upon the law itself.
A. The Past
Between the fifth and twelfth centuries, English law was legitimated by
tradition." 5 Exercises of legal authority were "legitimate" to the extent that
they were consistent with prior exercises of legal authority in similar situa-
tions. '1 6 The system had developed an inventory of routine responses, or
"customs," that corresponded to recurring factual situations.' 7 Adjudication
proceeded by comparing a particular factual situation with the inventory of
available responses and applying the response that most closely corresponded
with the facts presented."'
"Precedent," to the extent that it existed at all, was a purely empirical
phenomenon, for example, reference to prior applications of custom in
factually isomorphic situations.31 9 Although the system relied upon the rec-
314. See supra section I(B)(I).
315. See supra sections I(A)-(B). "[T]he old law . . . was preserved merely because it was
old. Those who practiced and obeyed it . . . offered no account of it except that it had come
down to them from their ancestors." H. MAINE, supra note 150, at 130; see also C. LEVI-
STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1973) ("antiquity and continuance are the foundations of legiti-
macy").
316. "For the people of the early Middle Ages, the fact that a rule had been applied in the
past . . . meant . . . that the rule existed, and therefore ought to be obeyed." C. RADDING,
MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 20.
317. See supra section 1(B). The development of such an inventory was possible simply
because society was much simpler and far less problematic than it was to become; the devel-
opment of such an inventory was also possible because society had changed very little throughout
the preceding centuries. As others have noted, "things have changed more in the past two
hundred years than in the previous two thousand years." Collier, Precedent and LegalAuthority:
A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 771, 783 n.47 (referring to comments made by Herman
Oliphant in his 1927 Presidential Address to the Association of American Law Schools, reprinted
as Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 74 (1928)).
318. ILlegal expertise consisted . . . of knowing what the laws were. There was little
room for interpretation, because there either existed a law to fit the facts of a case,
in which case its applicability was . . . obvious, or there did not ....
C. RADDING, MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 33 (describing the practice of law
in medieval Italy).
319. See generally C. RADDING, MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 17-33 (medieval
laws were a set of relatively independent rules governing a variety of concrete situations).
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itation of maxims as the mnemonic embodiment of custom, 20 such recitations
were not the invocation of abstract principles of legitimacy, but merely a
symbolic linking of what was "being done" with what "had always been
done." There was no need for abstract principles of legitimacy because a
particular exercise of legal authority was legitimate to the extent that it
replicated an unbroken sequence of similar exercises.32
1. "Immemorial Custom"
The destruction of the traditional referent began in 1178, when Henry II
created the Court of Common Pleas. English law entered a transitionary
stage in 1178 and remained there until at least the fifteenth century.3 22 During
this stage, the legitimating referent was still the force of tradition, but
tradition in a new guise.
English law was legitimated by reference to "immemorial custom," which
may seem peculiar given that the king's court was actively engaged in
"inventing" much of this law. The referent was, however, inevitable: al-
though the court could invent new manifestations of the law, it could not
invent a new rationale for "the law." Such a measure was inconceivable to
a legal system that was only beginning to move away from simple tradition.3 23
Consequently, it was necessary for courts to articulate a legitimating referent
that retained a linkage to the past while permitting the legitimation of legal
practices that had obviously not existed in ages past.
This transition was accomplished by grounding the law upon generalized
custom, as opposed to the bucolic customs that had constituted English law
320. See supra section 1(B).
321. Charles Radding's insightful study of the evolution of a meaningful jurisprudence in
medieval Italy offers comments which apply with equal force to the English jurisprudence of
this era:
[Ilt [was] a habit of thinking about the laws as a set of more or less independent
rules applying to a variety of concrete situations. There was no thought that one
law might have implications for the interpretation of another nor that they could
be seen as logically interrelated parts of an internally consistent whole. This con-
ception, in turn, defined the nature of early medieval legal expertise. Legal science
meant knowing what the laws were. It did not involve analysis of the entire body
of laws to determine underlying juristic principles that could be applied to circum-
stances not explicitly covered by [existing law], nor did it involve mastery of a set
of concepts whose use would maintain the logical consistency of the law.
C. RADDING, MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 21-22.
322. The end of this transitionary stage is located at the beginning of the fifteenth century
because it was during this period that written pleadings appeared and law began to become a
written, as opposed to a purely oral, enterprise. See supra section I(B).
323. One author has described the mind-set of this era as manifested in a slightly different
context: "To be old was to be good; the best writers were the more ancient. The converse
often seems to have been true: if a work was good, its medieval readers were disposed to think
that it was old." A. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP 9 (1984).
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until the twelfth century.224 Therefore, although the king's court might create
a remedy where none had existed before, this act of creation was legitimate
because it was simply an extension of a generalized custom that had existed
from time immemorial. The move from empirical custom to generalized
custom was the first step toward an abstract, externalized legitimating ref-
erent. Nevertheless, generalized custom remained an empirical referent be-
cause its legitimation source was the reiteration of at least theoretically
venerable usages.325
Bracton's use of cases is perfectly reasonable in this context: when he was
writing, the king's court had been creating and applying the new "common
law" for some seventy-five years. Because Bracton intended to criticize his
contemporaries for their erroneous application of this law, he required
empirical data as to the nature and extent of their errors. The only source
of such data was the plea rolls, which recorded specific applications of
"immemorial custom." Although he obviously had some general recollection
as to the course that the law had taken in decades past, Bracton certainly
would not have been able to recall specific cases from those years. Therefore,
he required some method of reacquainting himself with what the judges of
that era had done in specific situations. Unlike his predecessors of a few
centuries past, Bracton could not simply rely upon actual custom, as opposed
to the increasingly fictionalized "immemorial custom," because the appli-
cation of actual custom had become increasingly problematic, if not dis-
credited. Consequently, he turned to the memoranda on the plea rolls as a
device for reminding himself as to what had actually been done in the
relatively recent past.
By using memoranda from the plea rolls, however, Bracton invented a
new method of legal research and set in motion forces that would eventually
lead attorneys to regard cases as significant in and of themselves. The
development of a modern conception of "precedent" is simply a matter of
coming to value the details of the recordation of a past practice over the
empirical specificities of the practice itself. In order to accomplish this,
324. See I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 143, at *74. "General customs are such as prevail
throughout a country and become the law of that country .... Local customs ... prevail only
in some particular district." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
325. In describing the law of this era, Weber notes that its concepts were:
[Niot 'general concepts' which would be formed by abstraction from . . . logical
interpretation of meaning or by generalization and subsumption; nor were these
concepts apt to be used in syllogistically applicable norms. In the purely empirical
conduct of legal practice and legal training one always moves from the particular
to the particular but never tries to move from the particular to general propositions
in order to be able subsequently to deduce from them the norms for new particular
cases.
MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 201-02. Weber also observed
that English law during this era was not interested in developing "a rational system but rather
[aimed at] a practically useful scheme ... oriented towards the interests of clients in typically
recurrent situations." Id. at 201.
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however, one must be able to accept that judges play an active role in the
articulation and application of the law. This period was not capable of such
a recognition, so cases were regarded as significant only to the extent that
they evidenced what custom was and what it was not.
3 26
Because cases were the available data of custom, a market arose for
reports of them.3 27 These reports, however, did not resemble modern case
reports.2 2 The system could tolerate eccentric reporting because the con-
trolling force of the law was "immemorial custom," which meant that it
was beyond the power of a judge to alter the law by a decision issued in a
particular case.3 2
9
The development of an interest in case reports did, however, have a
profound consequence for the evolution of the legitimating referent. Al-
though the law overtly relied upon "immemorial custom," the habit of using
cases to evidence custom permitted the development of a legitimating referent
that was predicated upon principles of an abstraction transcending simple
adherence to prior usage. Such a referent became possible once the partici-
326. It was because cases were merely artifacts of custom that English law could maintain
that it was custom which controlled a decision rather than the cases that were cited as evidence
of custom. See supra section I(B).
327. The development of an interest in cases and of a market for reports of cases is, of
course, attributable to empirical forces far more profound than Bracton's example. During this
era, English society was experiencing social change in a variety of areas, albeit slowly. This
also contributed to the development of an interest in case law because processes of social change
produce empirical situations that cannot be resolved by reference to "what has been done
before." If there had been no quantum of social change, English society could have settled
comfortably into a system of traditional law in which the characteristics of the common law
replaced the bucolic customs of an earlier age. And it is true that the common law almost
achieved such a settled rigidity for a time. Fortunately, at least to the modern way of thinking,
external forces interceded to make this finally impossible. Unfortunately, however, the identi-
fication and description of these forces is quite beyond the compass of the present exercise.
328. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 268-73. In discussing the case reports in the
Year Books, Wallace notes that:
[Y]ou cannot but be struck with the peculiar manner of them, quite unlike that of
modern days. The Report seems to be almost an exact transcript of whatever was
said or done in court during the trial of a cause, and often ends with the statement
or argument or counsel . . . without the least mention of what became of it finally.
The same thing happens in other volumes of the Year Books.
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 76.
Wallace also notes that some of the earliest reports included "the reasons and causes of the
judgments" but that "the practice of so expressing them ceased" for a time, to be resumed
with the rise of the modern case reporters. See id. at 75-76.
329. Indeed, to the extent that a decision in a particular case departed from past practices,
it would have been regarded as erroneous and would not, therefore, have been a matter in
which there was any especial interest. It is also probable that the system could tolerate a high
degree of ambiguity in its case reports because it was based upon a consensus as to the substance
and consequences of extant legal principles. Given this consensus, variations in case reports
were unimportant because, given the fundamental assurance as to the nature of "the law,"
they could not give rise to any confusion or uncertainty in that regard. See, e.g., C. RADDING,
MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 850-1150.
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pants in the legal system developed the idea that cases could be construed
as the empirical manifestation of a metempirical phenomenon, i.e., an
abstract legitimating referent. 30
2. Natural Law
It is impossible to identify the precise moment when Anglo-American law
shifted its allegiance from custom to rationality, although it is possible to
say it occurred between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. 3 1 The instant
of its occurrence is, however, less important than the form in which it
initially manifested itself: legal systems can rely upon any of three referents-
tradition, faith or rationality. 3 2 Rational referents are divisible into "value
rationality" and "legal rationality." Weber concluded that systems evolve
from a traditional referent through a value rational referent and into a
"legal" referent.33
When value rationality is the referent, "valid is that which has been
deduced as absolutely demanded"; when legal rationality is the referent,
legal authority is legitimate if it comports with rules that are "formally
correct and [that] have been made in the accustomed manner. 33 4 The classic
example of a value rational referent is "natural law.""33 "Natural law" is
330. In discussing a similar phenomenon in Italian jurisprudence, Charles Radding notes that
it resulted from an increase in judicial heterogeneity:
To understand why this is important, one needs to recall that one of the basic
experiences in developing critical standards is the need to explain one's view to
others to whom those views are not obvious. Because the judges ... all came from
the same environment, shared similar training, and often sat together ... on courts,
they would not often have had this experience .... Indeed, the shared perspective
resulting from common experiences probably accounts for the absence of discussion
about law or facts apparent in all the pleas of the early Middle Ages: there was no
need to discuss how to assess a case when all those involved viewed the issues from
much the same angle.
C. RADDING, MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 136, at 75. The creation of the king's court
would have had a similar effect on the English judiciary, because it resulted in the creation of
a professional class of jurists and because these jurists were the product of differing backgrounds
and training, at least until standardized legal training appeared in English law. See, e.g., MAX
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 198-223 (criticizing the effects
which later English legal training had upon the law's ability to develop "rational" constructs).
331. For a treatment of "the development of legal science" as "a shift from taking laws as
external realities to adopting the stance of a consciously critical interpreter," see C. RADDING,
A WORLD MADE BY MEN, supra note 136, at 400-1200 (1985).
332. See supra section I(B)(I).
333. These referents will be referred to as a "value rational referent" and a "legal" referent,
in order to avoid the cumbersome, "legal rational referent." The third general referent, i.e.,
"faith," cannot be incorporated into a general evolutionary sequence because it operates as a
sociological "wild card." See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80,
at 224-55, 336-37 (legitimacy rests upon the authority of a concrete individual which is not
based on rational rules or tradition).
334. Id. at 8-9; see also id. at 336 (the legitimacy of an exercise of authority can be established
by "a system of consciously made rational rules").
335. Id. at 8-9 ("The purest type of value-rational validity is represented by natural law").
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legitimation according to "an objective standard of values" rather than by
a repertoire of formally established rules.336 Because value rational legiti-
mation is the necessary intermediary between traditional and legal referents,
Anglo-American law exchanged its reliance upon "immemorial custom" for
a reliance upon "natural law."
The first step in this exchange was apprehending "immemorial custom"
as a body of "principles" transcending empirical routines. Once this step
had been taken, custom ceased to be a purely empirical phenomenon and
took on at least a veneer of abstraction, albeit an abstraction the legitimacy
of which was ostensibly grounded upon adherence to tradition.33 7 This gloss
of abstraction became the foundation for a value rational referent-"natural
law."
Value rationality continues the reliance upon an external body of legiti-
mating principles that was the animating feature of English law while "im-
memorial custom" was its referent. This body of principles provides an
assurance of order and stability, as the legitimacy of specific exertions of
legal authority does not depend upon the caprice or jurisprudential aptitudes
of the decisionmaker. The distinction between the two referents lies in the
constitution of this body of legitimating principles. As long as "immemorial
custom" is the referent, it consists of a congeries of propositions of idio-
syncratic generality that have been inductively derived from the routines of
daily activity.33 s After "natural law" becomes the referent, it is a more or
less accessible scheme of ethical principles.33 9 A value rational referent con-
tinues its predecessor's reliance upon an external body of legitimating prin-
ciples, and regards cases with an attitude which resembles that of its
predecessor, as artifacts of "natural law," and values them accordingly.
However, because a value rational referent is predicated upon abstract
concepts, as opposed to the fundamentally empirical concepts that animate
a traditional referent, the two systems approach their artifacts differently.
In a value rational system, these artifacts are used by judges who have
been given the task of "discovering" the "natural law. 3 40 This refers to a
336. Id. "Natural law has ... been the collective term for those norms which owe their
legitimacy not to their origin from a legitimate lawgiver, but to their imminent and teleological
qualities." Id at 288, 313.
337. During this era, the courts developed convenient legal fictions whenever necessary in
order to maintain the illusion that they were simply applying principles that derived from
immemorial custom, as opposed to inventing novel solutions for novel situations. See, e.g., H.
MAINE, supra note 150, at 16 ('Legal Fiction' [signifies] any assumption which conceals, or
affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration .... The fact is ...
that the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was.")
(emphasis in original).
338. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 47-92.
339. See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 284-300.
340. See supra section I(B)(2). In a system that relies upon tradition as its legitimation
referent, cases are regarded as evidence of custom. Consequently, cases become empirical data
from which judges and legal practitioners can infer the parameters of particular custom.
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process by which the constitutive parameters of a scheme of ethical principles
are inferentially identified and described. Although this process is superfi-
cially similar to the process that occurs in a system which relies upon a
traditional referent, there are fundamental differences. A system which is
legitimated by reference to tradition uses cases as data illustrating the au-
thoritative value of empirical routines, while a system which is legitimated
by reference to natural law uses cases as inductive support for propositions
that have been inferentially deduced from the scheme of ethical principles
which are postulated as the system's value rational referent. a4,
Because the emphasis was upon "discovering" the "natural law," law
came to be regarded as a "science" that was to be undertaken with meth-
odologies comparable to those found in other fields of scientific endeavor.3 42
This approach affected the use of cases and case reports.
While the natural system continued to tolerate ambiguity in case reporting,
it did assume certain characteristics of modern law reporting. For example,
the system developed a concern with accurate reporting and with the issuance
of reports that included standardized features such as the facts, the arguments
of counsel and the judgment of the court.3 43 "Accurate reporting," however,
did not mean what it means today. Reporters prepared their own "reports"
of cases, as opposed to printing opinions drafted by the deciding judge. The
consequence was that cases were "reported" differently by different report-
ers.
Although this would be intolerable to a modern lawyer, it was perfectly
reasonable when judgments were legitimated according to an external ref-
erent. Reports could be idiosyncratic because cases did not constitute, but
merely evidenced "the law." "The law" had a fixed, independent existence,
so that particular cases could not affect its substance,3 4 which had two
consequences for law reporting. First, there was a preference for older cases,
as it was reasonable to assume that, having stood the test of time, they were
more likely to represent accurate reflections of the underlying principles of
341. "[V]alid is that which has been deduced as absolutely demanded." MAX WEBER ON
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 8.
342. See supra section l(B)(2) & (C). This also reflected a perception of law as a phenomenon
that was analogous to other natural forces and subject to discovery by the same means. See,
e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 289 (the "elaboration
of natural law . . . derived from the concept of nature of the Renaissance, which everywhere
strove to grasp the canon of the ends of 'Nature's' will."); W. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 114-
51 (5th ed. 1967).
343. See, e.g., J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 446; see also supra section I(A).
344. The following quotation was offered in defense of the charge that Edmund Anderson,
who was appointed Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in 1582, had "a slavish
adherence to precedents":
'What!' says he in one case, 'shall we not give judgment because it is not adjudged
in the books before? We will give judgment according to reason; and if there be
no reason in the books, I will not regard them.'
J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 141 (quoting GOULDSBOROUGH's REPORTS 96 (1653)).
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"the law." 3 45 The corollary to this preference is that the modern concern
with gaining immediate access to judicial pronouncements was not used.
Second, participants in the legal system were not impelled by the desire to
obtain every case pertaining to an issue. A search for all relevant cases was
unnecessary because the resolution of legal problems was governed by "prin-
ciples" rather than cases.346
This situation changed after the law exchanged its value rational referent
for a reliance upon "enactments which are formally correct and which have
been made in the accustomed manner," that is, those enactments which are
"legally" correct.
3. Rational-Legal Referent
This exchange had been completed by the beginning of the twentieth
century, so that the legal system now relied upon "[rnational adjudication
on the basis of rigorously formal legal concepts. 3 47 In such a system:
[Llaw is self-justifying. It requires no appeal to moral or political values
for its legitimacy. Its own systematic logical structures provide its legiti-
macy. Law is accepted solely as a rational system of rules. The religious,
traditional or ethical natural law principles which grounded it in earlier
era are lost as law is 'unmasked' as merely technical rules of ever increasing
intricacy.13'
The participants in the legal system dedicate themselves to mastering the
evolving intricacies of an ever-expanding body of technical rules which result
from legislative and judicial action. Although legislative enactments are a
conspicuous feature of contemporary American law, judicial action continues
to be an essential source of rules because judicial pronouncements are the
means by which these enactments are operationalized and because such
345. See supra section I. This also explains why it was common for a reporter to issue a
volume that reported cases which had been described many years before, and as to which he
may or may not have had personal knowledge. See, e.g., J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 142-
43, 153-54, 165-96. Lord Coke, for example, "brought out the 1st volume" of his reports
"twenty years after the date when he ... began" preparing it. Id. at 166. And remember that
the American colonial lawyers were more interested in obtaining reprints of English cases than
in receiving reports of the cases that were being decided by their own courts. See supra section
I(C).
346. Indeed, there was a tendency to "re-report" cases that were held in high esteem and
that had already been reported by other reporters. See, e.g., J. WALLACE, supra note 47, at
229 ("The cases are merely selected from other books").
347. MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOYn AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 296-321. Weber
believed that the transition to a purely rational legal system had been accomplished in certain
of the civil law countries, but that the Anglo-American persistence in relying upon common
law and the force of "precedent" impeded the realization of this accomplishment in the English
and American legal systems. Id.; see also R. COTTERRELL, supra note 5, at 162-66.
348. R. COTTERRELL, supra note 5, at 166 (1984). Rules are accepted "because they are rules;
not for their moral worth or political idealism." Id. at 165.
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pronouncements are the only source of rules in areas that have not yet
become the objects of legislative attention.34 9
With the demise of an external referent, "the law" becomes whatever
judges say it is; their decisions no longer merely evidence "the law" but
have become "the law." It is therefore absolutely imperative that the par-
ticipants in the legal system have access to judicial pronouncements as
rendered; hence the importance of reporting and distributing judicial deci-
sions. The system no longer tolerates idiosyncratic case reporting. Because
judicial decisions are now the "text" of the law,350 the system insists that
they be reported accurately and consistently. Thus, reporters "publish"
decisions that have been drafted by the judges, after confirming the accuracy
of such reports with the issuing judicial officer.
Section I described certain consequences which this emphasis had for
American case reporting, including increases in the value and in the supply
of case reports.35 These increases resulted from an approach to case law
that is a profound departure from the approach that prevailed when the
legal system relied upon an external legitimating referent. This approach is
the "factual" approach to case law.352
As opposed to its predecessor,353 the factual approach treats cases as the
"facts" of the law; that is, judicial decisions are the "facts" which, in the
aggregate, come to constitute a "body" of law. Such an aggregate can
concern a particular category of law so that, for example, there emerges a
"body" of Ohio tort law consisting of the decisions that the Ohio courts
have rendered on issues concerning tort liability. 54 To practice tort law in
Ohio, one must have access to this "body" of law; to have access to this
"body" of law, one must have access to its constitutive elements, the
decisions on Ohio tort liability.355 Thus, in a rational-legal system, judicial
decisions come to be prized in and for themselves because they are the
constitutive fabric of "the law." Judicial opinions can and do change "the
349. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR AN AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
350. See Collier, supra note 317, at 771, 805-08. "In the classical tradition of the humanities,
authority derives principally from an original text .... Etymologically, the 'authority' is the
author (auctor), the originator of something." Id. at 805-06 (footnote omitted).
351. See supra section I(C)(3).
352. The description of this approach and its consequences for the practice of law and the
utilization of case reports therein is an attempt to articulate what Polyani describes as "the
structure of tacit knowing" in the context of the American legal profession. M. POLYANI,
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY x (1962).
353. See supra section I(B)(2).
354. This "body" of Ohio tort law is, of course, only one of the constitutive elements of a
larger "body" of American tort law; and this larger "body" of American tort law is only one
of the constitutive elements of a larger "body" of American civil law which, in turn, is only
one of the constitutive elements of a larger "body" of American law, and so on.
355. This discussion and the discussion that follows proceed on the basis of sociological
concepts that were discussed in section I(B)(1), supra. For a more detailed discussion of the
processes by which particular approaches to discrete realities emerge and maintain themselves,
see, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 104-16, 138-47.
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law," which means that access to them assumes critical importance.
This reverses an assumption that governs when a system relies upon an
external legitimating referent. Such a system prefers older cases, assuming
that they are more likely to be accurate because they have stood the test of
time or because they were issued at a time when the legitimating referent
was more accessible and/or both. When a system relies upon a "legal"
referent, the reverse is true. There is an exaggerated preference for "new"
cases on the assumption that, as the most "current" pronouncements on an
issue, they are also the most accurate pronouncements on that issue. As the
system increases its complexity and the pace with which it issues its prece-
dents, this preference becomes more exaggerated, so that practitioners de-
mand access to "newer" and "newer" case reports. 356
Consequently, this approach accounts for the fact that, unlike other
commodities, case reports increase in value as they increase in number. This
phenomenon occurs because reports are perceived as providing access to
information that produces certain advantages in the practice of law, partic-
ularly in adversarial encounters in the practice of law.357 Access takes on a
significance that transcends the precedential value of a particular decision,
because anyone who is familiar with the practice of law in modern American
society appreciates that it is an undertaking fraught with ambiguity and
uncertainty. When a system relies upon a "legal" referent for its legitimation,
the constitutive principles of legal authority are liberated from the constraints
of an external legitimating referent and left to evolve into esoteric and often
perplexing intricacies . 58 Because they are not anchored in an external ref-
erent, these intricacies are subject to the possibility of sudden, dramatic
change. This infects the practice of law with uncertainty. As opposed to the
practitioner in a traditional legal system, who knows what the law is and
will be because he knows what the law has been, the practitioner in a
356. See, e.g., 3 LEXIS Brief 4 (May 1989).
[Clommunications law is constantly changing. From FCC decisions to federal case
law, new parameters are constantly being defined. To stay abreast of the most
recent developments, the practitioner must regularly check a variety of legal re-
sources.... LEXIS ... puts these resources at your fingertips.
Id. See also BNA Online announcement: "Get news from Washington-while it's still new."
Furthermore, a WESTLAW advertisement included the following assurance:
WESTLAW gives you new decisions online days, even weeks earlier than any other
service....
Days ahead in reporting federal court decisions.
Weeks ahead in reporting state court decisions.
Nat'l L.J., June 19, 1989, at SIo-SI1; see also Nat'l L.J., June 26, 1989, at 64 (WESTLAW
advertisement for its Shepard's PreView service: "Now a list of the most recent decisions citing
your case can put your research a step ahead").
357. For example, LEXIS describes itself as providing "[the power to win." See, e.g., Nat'l
L.J., June 26, 1989, at 32-33.
358. Although systems which rely upon traditional or value rational referents may include
doctrines of profound complexity, these doctrines will not fluctuate dramatically because they
are grounded in an external legitimating referent which is not receptive to alteration.
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rationally-derived legal system has no assurance that because he knows what
the law was yesterday, he knows what the law is today. This insecurity
increases as the legal system continues to increase the specificity and com-
plexity of its rules. 5 9
The lawyer's insecurity is enhanced by the adversarial ethos of American
law. Adversarial encounters are consummated before a judicial officer who
is unlikely to have any particular tolerance for attorneys who are "unpre-
pared." The awareness that this officer expects a certain level of "prepar-
edness" and is capable of imposing a variety of official and unofficial
sanctions if that expectation is not satisfied imposes pressure upon the
advocates to "be prepared" when they appear before him. This pressure is
aggravated by the adversarial character of the appearance; each side's ad-
vocates will be aware that there is a very real possibility that their opponent(s)
will have done their homework in order to be "prepared" for their mutual
encounter before the judicial officer.
As such an encounter approaches, each side will be driven by the desire
to be "prepared" This desire emanates both from a desire to perform in a
professional manner and from a desire to avoid the embarrassment that is
associated with a "lack of preparation. 3 60 The desire to be prepared will
also reflect, either explicitly or implicitly, a determination to avoid the
situation in which the other side has discovered "a case" that is beneficial
to it and disadvantageous to the preparer. This determination also often
encompasses a determination to avoid the situation in which one discovers,
after the judicial encounter has concluded in a fashion that is adverse to
one's client, "a case" that was favorable to that client's position and that
"might have made a difference if we had known about it." Both situations
are, of course, to be avoided because of the embarrassment and consequent
diminution in professional confidence which they produce.
Obviously, the practice of law in such a system will emphasize access to
case reports, as they are the primary means for being "prepared" and
359. Moreover, this insecurity is the product of a system of legal education that is predicated
upon what one observer characterized as the "atomistic" approach to law:
American law became associated with precedents rather than principles and with
ad hoc rationalizations, as the judges moved from case to case. Instead of attempting
to discover 'the underlying theory of law,' the American lawyer looked 'for cases
"on all fours,"' cases whose facts duplicated as closely as possible the ones from
the case at hand.
R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 133
(1983).
The greater the number of decisions that had been rendered, the greater the
likelihood that one could be found precisely on point. The more needful it seemed
to find this closest possible parallel case, the greater was the demand for access to
the largest and most up-to-date collection of decisions.
A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAWS 374-75 (1921).
360. This desire has been enhanced by the recent increase in legal malpractice actions and
by the increasing activism of attorney disciplinary entities.
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thereby avoiding embarrassment and a consequent loss in professional con-
fidence. And this access to case reports becomes important for two reasons,
one of which is explicit and overt, and one of which is implicit and unex-
pressed. On an explicit, overt level, access to case reports will be prized
because it is the means by which one "prepares" for an adversarial encounter.
"Cases" are the constitutive elements of the law; one can only prepare by
gaining access to and scrutinizing as many pertinent cases as possible.
Because the level of one's preparation will be correlated to the extent to
which he or she has gained access to such cases, the system will emphasize
the generation of as many case reports as possible, along with making those
reports available to practitioners with all possible speed. Indeed, in such a
system, access to judicial decisions that have not been "published" may be
prized, so that certain law firms and governmental agencies will attempt to
accumulate their own stock of decisions that have been issued by courts
before which they often appear. These "unreported" decisions can be at-
tached to pleadings or otherwise made available to the presiding judicial
officer and can be used both in an attempt to gain a strictly "legal" advantage
as "precedent" and, in a more nefarious sense, in an attempt to "throw the
other side off balance" or to curry favor with a judge whose earlier,




In addition to their significance at this explicit, overt level, access to case
reports also has significance at an implicit, subtle level. The above discussion
explained that the ambiguity and uncertainty of much of contemporary law
produces certain pressures in those who practice that law, including the
pressure to be "prepared" when appearing at an adversarial encounter before
a judicial officer. In addition to exploiting access to case reports in order
to locate cases that can be cited as evidence of "preparation" at such an
encounter, those who practice law will also exploit their access to case reports
for another, perhaps even more important purpose.
This purpose is to assure themselves, again on an implicit, perhaps even
unconscious level, that they are "prepared" by providing them with some
tangible evidence that they have undertaken a search for "adverse precedent"
or even for cases that would prove helpful to their position, but have been
unsuccessful in locating any cases to either effect. The ability to undertake
such a search and arrive at some tangible result is a very significant symbolic
means for providing oneself with some assurance that one is "prepared" for
a particular adversarial encounter.3 62 Furthermore, the extent to which one
is able to have confidence that such searches are correct in their outcomes
361. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 230, at 940.
362. Indeed, the ability to undertake such a search may be the only empirical means by
which one can gain any assurance that he or she is "prepared" for a particular adversarial
encounter.
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is directly correlated to the confidence and assurance with which one is able
to approach a particular judicial proceeding.3 63
The net effect of the "factual" approach to case law is, therefore, to
enhance the value of access to reports of judicial decisions; here, "access"
encompasses both the fact of procuring such reports and the speed with
which this is achieved. A subsidiary effect is to increase the market for such
reports, so that there is an emphasis upon gathering and issuing more and
more reports of judicial decisions without regard to the metempirical signif-
icance of those decisions. This emphasis is generated by a practitioner concern
with locating cases that may be "on point" or "on all fours" with the
matter that one is currently handling. This concern derives from the as-
sumption that such cases exist "out there" if one can only gain access to
them. Such an assumption, in turn, derives from a generalized attitude that
is not confined to the legal profession although it is permeating that pro-
fession with increasing rapidity.
This generalized attitude is the modern conception of information. "In-
formation" denotes "some tangible or intangible entity that reduces uncer-
tainty about a state or event." 3M Case reports, therefore, are a specialized
subset of "information." In the last few decades, American society has
developed a particular concept of information as an essential commodity in
decisionmaking in a competitive environment.3 65 Because information is the
means by which one gains competitive advantage, access to information takes
on critical significance 66
In the legal system, the desire for access to information takes the form of
an ever-increasing demand for case reports.3 67 Because this demand is the
proximate result of thinking of information such as case reports3 6 as the
means by which one stays competitive, it does not reach satiation. Instead,
363. In this sense, of course, the ability to conduct such searches has a symbolic functions
that is analogous to the signs of "election" to which Weber assigned such an important role
in his study of the Protestant ethic. See M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT
OF CAPITALISM (1958).
364. H. LUCAS, JR., THE ANALYSIS, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
4 (1985).
365. Id. at 27-42.
366. The conceptualization of information as a commodity results in the drive to create
systems which improve our access to that commodity. These systems are referred to as "infor-
mation systems." An information system is "a set of organized procedures that, when executed,
provide information for decision making and/or control of an organization." Id. at 3-4.
Information systems are discussed in section Ill(B), infra. For a theoretical analysis of deci-
sionmaking and the role which access to information plays in that process, see I. JANIS & L.
MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT
(1977).
367. It also includes, of course, a demand for "information" in the form of statutes,
regulations and other "nonjudicial" materials. Since the discussion is concerned only with case
reports, it does not include reference to these materials.
368. See, e.g., BNA Online announcement ("fourteen leading BNA information services");
Nat'l L.J., June 19, 1989, at S9 ("WESTLAW is first in legal information in America").
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the demand continues to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively. Con-
sequently, the system experiences a tremendous expansion in the number of
case reports that are available. 69
B. The Future
The American legal system is experiencing such an expansion that it has
responded by attempting to limit case reports.170 This section argues that
limited publication is not a viable means for dealing with this phenomenon
and suggests an alternative; exploiting available technology in order to
develop new research methodologies. Such methodologies are foreshadowed
by techniques that are already in existence, and they will almost certainly
lead to the development of new conceptions of "precedent."
1. Overview
The consequences of a legal system's adopting a "factual" approach to
case law manifest themselves at an individual level and at an institutional
level. At an individual level, there is an increased demand for case reports
and a concomitant emphasis upon obtaining the newest possible case re-
ports.
3 71
At an institutional level, there is a reaction to what is perceived as an
undesirable proliferation of "law," followed by the implementation of meas-
ures to arrest this proliferation. Because "the law" has become "cases,"
these measures endeavor to limit the proliferation of "law" by rationing
"cases." Because "cases" are accessed by means of case "reports," they
attempt to limit case "reports." This limit is achieved by creating a distinction
between "published" cases, which are "law" or "precedent," and cases that
have not been "published," which are "not-law" or "not-precedent. 3 72 The
369. This expansion in case reports is, of course, also attributable to the sheer increase in
the number of cases that have been, and are being, brought in the courts of this country. This
is an empirical fact that is essentially outside the scope of the analysis that is being presented
in this Article; it is, however, factored into the discussion that is presented in section Ill(B),
infra.
370. See supra section I(C)(4).
371. See supra section III(A)(3).
372. This distinction arises because the obvious option, limiting the number of decisions that
actually appear, is unavailable because most appellate courts cannot refuse to decide cases that
have been filed with them. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 130-35. And although
some courts have issued decisions without opinions, such as "affirmed" or "reversed," these
have been criticized because they provide the parties to such cases with no information as to
the reasons for the court's decision. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167,
1173-76. And even this is no guarantee that the reasoning for a particular disposition will
remain unpublished:
In 1898, it was reported that the judges in New Jersey had omitted 667 decisions
by designating them as 'Conclusions,' but they were nonetheless published in the
first thirty-three volumes of the Atlantic Reporter. The Tax Court, much later,
attempted to designate some of its opinions as memorandum opinions that were
not to be published. However, they were published and are widely quoted in tax
literature.
Surrency, supra note 153, at 64 (citing 21 REP. A.B.A. 444 (1898)).
1990]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:461
implicit rationale of these rules is that "cases" cannot become "precedent"
without undergoing the intermediate step of "publication."
If this rationale is offered as a jurisprudential postulate, then it is unsound,
for as one judge said, "[e]ach ruling, published or unpublished, involves the
facts of a particular case and the application of law . . . to the case. Therefore
all rulings . . . are precedents, like it or not. 3 73 To paraphrase an earlier
observation, "there is no magic in publication. '374 If there were, then courts
would categorically refuse to accord precedential significance to the unpub-
lished decisions which are brought to their attention. Those who have
practiced law know, however, that this is not the case.375 Moreover, if there
were "magic in publication," then a decision that had been "published"
would be "precedent" regardless of the fact that its publication may have
resulted from circumstances other than the proper course of decisional
justice. 76
Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of limited publication pro-
visions is that they are not intended as jurisprudential postulates but are,
373. Statement of Chief Judge Holloway, joined in by Judges Barrett and Baldock, dissenting
from the promulgation of Rule 36.3 of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. Appendix
III (Nov. 18, 1986). Chief Judge Holloway dissented from that part of the revision of Rule
36.3 that prohibited the citation of unpublished opinions as precedent, noting that a court
"cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation" unless they have
been "published." Id.; see also Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091,
1094 (4th Cir. 1972) ("any decision is by definition a precedent"). Judge Posner reached a
similar conclusion: "Almost by definition, all opinions have some actual or potential precedential
value because if the appeal involved no element of novelty whatsoever it could be disposed of
in one line, or perhaps with a citation to a previous case or a statute." R. POSNER, supra note
160, at 123. Decisions can, therefore, be "good" precedents or "bad" precedents or "overruled"
precedents or even "redundant" precedents, but they cannot be no precedent. See, e.g., Robel,
supra note 230, at 940, 946-47.
374. Master v. Miller, 2 Rev. Rep. 399, 403 (1791) ("There is no magic in parchment or in
wax," quoted at text accompanying note 1, supra).
375. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 120-27; Robel, supra note 230, at 940, 946-
47.
376. See, e.g., Kilkenny Catt & Gallico Catt v. State, 285 Ark. 334, 691 S.W.2d 120 (1985),
also available on LEXIS (States library, Ak file) (May 20, 1989). Although both LEXIS and
the West reporter indicate that this opinion is available in the Arkansas reports, it does not
appear at the page cited, nor does it appear in WESTLAW. It seems that the opinion may
have been included in the West reporter, and reprinted therefrom by LEXIS, as the result of
a prank: the opinion recounts the travails of the Catt brothers after they are apprehended by
"Les Javert," an undercover police officer. 691 S.W.2d at 121. Aside from other circumstances,
the fact that the opinion is dated April 1, 1985 lends inferential credence to its status as what
might be denominated "suspect precedent." Assuming, arguendo, that the Catt case is the
result of a prank, and is not a decision that was entered as the result of legitimate litigation,
does the fact that it has appeared in print, in a West reporter, therefore render it "precedent?"
If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the American legal system has certainly
embarked upon a peculiar, Alice-in-Wonderlandish existence, in which legitimate cases are
denied precedential status because they have not appeared within the pages of a West reporter,
while prank cases are accorded such status because they have appeared within the pages of
such a volume.
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instead, expressions of simple pragmatism. That is, these provisions are
prudential constraints that have been developed to respond to what is
perceived as an empirical crisis-the proliferation of cases and case reports.3 77
If they are approached from this perspective, then these rules depend upon
the logic noted earlier, that it is inherently unfair to allow those who can
access "unpublished" decisions to use them to the disadvantage of those
who cannot do So. 3 78 Although this proposition is unimpeachable in its
concern for achieving equity among litigants, it has not achieved this result
79
and, indeed, has encouraged an opposite result.
For example, one consequence of limited publication provisions is to
enhance the perceived value of unpublished decisions. Other authors have
documented the practice among government agencies and affluent litigants
of accumulating files of "unpublished" decisions to be offered in support
of future arguments.3 s0 Even if a particular judge makes a valiant attempt
not to accord "precedential" status to such decisions, he will most certainly
be influenced by the desire to conform to such decisions in order to display
a rational consistency in his judging activities."' Furthermore, even if a
particular judge is not actually swayed by the logic of an "unpublished"
opinion, this is unlikely to be apparent to the litigants and to decrease their
perceptions of the "value" of such an opinion. In a system which is
377. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 160, at 120-27.
378. See supra section I(C)(4).
379. One reason why such provisions do not achieve the results which they seek is the fact
that many courts readily grant requests to publish otherwise "unpublished" opinions. Because
these requests are likely to come from litigants who are able to pursue a consistent course of
conduct, such as institutional litigants or litigants for wealthy clients, this injects a distinct
element of unfairness into the application of the limited publication provisions. See, e.g., R.
POSNER, supra note 160, at 120-27; Judge Posner refers to this as "bias in the creation of
precedents." Id. at 126.
380. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167, 1195-96 ("Compilations of
those opinions will still be made by institutional litigants . . . and by wealthy private litigants");
see also P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 38-40 (1976)
("bootleg, private publication of unpublished opinions"); Robel, supra note 230, at 940, 946-
47. At least one commentator notes that the availability of compilations of "unpublished"
opinions "frustrates the objective of the non-publication policy, namely, reducing the quantity
of printed material that lawyers must read and use." See P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 36. See also EEOC v. Watson Standard Co., 119 F.R.D. 632
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (denial of summary judgment properly based upon an unpublished decision
submitted by defense counsel).
381. The reference to the habits of "a judge" subsumes the effects upon a panel of judges,
as panels consist of individual judges who are susceptible to the influences noted above. See,
e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167, 1197-99. Reynolds and Richman note that
a far more insidious use can be made of such opinions, as when one litigant does not cite a
favorable albeit unpublished opinion but bases his arguments upon its logic. The opposing
parties and the judge are likely to be unaware that the latter is being importuned to conform
present practice to a prior decision. And, on another level, "[in a multi-panel appellate court,
[nonpublication] may leave the law in a state of disarray that is hard to cure because counsel
are prevented . . . from calling attention to contradictory or chaotic decisions." P. CARRINOTON,
D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 38-39.
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predicated upon ambiguity, tangible symbols assume a symbolic significance
that may or may not correspond to their empirical effects."a 2
This perception causes LEXIS and WESTLAW to seek out "unpublished"
decisions and include them in their respective data bases. The question then
becomes whether or not these decisions are properly characterized as "un-
published."
The author submits that they are not. Limited publication provisions were
introduced in the federal courts in the early 1970's. Neither LEXIS nor
WESTLAW nor any other system for the full text retrieval of judicial
opinions existed at that time. Consequently, these provisions were articulated
on the basis of two empirical categories that reflected the then-extant realities
of legal research: (1) accessible in full-text in a printed volume of case
reports; and (2) not accessible in full-text in a printed volume of case
reports.3"3 With the development of LEXIS and WESTLAW into their present
form, these categories are now incomplete. Consequently, the contemporary
realities of legal research require the addition of a third category: (1) acces-
sible in full-text in a printed volume of case reports; (2) accessible in full-
text from a computer data base such as LEXIS and/or WESTLAW; and
(3) not accessible in full-text. The next section considers whether there is
any reason to distinguish between the first category, "print publication,"
and the second category, "online publication," with regard to the preceden-
tial value that is accorded to a particular decision.
2. Online Publication
The status of online publication depends upon whether it is reasonable to
distinguish between the "publication" of an opinion and its appearance in
printed form in a volume of case reports. The answer to this question lies
in the function that is assigned to the "publication" of an opinion.
382. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 37-38
(continued reliance upon unpublished decisions as precedent even after the Fourth Circuit had
declared that they were "non-citable"). With the advent of online systems such as LEXIS and
WESTLAW, the possibility of access has been dramatically expanded. Consider, for example,
the plight of a single practitioner in a small Midwestern town, approximately one hundred
miles from any significant law library. If he develops a conventional office library, then he will
acquire the state's statutes and a subscription to the bound volumes of the appropriate regional
case reports, along with the index that is necessary for the utilization of these reports. But if
he elects to subscribe to one of the online systems, he will have access to the statutes of his
own and other states, plus the federal statutes and implementing regulations; he will also be
able to access federal cases plus cases issued by the courts of his own and every other state.
And in addition to being able to access more materials, the materials that he can access online
will be far more current than the materials that he can obtain through conventional means.
Imagine, therefore, the psychological and professional impact that his "going online" will have
upon his contemporaries in that small Midwestern town that is approximately one hundred
miles from any significant law library.
383. As recently as 1976, the Bluebook did not include a citation form for citing to cases
obtained from LEXIS or WESTLAW. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.7 (1976).
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Limited publication provisions are based upon the assumption that it is
inequitable to allow decisions to be utilized as precedent when they are not
equally available to all litigants.31 4 This assumption derives from the ancient
requirement that laws must be "promulgated" in order to be effective.3"5
"Promulgation" meant that the provisions of a law were made accessible
to those who might be affected by it, and this could be accomplished either
orally or in writing.116 The correlation of "precedent" with "publication"
is a logical extension of this requirement,38 7 but the correlation of "publi-
cation" with "printed in a volume of case reports" is not: "[plublication"
means "to put into general circulation, as distinguished from printing." '388
The requirement that judicial opinions must be "published," therefore,
means that they must be made generally available, not that they must have
been printed in a West or other "hard copy" reporter.3 9
Because "publication" is not synonymous with being printed in such a
reporter, the issue then becomes whether the inclusion of decisions in the
LEXIS or WESTLAW data base(s) is sufficient to constitute "publication."
Given that these databases are becoming ever-more ubiquitous features of
legal research in this country, and given that the cost of accessing them is
not prohibitive,319 there is no rational basis for distinguishing between "online
384. See supra section III(B)(1).
385. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 160, at 477; see also 6 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS
HOBBES 26-28 (W. Molesworth ed. 1966) (arguing there should be wide distribution of statutes
similar to wide distribution of the Bible); G. HEGEL, PmLosoPHY OF RIGHT 138 (T. Knox trans.
1942) (law must be "universally known" to have binding force).
386. "Promulgare" "[in Roman law" meant "[t]o make public; to make publicly known;
to promulgate. To publish or make known a law after its enactment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1380 (4th rev. ed. 1968). See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOOIAE 15-16 (Blackfriars ed. 1966);
Weaver, supra note 160, at 477. The emphasis is upon providing public access to the provisions
of such an enactment rather than upon the means by which such access is provided; as an
example, although the modern legal system emphasizes "promulgation" in writing, this is not
an effective means of promulgation to an illiterate audience.
387. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "promulgate" means "[t]o publish; to announce
officially; to make public as important or obligatory." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (4th
rev. ed. 1968).
388. Lynett v. Huester, 322 Pa. 524, 527, 185 A. 835, 837 (1936); accord United States v.
Williams, 3 F. 484, 486 (C.C. N.Y. 1880) (same); United States v. Baltimore Post Co., 2 F.2d
761, 764 (D. Md. 1924) (same); In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 619-20, 144 P. 505, 515 (1914)
(same); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396, 1397 (4th rev. ed. 1968). The verb "print"
means "to make an impression with inked type," and is not synonymous with "publish" which
means "to make public." See In re Publishing Docket in Local Newspaper, 266 Mo. 48, 50,
187 S.W.2d 1174, 1175 (1915); accord People ex rel. City of Chicago Heights v. Richton, 43
Ill. 2d 267, 271, 253 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1969) (same).
389. See, e.g., Baer v. R & F Coal Co., 782 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986) (unpublished decision
can be cited as precedent if counsel serves a copy on opposing parties and on the court); accord
Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270, 283 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (court relied on unpublished decision
because all parties had access to the opinion and opinion was well-reasoned).
390. See, e.g., Phelps & Moyer, Library Budgets for Start-Up Firms, Nat'l L.J., June 19,
1989, at 18-19 (costs of establishing a library consisting of bound volumes versus costs of
accessing WESTLAW and LEXIS).
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publication" and "print publication." Once decisions have been incorporated
into such a database, they have been "published" in the sense of being "put
into general circulation." 3 9' Consequently, no unfairness inheres in allowing
litigants to cite them for whatever precedential value they may have in a
particular context.3 92
3. Consequences of Online Publication
Supplying ... information on paper is . . .practically useless . . . when
the volume of information is large and computer search and retrieval
capabilities are essential to efficient use. 93
The acceptance of online publication will undoubtedly have dramatic
consequences. It may be the first event since Bracton that will have a
significance comparable to his use of cases from the plea rolls. This section
suggests what some of these consequences may be.
a. Restrictive publication
Will restrictive publication survive? If so, then the online services will
continue to function in much the same way as do the print reporters. If not,
391. This is precisely analogous to the practice by which the West Publishing Company seeks
out decisions that have not been "published" by a jurisdiction's "official" reporter and prints
these "unpublished" decisions in its own reports. See supra section I(C)(3). Such decisions are
accorded a precedential status that is in no wise inferior to decisions that have been "officially"
published. It also appears that courts may be beginning to treat decisions that are available
online as "reported" decisions. See, e.g., Doe v. Cutter Laboratories, 703 F. Supp. 573, 574
n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ("This case is reported on WESTLAW at 1987 WL 24717").
392. This requires developing standardized citation forms which (a) clearly denote that the
full text of a decision must be obtained online, and (b) provide the information that is needed
in order to do so expeditiously. The most reasonable course of action is to rely upon the
identifiers that LEXIS and WESTLAW attach to the "unpublished" decisions in their databases
and to require parallel citations (a) to both services if a particular decision is available from
both, and (b) to volumes of printed reports if a particular decision is also available through
that means. Such a citation form allows decisions to be located either online or in a volume
of printed reports if it appears in such a volume and if the firm and/or court relies upon such
volumes.
Although both the Bluebook and Maroon book include citation forms for LEXIS and
WESTLAW, neither is satisfactory; for one thing, both characterize these as forms for citing
"unreported" decisions. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, R. 10.8.1 (14th ed. 1986); THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MANUAL OF LEGAL CITATION, R. 4.2(b) (1989). Aside from being
factually incorrect, this errs by preferring "book cites" over "online cites." Both the preference
for book cites and the equation of "publication" with "printing" come perilously close to
exalting form over substance, i.e., to a ritualistic insistence that case reports must appear in
printed volumes because "this is the way that it has always been done." Unless the law divests
itself of this attitude, it will become a system in which certain practices persist despite the fact
that they have ceased to serve a necessary or even useful purpose.
393. OMB, Advance Notice of Further Policy Development on Dissemination of Information,
54 Fed. Reg. 214, 216 (1989).
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it will be possible to develop new methodologies and new conceptions of
"precedent."
Restrictive publication is based upon any of several rationales, none of
which militates against comprehensive online publication. 9 4 However, a
recent Supreme Court decision may pave the way for the demise of restrictive
publication. The issue in United States v. Tax Analysts was whether the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") was obliged to supply a private enterprise
with copies of federal tax decisions.195 Tax Analysts ("TA") electronically
distributes such decisions to its subscribers.196 Because of difficulties in
obtaining them from the courts, TA served a Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") request seeking copies of all decisions obtained by DOJ.197 DOJ
resisted, but the Court held that it must comply with the request. 9
This holding opens the way for essentially unlimited access to federal
judicial decisions. If the Department of Justice must comply with this request,
then other agencies must comply with similar requests. Reporting services
could, therefore, use FOIA requests to obtain at least the decisions issued
in cases in which the federal government was a party. Given the extent to
which the federal government is involved in the litigation of certain types of
394. These include the problems of storing and accessing bound volumes of case reports, the
destruction of a coherent mass of decisional law by an inundation of redundant precedent, and
the inefficiency that would result if judges knew that all of their opinions were available for
public scrutiny. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 227, at 1167. When cases are
available online, the problems posed by bound volumes of printed reports are no longer relevant;
and computerized research allows large masses of material to be searched in ways that were
not available when limited publication appeared. The availability of these new search technol-
ogies means that neither the volume of this material nor its anticipated redundancies threatens
the coherence of "the law." Finally, no correlation has been established between publication
rates and the expenditure of judicial resources and even if it had, this would go more to
deficiencies in judicial decisionmaking strategies than to the issue as to whether all decisions
should be available for public perusal. See, e.g., id. at 1167, 1191. The resolution of the latter
issue may require developing new strategies of decisionmaking: for example, if certain decisions
are not "published" because they present routine issues that are not considered to contribute
markedly to the state of the law, one solution would be to dispose of those cases with short,
relatively standardized opinions. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEAOOR & M. ROSENBERG,
supra note 230, at 38-40. It might be desirable to code them into a separate data base or so
that they were accessible by different means. See, e.g., id. at 40-41 (proposal to publish "less
important" decisions in "a separate set of books . . . in relatively impermanent form" and/or
to revive the old English practice of allowing "an Official Reporter of stature" to reissue such
decisions "in permanent form"). Such decisions could be included in a standard data base but
be accessible only as a bloc if the system were to develop a concept of precedent that considered
the extent to which a particular outcome had been consistently repeated.
395. 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989).
396. Id. at 2844. TA summarizes them in a printed publication and makes the full text
available on micro fiche and on a data base. Id.
397. Id. The case only involved decisions issued by the federal district courts, although TA's
request also sought copies of decisions from the courts of appeals and the Court of Claims.
Id. Since the DOJ represents the federal government in "nearly all civil tax cases," this allowed
Tax Analysts to obtain access to almost all of the decisions that issued in this area. Id.
398. Id. at 2853.
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issues, the cases subject to FOIA access would constitute a significant portion
of all the decisions issued by the federal courts, at all levels.
However, it is far more reasonable to require that the courts make decisions
readily available to services such as Tax Analysts. This would provide the
opportunity for the online publication of all decisions which, in turn, would
provide the opportunity for developing new research methodologies in ac-
cordance with the suggestions offered below. This approach would also
eliminate the burdens that the Tax Analysts outcome imposes upon federal
agencies.'"
Although the Supreme Court may neither have foreseen nor intended this
consequence, the Tax Analysts decision may herald the eventual demise of
restrictive publication. At the very least, it illustrates the operation of the
forces described in section III(A)(3). As long as restrictive publication exists,
similar tactics will almost certainly be used to obtain access to the "facts"
of American law-judicial decisions.
b. New research techniques
Suppose that all decisions are online. An attorney is preparing to oppose
the adoption of a judicially established rule of law which holds parents
absolutely liable for the intentional torts of their children under the age of
twenty-one. Such a rule has been in force in two other jurisdictions for
varying periods of time, and has been rejected on several occasions by a
third jurisdiction. Because all decisions are available online, the attorney
uses a computerized research system to assemble the entire body of law on
this issue. Assume that this universe of precedent consists of one hundred
decisions, sixty-five of which are from the two jurisdictions in which the
rule is in force and thirty-five of which are from the jurisdiction that has
rejected it. Having compiled this universe, the attorney can either craft her
argument upon traditional principles or nontraditional principles.
If she elects the former, the attorney will proceed according to the present
conception of precedent of judicial decisions as the "facts" of the law. The
attorney will begin by reviewing the universe of precedent, although she is
likely to concentrate most of her energies on the thirty-five decisions from
the jurisdiction that has rejected the rule. She is likely to'do so both because
399. Justice Blackmun dissented because he found it incredible that the majority would,
require the taxpayers to bear the cost of supplying copies of these decisions to an organization
that "is in business and in that sense is a commercial enterprise." Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). He noted that TA "sells summaries of these opinions and supplies full texts to
major electronic databases." Id.
400. The discussion that follows is based upon the assumption that "all judicial decisions"
refers to all judicial decisions having precedential effect. Because precedential effect is generally
accorded only to appellate decisions, the discussion assumes that all appellate decisions are
available online. See, e.g., J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, LEGAL RESEARCH ILLUSTRATED 12 (1987
ed.). Many of the observations are, however, equally applicable in a system in which the
decisions of all courts, trial and appellate, are available online.
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these decisions are intuitively more appealing, as this is the result that she
wants to achieve, and because this approach provides a useful ad hoc device
for carving the entire universe up into more manageable proportions. The
attorney will then select a subset of decisions and will extract propositions
from those which she perceives as being the most persuasive or favorable to
her position. 40' Thus, she will be limited to propositions that are explicitly
enunciated in the decisions.
The next step is to use these propositions, which represent a subset of the
reasoning that is contained in the total universe of opinions, to develop her
argument. Assume that the attorney has selected fifteen decisions upon which
to place primary reliance. Her argument will consist of a recitation of
propositions that she has extracted from this intuitively selected sample of
judicial decisions and followed by extrapolations from those propositions.
The latter will take two forms: (a) postulated identities and/or analogies
between facts at issue in the decided cases and in the instant case; and (b)
arguments of "policy." The operation of the former is evident.402 For the
latter, the attorney will extract empirical considerations from her subset of
preferred opinions and will assert both (i) that they are matters about which
her judicial audience should be concerned, and (ii) that a decision in her
favor would favorably impact upon the status of these considerations in
their jurisdiction.4°
If the attorney elects the latter, she can build her argument on a new
conception of precedent as a quantitative phenomenon. Here, she can
develop her argument not only from propositions that are included within
a subset of the universe of precedent, but also from the contours of all the
decisions in that universe. With regard to the latter, the attorney no longer
relies upon her own "instincts" as to what is and is not "important" but
proceeds in a more objective fashion.
401. In making this selection, she will be guided by certain assumptions. For example, she
may assume that a decision of the highest appellate court is superior in precedential value to
a decision of an intermediate appellate court, or that more recent decisions have more prece-
dential impact than older decisions, etc. These assumptions constitute the common-sense un-
derstandings that are an essential aspect of her "taken for granted" professional reality. See,
e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 138-47.
402. As an example, assume that the attorney represents the parents of a nineteen-year-old
boy who has a history of vandalism and assaults. In arguing that his parents should not be
held liable for his conduct, she will rely upon decisions in which the preferred jurisdiction
refused to hold parents liable in situations which she perceives as being factually analogous to
hers. Such cases are likely to involve, in descending order of preference, the transgressions of
a nineteen-year-old boy, then of a nineteen-year-old girl, then of a eighteen-year-old boy/girl,
and so on.
403. The attorney might argue, for example, that the implementation of such a rule would
discourage individuals under the age of 18 from assuming financial responsibility for their lives
and/or that it would encourage irresponsible and socially detrimental courses of conduct.
404. The discussion that follows is intended to be illustrative only, as it is particularly difficult
for one trained in "factual" precedent to foresee the directions that this concept is likely to
take with the implementation and maturation of computerized research technologies.
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This new approach might involve analyzing the facts that are involved in
the universe of precedents. Although present technologies commit this to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual researcher, computer methodologies will allow
for the rapid searching, indexing and processing of the factual elements of
judicial decisions. 405 This capability would permit the identification of pat-
terns among the entire universe of decisions. Although it is not possible,
here, to detail such an analysis, it could examine the ages of the individuals
for whose activities liability was imposed in the two disfavored jurisdictions
and compare that with the ages of those for whose activities liability was
denied in the favored jurisdiction. It might also examine the relationship
between the ages of these individuals and the activities that had generated
the litigation.
The analysis would produce an objective schematic of the factual profile
of the precedential universe with, perhaps, a projection as to postulated
relationships among certain demonstrated regularities and irregularities. This
schematic would provide the court with a consistent mapping of the factual
contours of the precedential landscape, so that the parties would be confined
to arguing about the legal significance or insignificance of these contours as
opposed to arguing about discrete facts from particular decisions. This
schematic would also provide an objective foundation for ascertaining whether
asserted "policy" considerations warranted a particular outcome.4
A quantitative approach might also focus upon the results of these deci-
sions. This aspect could consist of two parts. The first part would concentrate
upon the extent to which the two disfavored jurisdictions were actually
allowing recoveries for the activities of children of particular ages. A mapping
of the results of these decisions might show, for example, that although the
appellate courts were ostensibly applying such a rule, their decisionmaking
practices were effectively holding recoveries to a minimum, allowing recovery
only in the most egregious situations. The second part would concentrate
upon the favored jurisdiction, and might extend to an analysis of related
precedent. Such an analysis could show that recovery was being permitted
in this jurisdiction although under another, less "radical" guise. This analysis
could be used in making meaningful policy arguments, as opposed to the
often intuitive projections that presently characterize such endeavors.
These are two examples of the application of a quantitative conception of
precedent. Another application might concentrate upon the decisional pat-
terns of particular judges or courts; a radical departure from a prior,
405. See, e.g., J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 400, at 69.
406. Such a schematic might, for example, be used to argue that liability in the two disfavored
jurisdictions was being imposed almost exclusively upon the parents of offspring under the age
of eighteen. This might support the proposition that liability-generating activities are more likely
to be engaged in by children under eighteen, perhaps because of the maturity levels of such
individuals. Moreover, this could be used to argue that a "liability for conduct of children
aged 21 and under" rule would be over-inclusive, as the same result could be accomplished by
confining the operation of the rule to children aged 18 and under.
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consistent pattern could be used as the basis for asserting that this decision
was erroneous. Here, the quantitum of prior, consistent decisions is being
asserted as having "precedential" effect. After all, if stare decisis is consis-
tency, then perhaps empirical inconsistency is a factor that should be incor-
porated into precedential analysis.0 Yet another application could be the
"method of absence."4 ° Here, arguments would be supported by "negative
citations," for example, citations consisting of the parameters of specific
computer searches that have produced no decisions "on point."' '  At the
present time, attorneys can argue that no reported decisions appear on point.
It seems, however, that the ability to assert that no court has addressed a
particular issue should carry some heightened authoritative implications.
Also, arguments could be predicated upon the extent to which a particular
issue had spawned litigation, and the outcome of that litigation.4 1 1
This raises a related issue. With the appearance of a quantitative conception
of precedent, it may be that arguments will rely upon "bloc cites," that is,
citations to an entire body of decisional law. As opposed to the "string
cites" which are disfavored in current practice, "bloc cites" would be utilized
in order to invoke the authoritative significance of a volume of consistent
decisional law. The phenomenon of consistency among this body of deci-
sional law would itself have precedential import. If this were to become the
407. It is also possible that such an analysis could be used in an attempt to predict arguments
that might appeal to a particular judge and/or court: although present-day practitioners attempt
to achieve similar results by relying upon anecdotal information from their peers, a quantitative
analysis of the decisionmaking habits of particular jurists, based upon every decision that each
had issued, could take "judge watching" to new levels of precision and abstraction.
408. See, e.g., 2 R. ARON, supra note 87, at 268.
409. Citations to this effect are already appearing. See, e.g., In re Graven, 1989 WL 55600
(Bankr. W.D. Mo.) ("As per LEXIS and WESTLAW, there are no reported cases"); accord
Brooks v. Johnson and Johnson, 685 F. Supp. 107, 108 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (LEXIS search
revealed no reported cases on point); Sarratone v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1257,
1263 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (LEXIS search revealed that case had been cited but not for point at
issue); Carter v. Orr, 587 F. Supp. 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1984) (plaintiff filed suit in violation of
injunction against litigiousness; LEXIS search revealed 46 reported cases filed by plaintiff in
addition to 178 cases cited by defendant); Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp.
950, 951 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (characterization of church as litigious supported by LEXIS
search revealing 30 cases filed by the church); see also Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp.,
1986 WL 7065 (N.D. Ill.) (LEXIS search rejected as a device to ascertain whether a particular
class had been certified and, if so, the outcome of that certification as LEXIS only includes
reported decisions).
410. With the appearance of a quantitative concept of precedent, attorneys will be required
to provide citations indicating that a specific, defined search request was used to explore a data
base with a carefully described result. The court can then replicate the search that was undertaken
and either verify or disconfirm the extent to which the attorney's argument is supportable based
thereupon. Such citations would also have to indicate the date on which the search was
performed. And it may be that courts will have to establish rules defining the point at which
they will cease to search for relevant precedent. Perhaps these rules should put the onus on the
parties to the litigation to ensure that the court is apprised of any recent developments in the
area, or perhaps they should simply establish a categorical point beyond which precedent will
not be explored.
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case, courts might find it advisable to distinguish between the precedential
impact of particular decisions by issuing decisions as "first-order" precedents
or "second-order" precedents. Although this is an alien practice to those
who have been inculcated with the contemporary notion of precedent, it
addresses the "proliferating precedent" issue and is a perfectly reasonable
tactic in a system in which the quantitative empirical aspects of judicial
decisions are factored into their status as "precedent."
c. Consequences of a quantitative conception of precedent
The conception of precedent that is described immediately above will result
from a shift in the prevailing legal paradigm. "Precedent" is the means by
which the constructs of a particular legal paradigm are operationalized and
applied to empirical phenomena.
Section Ill(A) explained that traditional law, or "custom," is operation-
alized through an empirical conception of precedent, while an artifactual
conception is used to achieve the same end for value rational systems
grounded upon an external body of legitimating principles. It also explained
that value rationality is an intermediate stage in the transition to "legal"
rationality, in which law is predicated solely upon the authority of a body
of formally established rules. Section Ill(A) did not explain, however, that
according to the architect of this schema, American law never completed
this transition.
Weber contended that American law is incapable of reaching complete
"legal" rationality so long as it relies upon the erratic progress of "prece-
dent" instead of upon a formally enacted legal code. 41 1 Such a code is
essential because it provides the foundation of "pure" rationality from which
systematic rules can be derived. A system of precedent lacks this central core
of rationality and cannot, therefore, achieve the final transition to a purely
"legal" referent. 412
Weber's comments were no doubt correct at the time they were made, but
they were made in ignorance of the effects which technology can have upon
the articulation of a "legal" referent. In order to understand these effects,
it is necessary to consider the structures which conceptual systems, including
legal systems, can assume.
Conceptual systems are structured by the thought processes through which
they are articulated. There are three available categories of thought processes:
"empirical, rational or abstractive. 41 3 Empirical thought processes are con-
cerned with observable phenomena and permit the articulation of empirically-
grounded conceptual systems, such as magic or customary law.41 4 Rational
thought processes, which are concerned with concepts and their connection
411. See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN EcONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 315-17.
412. Id.
413. J. WILLER, supra note 138, at 19.
414. Id. at 25-28. Magic, for example, assumes the existence of routine, causal connections
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to each other, 4 5 permit the articulation of conceptual systems which, al-
though they may affect empirical reality, elicit their raison d'etre from
nonempirical concepts. Such systems include religious systems and legal
systems that are grounded in external "principles" such as the principles of
"natural law. ' 416 Abstractive thought processes unite empirical and rational
thought processes into a new phenomenon which permits the development
of conceptual systems that measure rationally-derived concepts according to
their utility in predicting or controlling empirical reality. 47 Abstractive thought
processes are the basis of scientific systems. 4
1
1
Weber, of course, blamed the American legal system's reliance upon
precedent for its failure to complete the transition to a purely "legal"
referent. He believed that "precedent" inflicts an unavoidable irrationality
upon a legal system because it consigns the corpus of the law to the
idiosyncratic predilections of particular decisionmakers. Moreover, Weber
argued that "legal" referents appear only after a cadre of disinterested
experts have developed and implemented "rigorously formal legal con-
cepts. ' 41 9 Because such concepts cannot appear in a system of precedential
law, Weber concluded that American law cannot complete the transition to
a "legal" referent.
In this Weber erred: the implementation of computerized research tech-
niques based upon the implemention of comprehensive online publication
will permit the articulation of a quantitative conception of precedent. This
conception of precedent will permit the American legal system to move away
from a system which relies upon intuitive, essentially ad hoc "rational"
constructs and into a system which implements abstractive thought processes
to develop a conceptual scheme which is "scientific" in its concern for both
logical and empirical integrity.
between empirical phenomenon, whereas expertise consists of knowing that certain connections
exist, with no concern as to the reasons why they may exist. In such a system, therefore, an
artisan of magic would be expected to know that the burning of a red feather will cause rain,
but would not be expected to be able to explain why this should be so. See id. at 22-28.
415. Id. at 22-23. "[T]he primary meaning of concepts is in their connection to one another."
Id. at 23.
416. Id. at 23, 28-30. Religious systems consist of an internally consistent network of rational
constructs. "Rational" refers to the fact that these constructs are created by the individuals
who develop the system and "are purposefully empty of intrinsic meaning," i.e., their signif-
icance comes from their relationship to each other. Id. at 24. In a magical system, the emphasis
is upon the empirical consequence of empirical acts, i.e., burning a red feather. See supra note
414. In a religious system, the emphasis is upon the metempirical consequence of empirical acts
so that, for example, burning a red feather might be a symbolic act of penance in a religious
system. Although the manifestation of this behavior is an empirical phenomenon, its meaning
derives from a system of purely rational constructs, i.e., the concept of "penance" and the
associated concepts which give it meaning. J. WILLER, supra note 138, at 29-30.
417. Id. at 24.
418. Id. at 30-34.
419. See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECoNOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 80, at 351.
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Weber believed that the achievement of such a system was possible only
by creating a rigorous, formalistic conceptual system and then conforming
empirical practice to the tenets of this system. Indeed, Weber's concept of
legal systems may have been inevitable given the constraints that were
imposed by the technology of his time or, for that reason, of ten or fifteen
years ago. The American legal system is, however, approaching technological
innovations that can allow it to move beyond these constraints and into a
system of surpassing rationality, efficiency and justice. But unless the Amer-
ican legal system understands this and embraces the opportunities that this
technology offers, it risks an unreasoned adherence to outmoded constructs
and practices that could evolve into the "customary" law of the twenty-first
century.
IV. CONCLUSION
A system of law is . . . largely influenced by the technical methods used
by the lawyers in going about their daily business .... The method which
they pursue, the character of the books and sources which they use, and
the attitude of mind with which they approach them, all have their influence
upon the shaping of the law, and upon their conception of law itself.42
Case reporting is a unique phenomenon in Anglo-American law, for it is
the point at which pragmatism and principle intersect to create the essential
characteristics of the "common law." Historically, case reporting has evolved
from an idiosyncratic exercise to one that is predicated upon great technical
rigor. This Article has traced that evolution for three purposes.
First, the Article illustrates that present reporting techniques are but the
lineal descendants of older, less sophisticated techniques. Second, the Article
establishes the proposition that the application of computer research tech-
nologies can only enhance the accuracy and sophistication of American case
reporting and of the legal profession's utilization of such reports. Third, the
Article offers a cautionary tale: if American law rejects the realities of
modern computer technology and continues to insist that there is some
"magic" in case reports which are printed and appear in bound volumes, it
will be engaging in an ultimately futile attempt to re-establish "custom" in
an era when "custom" controls no other aspect of social life.
420. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 13, at 253.
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